Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
6-13-2016 12:00 AM

Social Barriers to Entry: Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals in
the US from 2000 to 2013
Chethan D. Srikant, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: Prof. Jean-Philippe Vergne, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Business
© Chethan D. Srikant 2016

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business and Corporate
Communications Commons, Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, and the Strategic
Management Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Srikant, Chethan D., "Social Barriers to Entry: Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals in the US from 2000
to 2013" (2016). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 3793.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3793

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
Management scholars recognize the uncertainties and challenges during the market entry
process that can impede operational startup. However, very little empirical research exists
to fully understand these challenges and explain firm responses. Even less attention has
been paid to the threats from non-market actors and the countering strategies employed
by firms. Hence, this thesis explores firm reactions to community contestation, as a form
of social barrier to entry that can prevent the firm from exploiting market opportunities.
Specifically, I consider the strategic implications of firms’ rhetorical responses to
community contestation during the market entry process.
For this thesis, U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry (2000–2013) is an appropriate
context because only 26 out of the 59 proposed LNG import terminals could even get to
the regulatory approval stage. Regulatory success, defined as the gain of regulatory
approval in a relatively short amount of time compared to other competing proposals, was
a necessary precursor for achieving operational startup and implementing the market
entry strategy. The regulatory success of many proposals was threatened by extensive
negative media attention due to sustained community contestation, forcing the Federal
regulatory agencies to carry out an extensive and time-consuming evaluation in order to
project an image of fairness. Firms had to employ rhetorical strategies to publicly counter
the community contestation but were not equally successful.
Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), I identify four rhetorical
strategies associated with the regulatory success. I find that a demonstrable community
need enables an avoidance rhetorical strategy whereby firms try to sail through the
regulatory process without catching public attention, especially when the design
disadvantages of their proposals risk being exposed. When community need is not
demonstrable but contestation levels are high, firms implement counterattack rhetorical
strategies to undermine any community contestation, at times directly targeting the firm’s
detractors, and not just the issues they raised. By conceiving of community contestation
i

as a social barrier to entry and showing how it can be mitigated using rhetorical
strategies, my study contributes to the literatures on rhetoric, firm entry, and non-market
strategies at the community level.

Keywords
Community Contestation; Rhetoric; Non-Market Strategies; Firm Entry; Regulatory
Success; fsQCA; Social Barriers to Entry; Liquefied Natural Gas
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1

Introduction

Before 2000, there was just one operational liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal
in the United States mainland. Renewed interests in early 2000s led to the emergence of
proposals for new terminals. By the end of 2013, there were 59 different proposals but
only 26 (less than half) of these proposed terminals could even get regulatory approval
for start of construction. Many of these terminals faced sustained community opposition
that created impediments for the firms during the regulatory approval process and thus
became a form of social barrier to entry. Community contestation, as a form of social
barrier to entry, highlights the difficulties firms face between market entry decisions and
operational startup (Sine, R. J. David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007). However, much of the
strategy literature has focused on entry decisions in terms of timing and mode, and
empirical research has largely ignored the market entry process (Zachary, Gianiodis,
Payne, & Markman, 2015).
Communities become relevant in the market entry process because oftentimes firms enter
a market by establishing a foothold (Upson, Ketchen, Connelly, & Ranft, 2012) that is
often geographically determined (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005). A great deal of due
diligence is undertaken in order to ascertain the economic viability of the particular
location, especially when it is an energy facility such as an LNG terminal. However, as
Oliver (1997: 697) notes, “a firm’s sustainable advantage depends on its ability to
manage the institutional context of its resource decisions,”. When the resource decision is
the selection of a location the surrounding community becomes an important proximal
institutional context. Such communities become even more salient when community
members publicly oppose a proposed facility in their community (Yue, Rao, & Ingram,
2013). The success of a market strategy then becomes contingent on non-market tactics
(Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014), which are intended to influence social actors beyond
economic exchanges (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012).
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Extant literature on community opposition toward a firm’s entry has focused on the
community and its ability to organize opposition in the form of collective action
(McAdam & Boudet, 2012; Wright & Boudet, 2012) or in the form of a new venture
emerging from within the community (Greve, Pozner, & Rao, 2006; Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007). Very little is known about what the firm can do except exit at the first
sign of trouble (Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010). On the other hand, substantial evidence from
research on social contestation in more macro settings, such as industry, national, and
transnational contexts, indicates the potential utility of a firm’s rhetorical strategy (Desai,
2011; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015; McDonnell & King,
2013; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). Social contestation involves
“multiple social actors competing for influence over the rules, institutions, norms, and
policies that structure markets and economic relations” (Levy & Egan, 2003: 824), and so
a firm’s effective use of rhetoric becomes necessary to further its own agenda and limit
the negative influence of others.
Moral, ethical, and environmental issues, and societal appropriateness often shape
contestation in such macro-level social settings (Galvin, Ventresca, & Hudson, 2004;
Hoffman, 1999). Apart from these macro issues, opposition at a local community level is
typically rooted in daily existential issues, often described as NIMBY (not-in-mybackyard) issues (Schively, 2007). At the community level, firms have an opportunity to
promote the visible and tangible benefits of entry, such as job creation and economic
development. By addressing the economic interests of the community, the firm might
even succeed in avoiding a polarizing debate that is framed as the firm’s economic
interests versus the community’s environmental interests (Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999).
The implication is that firms can potentially implement rhetorical strategies to address
community contestation (social contestation at a community level). However, the kind of
impact these rhetorical strategies have on entry outcomes or the very presence of a direct
impact is not clearly established in extant literature. Hence, this dissertation seeks to
primarily answer the research question: How do firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to
community-level market entry conditions, and how do these strategies affect entry
outcomes?

2

Building on extant literature, I examine the types of rhetoric available to firms facing
social contestation. Firms can use either a persuasive rhetoric to focus attention toward
the positive attributes of the firm (McDonnell & King, 2013) or a dissuasive rhetoric that
directly addresses the source of the contestation by providing counterarguments to the
issues (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Countering issues is a necessity to dissuade the social
contestation from coalescing but need not be the only form of dissuasion. Often, those
deemed as having “a voice in determining institutional norms” (emphasis added) become
the sole participants in the evaluation process (Hoffman, 1999: 364). Further, schisms
between the proponents and opponents of a particular issue may be so large that they
might start “talking past each other” (Hoffman, 2011: 9) and “demonizing” each other
(page 3). This opens up the possibility for a second type of dissuasive rhetoric, largely
undertheorized in prior research, which, instead of countering the issue, targets the
detractors who are raising their voices. For instance, Uber founder and CEO, Travis
Kalanick, claimed that the California Public Utilities Commission “doesn’t like
technology, environmental progress, or anything that might make California a better
place to live”1. Even though Uber was seeking market entry into California, it still
questioned whether the CPUC was a “legitimate judge” in the evaluation process
(Lamont 2012: 205)
These three types of rhetoric comprise a repertoire of responses. Firms can also combine
responses from the repertoire to design a rhetorical strategy in response to social
contestation at the community level (community contestation), with the hope that it will
favorably affect their entry outcomes. In order to investigate the combination of
rhetorical types in a firm’s rhetorical strategy, I rely on the analytical capabilities of
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This method has been recently
introduced to the field of management to enable the exploration of complex relationships
wherein variables do not produce their effects in isolation, but in combination with other

1

http://www.pcworld.com/article/2682972/california-regulators-say-uber-lyft-and-sidecars-carpoolservices-are-illegal.html
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variables (Fiss, 2011; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Ragin, 2008a). Unlike traditional
econometric methods that can at best produce a three-way interaction while trying to
control for other factors, fsQCA allows the researcher to identify configurations of
multiple variables that jointly produce particular outcomes. In this thesis, fsQCA enables
me to combine the ensemble of rhetorical types that firms choose as their rhetorical
strategies and the contextual factors related to the sponsoring firms, the project and the
community.
I look at the impact of these rhetorical strategies on one crucial entry outcome, namely,
the regulatory success of firms’ proposals, defined as the gain of regulatory approval in a
relatively shorter duration as compared to competing proposals. The findings of this
study, obtained from both qualitative and quantitative data of all LNG proposals that
applied for U.S. regulatory approval between 2000 and 2013, show that distinct
community, project, and firm characteristics are associated with different rhetorical
strategies. I identify four main rhetorical strategies, two of which rely on combinations of
dissuasive rhetorical tactics targeting the issue or the detractor. By contrast, persuasive
rhetoric emphasizing positive attributes has very little utility in gaining regulatory
success. Taken together, these results provide an integrative framework that explains
which rhetorical strategies help firms deal with the social barrier to entry represented by
community contestation as firms seek to establish a foothold in a new market. This
integrative orientation of the thesis is reflected in my treatment of the research context,
literature streams, methods, and findings.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the LNG import terminal context that
includes the physical attributes of the material (LNG), industry trends, regulatory aspects,
and community contestation dynamics. Chapter 3, Literature Review, lays out the
multiple research streams that form the basis of my integrative theorizing, including
market entry (Markman & Waldron, 2014; Zachary et al., 2015); non-market strategies
aimed at regulators during market entry (Henisz & Zelner, 2012; Hiatt & Park, 2012);
social contestation (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Hoffman, 1999); community contestation
(Wright & Boudet, 2012; Yue et al., 2013); and firms’ rhetorical responses to
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contestation (Desai, 2011; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). Chapter 4 highlights the essence of
fsQCA as a methodological orientation geared toward theoretical integration.
The Findings (Chapter 5) demonstrate the utility of this integrative orientation in the
treatment of context, theory, and methods. While scholars are increasingly trying to
establish the link between rhetoric and reality (Zbaracki, 1998) by considering specific
tangible consequences of rhetoric (for example, Durand & Vergne, 2015), I am unaware
of any other study that focuses on the utility of a firm’s rhetorical strategy in gaining
regulatory success during a market entry process. Further, I situate these rhetorical
strategies within an intersection of contextual conditions that integrate the firm’s
market/non-market abilities, technical aspects of the project, and the community’s
perspective. My findings raise questions regarding the utility of persuasive rhetoric,
which ironically is pervasive in extant literature as well as within the LNG import
terminal context. I also provide theoretical foundations and extensive empirical evidence
regarding the role of dissuasive rhetoric targeting a firm’s detractor—a tactic that
research has, thus far, only alluded to (see Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 1998; James &
Wooten, 2006).
In Chapter 7, I extend this integrative research orientation by situating rhetoric within a
broader typology of firm responses. This helps me extend my primary research question
of this thesis (how firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to community-level market entry
conditions, and how do these strategies affect entry outcomes?) to a more general
research question that I consider as a guide post for my future work – how do firms try to
overcome community contestation in their efforts to succeed in their market entry
process?. I conclude this thesis in Chapter 8 with an assessment of the insights I have
gained so far and with excitement for the sights I will behold in the future.

5

Chapter 2 - U.S. LNG Import Terminals, 2000–2013

2

U.S. LNG Import Terminals, 2000–2013

The context for this study is the set of 59 LNG import terminals proposals that emerged
between 2000 and 2013 in the U.S. After the hesitant initial interest in LNG import
terminals in the 1970s (when fewer than 10 terminals were proposed), not a single
terminal was built nor was any new terminal proposed in the U.S. mainland after 1978.
Of the four terminals built in the 1970s, three were mothballed by 1983, and the only
remaining terminal received the occasional shipment once every year or two (Foss,
2007). Multiple factors contributed to the sudden decline of the industry but the most
crucial factor was the 1978 passing of the Natural Gas Policy Act that lifted controls on
all natural gas discovered in the U.S. after 1977. This policy decision, as well as pricing
disagreements with Algeria—the sole supplier at that time—led to the sudden dearth of
interest (Pelletreau, 1987). By early 2000, the situation had dramatically changed in the
global LNG markets and in the U.S. (Jensen, 2003). LNG began to emerge as a solution
to multiple problems that the U.S. energy sector was facing.

2.1 Liquefied Natural Gas
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a supercooled state (–260°F, or –162.2°C) of natural gas,
which mainly contains methane along with small proportions of ethane, propane, and
other heavier gases. It is a colorless, odorless, and non-toxic but flammable liquid. LNG’s
history can be traced back to Michael Faraday’s attempts to liquefy various gases, and the
first LNG plant dates back to 1912 at West Virginia.
LNG became important in the world energy stage because it occupies just 1/600th the
volume of natural gas and hence is the preferred state for storage and container
transportation of natural gas. A typical LNG value chain involves multiple stages: the
extraction of natural gas from sources below earth’s surface; the movement of this gas
through pipeline to a liquefaction facility; the liquefaction of natural gas to LNG; the
loading of LNG onto specialized shipping vessels at export terminals (normally built
alongside the liquefaction facility); the shipping of LNG to the destination port; the
6

unloading of LNG at the destination import terminal; the regasification of LNG back to
its natural state (the regasification facility is normally built as a part of the import
terminal); and finally, the movement of the natural gas through the pipeline network at
the destination (Foss, 2007).

Figure 1: LNG Import Terminal
Source: U.S Department of Transportation, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/LNG.htm
After natural gas enters the destination pipeline network, LNG can still be used in a
peakshaving facility.2 The flammable aspect of LNG became apparent in 1944 at a
peakshaving facility in Cleveland, Ohio. Substandard construction quality, because of the
redirection of stainless steel alloys toward war efforts, was attributed as the primary cause
that led to the death of 128 people, including nearby residents. Since then, the technology
to store and process LNG has continually improved, leading to a surge of interest in its
use across the globe.

2

Peakshaving is a process where natural gas is stored in LNG form or in naturally occurring underground
salt caverns. The reason for such a storage is to effectively meet local demands during peak demand
periods.
7

2.2 Global Trends in the LNG Industry
One of the first successful LNG shipments occurred in 1959, when a converted World
War II freighter, aptly called The Methane Pioneer, transported LNG from Lake Charles,
Louisiana, USA, to Canvey Island, UK. Based on this success, the British Gas Council
had planned to import LNG from Venezuela but changed its plans before the contracts
were finalized because of natural gas discoveries in Libya and Algeria. An LNG
shipment from Algeria to UK in 1964 was the first global commercial trade in LNG.
After 1969, when Japan first began importing LNG, Asia began to dominate LNG
imports. In 1990, Japan accounted for nearly 66% of the world imports (Energy
Information Administration, 2003; Foss, 2007).
Because of the need to liquefy the natural gas, LNG trade is dependent on the economics
of liquefaction projects and specialized transportation vessels (LNG tankers). Hence,
LNG trade “shows very little family resemblance” to world oil markets or onshore
natural gas markets (the exchange of natural gas over pipeline networks) (Jensen, 2004:
1). Countries that did not have significant domestic natural gas reserves typically
imported from nearby producer countries. The supply contracts were long term because
they provided the future cash-flow basis for financing the highly capital-intensive
liquefaction projects, with very little use of derivatives for financing. Even the LNG
tankers were built and operated with long-term contracts, or the exporters (and sometimes
importers) directly owned the vessels. This need for long-term contracting or direct
ownership of LNG vessels is driven mainly by the shipping costs that can be nearly 30%
of the total operating costs as compared to 10% for oil (Energy Information
Administration [EIA], 2003).
By early 2000, global LNG markets had undergone dramatic changes (Jensen,
2003). New liquefaction projects were underway across the globe, including in the
Pacific Rim and Atlantic Rim countries, to make use of cheaper and more efficient
technologies (EIA, 2003). LNG trade was becoming much more fluid with fewer longterm contracts with locked-up supply and pricing clauses (Jensen, 2004). New LNG
tankers were being commissioned and were available through third parties not linked to
the liquefying companies (Mazighi, 2003; World Gas Intelligence, 2006), which meant
8

that the global LNG market was heading toward greater liquidity and was no longer
tightly linked to the Asian markets. It also meant that LNG terminals were no longer just
an upstream integration. Many new players entered the field just to set up terminals with
the hopes of using them as a sort of tolling gate (charging a fixed percentage fee for the
regasification, converting the liquid to gas in order to send the gas through the pipeline
network). Even traditional players with downstream gas reserves entered the market not
knowing whether their liquefaction projects would be online in time. New ways of
financing regasification projects (turning LNG back to natural gas in import terminals)
were being implemented, allowing private investors and entrepreneurs to enter into the
game (International Energy Agency, 2004). Multiple technological advancements were
made for the safe transport, storage, and regasification of LNG (Greaker & Lund Sagen,
2008).

2.3 Re-emergence of LNG in the U.S.
LNG was meant to solve multiple problems that were starting to assume crisis mode in
the United States during the early part of the 2000s. Following the Kyoto Protocol, even
the non-signatory countries, such as the United States, were pressured to reduce their
greenhouse-gas emissions (EIA, 1998), prompting power companies to move from coal
to natural gas. However, the natural gas supply and pricing were very unstable, and the
unreliable supply was seen as a major factor leading to the multiple blackouts in the
California area (Gopal et al., 2003). In the Northeastern United States, harsh winters were
increasing commercial and household heating needs and thereby driving up the price for
natural gas (Pirog, 2004). While many industries relied on natural gas as a source of
power, U.S. domestic production of natural gas was dwindling, and restrictions restrained
the exploitation of new sources of natural gas, such as the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
(Humphries, 2005).
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Figure 2: Natural Gas Prices in the United States, 1999–2005 (in U.S. dollars per
thousand cubic feet)
Source: US Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas Prices,” accessed April 19,
2014, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_a_epg0_pg1_dmcf_m.htm.
This assessment is reflected in the very first paragraph of the testimony of Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
U.S. House of Representatives (June 10, 2003)3:
In recent months, in response to very tight supplies, prices of natural
gas have increased sharply. Working gas in storage is currently at very
low levels relative to its seasonal norm because of a colder than
average winter and a seeming inability of increased gas well drilling to
significantly augment net marketed production. Canada, our major
source of imported natural gas, has had little room to expand shipments
to the United States, and our limited capacity to import liquefied
natural gas (LNG) effectively restricts our access to the world's
abundant supplies of gas.

3

http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/testimony/2003/20030610/
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He goes on to conclude:
Creating a price-pressure safety valve through larger import capacity of
LNG need not unduly expose us to potentially unstable sources of
imports. There are still numerous unexploited sources of gas production
in the United States. We have been struggling to reach an agreeable
tradeoff between environmental and energy concerns for decades. I do
not doubt we will continue to fine-tune our areas of consensus. But it is
essential that our policies be consistent. For example, we cannot, on the
one hand, encourage the use of environmentally desirable natural gas in
this country while being conflicted on larger imports of LNG. Such
contradictions are resolved only by debilitating spikes in price.
In this concluding remark, he hints at the increasing social contestation that LNG
enterprises were facing. The re-emergence of the LNG industry faced multiple obstacles.
In spite of the initial surge of interest in LNG imports in the 1970s, no new import
terminals were proposed or built after 1978 for more than two decades, and only one
terminal was operational after 1983, receiving the occasional shipment. In early 2000,
new firms were entering an industry that had to discover how to align with vastly
different global LNG market dynamics; how to regulate the industry; the social and
environmental impacts of LNG terminals, especially in the light of the 9/11 events; and
the economic impacts following sharply rising demands in the northeast and the
California energy crisis. The industry faced not only uncertainties related to the factor
markets (the supply side), the product markets (the demand side), and regulatory and
policy arenas but also social and environmental uncertainties because of the social
contestation.

2.4 Regulatory Process
Between the 1970s and 2000s, changes had occurred on the regulatory front as well. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had replaced the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) in 1978. The FERC differed from the FPC in its structure and
mandate, with the FERC having the mandate to deregulate the natural gas market, leading
to such innovations as the energy bank. So much had changed from a regulatory
perspective since the 1970s that when the first new terminal was approved in 2003, it
became a citation in itself, being referred to as the “Hackberry decision” in subsequent
FERC decisions, various government publications, trade journals, and in legal
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documents. The following are some excerpts from the FERC press release accompanying
the Hackberry decision:
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission today signaled it will set a
different policy in regulating new liquified natural gas (LNG) projects
where markets are competitive and other criteria are met. The approach
is expected to remove economic and regulatory barriers to the
development of onshore LNG import terminals.…
The Commission agreed to a fresh approach for new LNG terminal
services proposed by Hackberry, which requested authority to construct
and operate its project under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. Viewing
the proposed plant as similar to a production facility, the Commission
noted that sales of the natural gas from the LNG plant would be made
in competition with other sales of natural gas in the Gulf Coast region
in a deregulated competitive commodity market.
“The public interest is served through encouraging gas-on-gas
competition by introducing new imported supplies of natural gas which
will be accessible to all willing purchasers,” the Commission noted in
its order.
This press release clearly sets out the FERC’s agenda to remove barriers and increase
completion in the deregulated natural gas markets. While the Federal Energy Regulatory
Authority (FERC) assumed charge of the LNG import terminal proposals, the de facto
assumption of jurisdiction began to be challenged. The deepwater LNG terminals came
under the purview of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) based on the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002. The Maritime approval process allowed the
Governor of the proximate state to have veto powers over the process. Further, multiple
states (including California and the New England states), and the federal senators and
representatives from those states, challenged the de facto jurisdiction of the FERC. In the
instance of the Sound Energy Solutions (SES) LNG terminal project in Long Beach,
California, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) wanted to gain
jurisdiction over the project. The FERC fought the legal battle with the CPUC but also
clarified this issue and asserted its jurisdiction through a press release that said: “We
acknowledge the legitimate concerns of the CPUC regarding matters of safety and
security and give our assurance that the evaluation of the proposed project will include
thorough and rigorous review of these issues.”
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It became apparent that the FERC and the MARAD (the two federal regulators) had to
ensure that the evaluation process was perceived by the communities as rigorous and fair
to prevent any further threats to their jurisdiction. The following figure illustrates the
complexities involved in this process. It was necessary for the federal agencies to be
continually perceived as being fair to all stakeholders throughout the process so that their
own legitimacy would not be threatened. For instance, when the FERC made a site visit
for the proposed Quoddy Bay LNG terminal, Linda Godfrey, a community activist,
commented: “My impression is that FERC is primarily interested in representing the
developers and the industry, and the role that citizens have in this process is
unconscionable in a democracy. There needs to be a group of people at the highest level
at FERC that from ‘day one’ is asking what [these projects] mean to local people. We
need a consumer advocate at the federal level. It is just not a level playing field.”
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Figure 3: Regulatory Process
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, www.ferc.gov
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2.5 Contesting Communities
Anticipating the issues that would be raised was not easy. Many communities in the
northeastern part of the U.S. opposed the terminals on the basis of mortal fear—that LNG
terminals could become terrorist targets, following the events of 9/11. However, in the
Gulf of Mexico, the primary concern was the impact on the fishery industry because of
the seawater intake by the LNG terminals. Gumbo Alliance in the Gulf of Mexico started
by responding to a report by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) on the potential impact on fish eggs and larvae as a result of open-rack
technology (the use of seawater to heat LNG). Gumbo Alliance soon became a powerful
multi-organization coalition, including recreational and commercial fisheries, charter boat
associations, and powerful nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Sierra
Club and Mobile Baykeeper. For terminals proposed at an upstream location in a river,
other issues took on prominence because of LNG tanker movement, such as the dredging
of the riverbed and the impact on recreational boating. In other cases, the toxic emissions
of both the terminals and the LNG tankers became an issue. In Maine, community
opposition became intertwined with Native American rights. In many communities, the
contesting community members—from Hollywood actor Pierce Brosnan to regular
Joes—expressed their safety concerns because of the LNG terminal in their neighborhood
and were often characterized as NIMBY protestors.
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Figure 4: Anti-LNG Protest Rally
Source: Sierra Club, Oregon Chapter, http://oregon2.sierraclub.org/chapter/stop-lng
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review

3

Literature Review

3.1 Market Entry
Firms can become accustomed to existing strategies and capabilities within a particular
market that can become detrimental when the market conditions change (Siggelkow,
2001). So the ability to successfully enter new markets has important implications for a
firm’s growth and survival (Burgelman & Grove, 2007). On the other hand, firms cannot
indiscriminately enter every new market without due diligence because of the
uncertainties and costs associated. It is then not surprising that much of the empirical
strategy research has focused on the specifics of entry timing and entry mode into new
markets (Zachary et al., 2015). While entry timing and mode decisions are critical, they
do not help in understanding the risks that firms need to manage between entry decision
and operational startup (Sine et al., 2007). Firms might calculate their entry timing and
entry mode to perfection but cannot fully predict the subsequent reactions from other
market and non-market actors. Research on foothold-moves considers one such risk, in
the form of threats from competing firms (Upson et al., 2012). Beyond competition from
other market actors, very little is known about the threats posed by non-market actors that
can potentially derail the firm’s market entry strategy.

3.1.1 Favorable Non-Market Actors
While the threats posed by non-market actors are still not fully understood, the
opportunities provided by non-market actors during the entry process have been given
considerable attention by organizational and management scholars in the recent past. One
category of non-market actors that is extensively studied is social movement activists.
Activists can enable an entire new form of organizing to emerge as illustrated by the
influence of the Grange anti-corporate movement in the U.S. that led to emergence of
cooperatives and mutuals (Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008). Activists can also create an
entirely new market for economic exchange such as grass-fed meat and dairy products
(Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008), or a new industry such as for-profit waste recycling
17

can be created by recycling social movement (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003), or
an influx of new firms into a nascent industry such as wind energy (Sine & B. Lee, 2009).
The second category of non-market actors that has received extensive scholarly attention
is the media. The media’s role is not seen as creating a new organizational form or new
markets or new industries but as being more of an influencer that can encourage the
influx. For instance, Lee and Paruchuri (2008) show that firms enter emergent and
uncertain markets based on the volume, tenor, source, and generalizability of media’s
associative rhetoric, which links easily comprehensible concepts with those relevant to
the new market. In other cases, the media helps in “market sensemaking” (Kennedy,
2008: 272) that increases the comprehensibility of audiences such as customers to
evaluate the firms that have already dared to enter an emerging market.
In this thesis, I consider the flip side of these favorable non-market conditions. I explore
how firms deal with media’s attention to activist contestation so as to contain any
negative repercussions on the regulatory process.

3.2 Regulatory Process
In some instances, governmental and quasi-governmental institutions can become a direct
source of non-market threats preventing firm entry (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Even when
direct threats are not evident at first sight, oftentimes the regulatory process involves
multiple stakeholders weighing in, leading to an arduous process for firms (Hiatt & Park,
2012). As the regulatory process progresses, the firm is involved in sharing information,
conducting studies, and engaging with local community audiences. Throughout this
process, the firm is forced to invest time and money, and to apply its social skills—“the
ability to induce cooperation in others” (Fligstein, 2001: 105). These requirements can
delay the firm’s efforts to establish a foothold or thwart them altogether. In fact, in my
setting, of the 59 proposals examined, 18 did not start the regulatory process, and only 26
eventually received approval, though at different speeds.
The threat (and cost) of failure is more pronounced for firms that face sustained social
contestation. Convincing the regulator does not require simply filing the application and
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following the rules. Although regulators often act under pressures from competing
interest groups, their mission is to work in the public interest and improve social welfare
(Laffont & Tirole, 1991). Hence, in contentious settings, firms must first establish public
validity for their arguments so that they can then potentially utilize “institutional actors to
put pressure on the regulators to rule in their favor” (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015: 1710). In the
longer term, as Sine et al. (2007) indicate in their study of startups in the independent
power sector, regulatory certification can confer benefits beyond a legal endorsement by
introducing a legitimating effect beneficial to the broader sector. The case of the
ridesharing app Uber, which sometimes operates in contested terrain, shows that the
firm’s failure to mitigate contestation can prevent market entry (e.g., in Vancouver,
Munich, or Las Vegas). So the eventual outcome and speed of the regulatory process is
potentially influenced by the firm’s response to community contestation (social
contestation at the community level).

3.3 Social Contestation
Social contestation (Galvin et al., 2004) is defined as the publicly visible negative
evaluations of the impact of an enterprise’s practices on the broader society and the
natural environment. Social contestation at macro-levels occurs when a broader set of
actors, typically referred to as stakeholders or audiences, become involved in the
evaluation of the “societal appropriateness” (Galvin et al., 2004: 57) of the industry and
the participating firms. The very nature of the industry—the day-to-day functions and
core operations of the firms in the industry—is evaluated against larger social values
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). In this sense, enterprises in socially contested industries are
neither deviant nor exhibiting misconduct per se but are carrying out regular business
operations that are being assessed in terms of their social worthiness (Patriotta, Gond, &
Schultz, 2011). It also means that firms face this contestation not because of the specific
characteristics of the firms themselves but because of their participation in the industry,
and because of the intended and unintended consequences of their participation.
Scholars have considered various aspects of socially contested industries but mostly in
mature industries, which are typically characterized by a large stable population of
enterprises that have existed for a long period of time. Social contestation often involves
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multiple issues but in mature industries while new issues emerge; they also get to
converge over a long period of time. Emergence and convergence occur because
stakeholders gain a better understanding of the socio-cultural impacts of certain practices
such as use of sweatshops (e.g., Lamin & Zaheer, 2012); repeated events become the
realization of worst-case scenarios and fears that can help focus stakeholder attention
(e.g., railway accidents considered by Desai, 2011); deeply embedded moral and cultural
evaluations of products and services that can translate into the stigmatization of all the
firms in the industry (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012); and changing societal
concerns such as environmental issues that shape the re-evaluation of firms in certain
industries (Elsbach, 1994; Hoffman, 1999).
These perspectives have not considered contexts where contestation need not occur
merely because various groups find inspiration from different existing institutions or
“home domains” (Patriotta et al., 2011: 1830); contestation can also occur because of
basic human needs and aspirations. As the LNG context of this thesis demonstrates,
community contestation can be based on themes such as mortal fear (e.g., the threat of a
terrorist attack on an LNG facility), living standards and aesthetics (often referred to, in
pejorative sense, as NIMBY), recreation (LNG vessels interfering with recreational
boating), and food sources (fish larvae being sucked into the regasification system).

3.4 Community Lens
My thesis highlights a critical departure from studies considering social contestation at
more macro settings because of some unique characteristics of firm–community
interactions. While the term community can refer to any form of social grouping, I use
this term to specifically refer to residential communities—“geographically bounded
social systems” (Freeman & Audia, 2006: 158). This duality of spatial and social
dimensions of a residential community distinguishes it from other forms of social
groupings and has important implications for organizational studies. Even wellunderstood organizational dynamics can be cast in a different light when studied in
relation to a community (Greve & Rao, 2014; Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013). Previous
research has demonstrated how memories, experiences, and cultural resources that evolve
over generations of community members can change our understanding of collective
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identity (Howard-Grenville, Metzger, & Meyer, 2012), and affect strategic decisions such
as downsizing (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010) and firm founding (Greve & Rao,
2012).
Much of the organizational and management research on firm–community interactions
can be categorized as the embedded perspective, where the firm is already a part of the
community (spatially or socially, or both). I will first review this embedded perspective,
and then introduce the NIMBY literature from sociology and urban studies where, prior
to the entry, the firm is neither socially nor spatially part of the community.

3.4.1 Embedded Perspective
The “embedded” perspective seeks to answer the broader question “How does
organizations’ embeddedness in social and cultural communities influence their
behavior?” (Marquis, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2011: ix). This perspective has been
extended for a wide range of phenomena. Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007: 925)
theorize about the “isomorphic pressures” of the metropolitan areas surrounding a
headquarters of a firm that influence its corporate social actions—“behaviors and
practices that extend beyond immediate profit maximization goals and are intended to
increase social benefits or mitigate social problems for constituencies external to the
firm.” The puzzle of selective contagion of “bank runs” is explained by Greve and Kim
(2014) as occurring because of the surrounding community’s cohesion and
communication. Lee and Lounsbury (2015) extend institutional logics theory to explain
that the local community logics can amplify or dampen the influence of broader fieldlevel logics and so facilities in proenvironmental communities faced greater pressures to
reduce toxic waste emissions than facilities in other communities.
This embedded perspective is not something new; if anything, it is a renewal of the core
aspect of old institutionalism. In their summarization of the differences between “the old
and new institutionalism,” DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 13) proposed that organizations
were embedded in “local community” when it came to old institutionalism but were
embedded in “field, sector, or society” when considered from new institutionalism
perspective. Selznick’s (1949) classic on the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which
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was considered the rock bed of old institutionalism, was all about the community
embeddedness perspective. The theoretical insights from the relationship between the
TVA and its surrounding community were summarized as: “Authority’s grass-roots
policy as doctrine and as action … resulted in commitments which had restrictive
consequences for the policy and behavior of the Authority itself” (p. 12). So, according to
Selznick, the TVA’s “democratic planning” process that involved the active participation
of the local community actually became a constraining factor for the TVA.
However, such “embedded” perspectives are premised on the firm already being a part of
a community and do not shed light on how new industrial activities may be considered by
the community as “the initial stage of an invasion” (McKenzie, 1924: 295) and hence can
lead to social contestation from the community.

3.4.2 Community Contestation—NIMBY
One stream that has considered community opposition to new industrial activities is the
so-called “NIMBY” research (not-in-my-backyard; see Schively, 2007). This stream of
research, mainly in sociology, energy research, and urban studies, tries to explain why
certain industrial activities are opposed by communities. Boudet and colleagues
(McAdam & Boudet, 2012; Boudet, 2011; Wright & Boudet, 2012) have explored a
subset of the LNG import terminals to advance our understanding of the socio-economic
attributes of the communities that make some more inclined than others to mobilize
opposition to these terminals. While Boudet and colleagues have explored how specific
collective action events against LNG terminals emerge within the community, I
complement their work by considering sustained community contestation over a longer
period, which allows me to incorporate a firm’s rhetorical reactions to the sustained
contestation and the impact of these rhetorical reactions on the regulatory success. Thus
their end point—community contestation—becomes the starting point for my thesis.
Others have considered the role that project-related factors, such as facility design, play
in inciting opposition (Devine-Wright, 2013; Grant, Trautner, Downey, & Thiebaud,
2010). Vasi, Walker, Johnson, and Tan (2015) consider the role played by the
documentary Gasland in influencing anti-fracking mobilization by changing the nature of
22

public rhetoric. This research stream is dominated by research from the community’s
perspective but rarely considers possible firm reactions and their impact.
Even in instances where firm reactions are considered, they are essentially cast as interfirm contestation where the entry of large corporations into a community can create a
counter-movement of community members starting their own new ventures (Greve et al.,
2006; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Greve et al. (2006: 802) investigate how “low-power
FM (LPFM) radio stations arose in response to the domination of radio by corporate
chains”. Marquis and Lounsbury (2007: 799) consider how “national banks’ efforts to
introduce a banking logic emphasizing efficiencies of geographic diversification
triggered new forms of professional entrepreneurialism intended to preserve a community
logic of banking” and thus led to founding of many new community banks.
To the best of my knowledge, the only research to consider firm responses to community
contestation after firms propose entry into a community are studies by Ingram, Rao, and
Yue in the retail industry (Ingram & Rao, 2004; Ingram et al., 2010; Yue et al., 2013).
Ingram and Rao (2004) explore the contestation surrounding anti-chain-store legislations
across various states in the U.S. where national chains competed against local
independent stores in shaping the landscape; however, various other interest groups at
both the local and national levels were also involved. Yue et al. (2013) consider the
impact of protests against Walmart (as the first entrant) on the entry decision of Target
(as the second entrant). Ingram et al. (2010) theorize that Walmart uses proposals for new
stores as low-cost probes whereby it can assess community acceptability based on the
resulting contestation. The subsequent firm reaction to the community contestation is the
entry–exit decision, with Walmart exiting in most instances, except when demonstrable
profit is probable. They also find that if Walmart does decide to open a store in spite of
the protests, it is likely to accompany the store-opening announcement with charitable
donations made with the purposes of restoring its image. This situation hints at, but does
not explicitly consider, the potential for usage of persuasive tactics even before the store
opens.
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The entry–exit decision may be the primary consideration in industry settings such as
radio stations (Greve et al., 2006), banks (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), and big-box
retail stores (Ingram et al., 2010). However, clashes between firms and communities are
more sustained when firms are location-constrained—that is, when firms propose new
projects with no (or very few) alternative locations, due to the required complementarities
between the project and specific geographical features (e.g., the need for a coastal
location next to a river and an industrial harbor). While high regulatory costs with
increased contestation may lead firms to seek alternative locations in industries such as
retail (Ingram et al., 2010), this option rarely exists for energy and infrastructure projects
because of various location constraints. By considering the LNG import terminal context,
the present study seeks to complement these recent efforts by shifting the focus from the
community’s response (to firm entry) to the firm’s response (to community contestation)
and from community entry decision points to community entry processes. Thus, I extend
this research stream by focusing on firms’ rhetorical responses to sustained community
contestation, and how they affect regulatory success, a crucial outcome in the entry
process.

3.5 Rhetoric
The extensive examination of rhetoric in organizational studies has earned such monikers
as the “rhetorical turn” (Green Jr. & Li, 2011: 1670) and “linguistic turn” (Kennedy,
2008: 270). Scholars have studied a wide range of phenomena related to rhetoric,
including “changes in the discourse of globalization” (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005: 29);
jurisdictional struggles involved in the emergence of new organizational forms (Suddaby
& Greenwood, 2005); the interaction of rhetoric and reality in practice adoption, leading
to distortions of both the original rhetoric and the emerging reality (Zbaracki, 1998); and
third parties’ responses to the diffusion of controversial practices (Briscoe & Murphy,
2012). My focus in this thesis is a particular organizational phenomenon—a firm’s
rhetorical responses to community contestation (social contestation at the community
level). These rhetorical responses are used by a firm in an effort to mitigate perceived or
real threats to its social acceptance, stemming from public opposition by non-market
actors in the community to the firm’s activities.
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3.5.1 Rhetorical Responses to Social Contestation
Rhetorical responses to social contestation can be broadly classified as persuasive or
dissuasive responses. Persuasive responses are meant to persuade stakeholder attention
away from the contestation and toward the positive attributes of the firm and its activities
(Zavyalova et al., 2012). Unlike persuasive rhetorical responses, dissuasive rhetorical
responses are meant to dissuade the persistence of social contestation by countering the
contestation head-on. Much of extant literature has focused on dissuasive rhetorical
responses that counter the issues embedded within the contestation (Desai, 2011;
Elsbach, 1994; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012) but very little attention has been paid to
countering the detractors directly by pointing out the detractor’s negative attributes. I
refer to the former as negative topical claims (i.e., claims directly targeting the issue) and
to the latter as negative personal claims (i.e., claims directly targeting the detractor).
Hereafter, for the sake of conciseness, I also use the term positive claims to encapsulate
the essence of these persuasive responses.
See Appendix A for a summary of past research on these various types of rhetorical
responses to social contestation. Out of the 14 works explored in Appendix A, 13 have
considered negative topical claims, 11 have explored positive claims and only 3 have
hinted at negative personal claims. The findings of these works relate to social
contestation at higher levels (and not community contestation) and they do not directly
address regulatory success, but by linking this stream of extant literature with community
contestation and regulatory success (as a critical market entry outcome), I am able to
develop novel theoretical insights.

3.5.1.1

Positive claims

Firms entering novel social settings often overcome the critical challenge of establishing
legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) through an rhetorical construction of socio-cultural
acceptance (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009; Weber et al., 2008). In such contexts, to ensure a widespread socio-cultural
acceptance, firms tend to highlight positive attributes and paint an optimistic picture of
the future (Garud, Schildt, & Lant, 2014). Further, firms also use positive claims when
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faced with contestation. For instance, Zavyalova et al. (2012) show that firms can deflect
media attention by highlighting positive dimensions, even when doing so is merely a
ceremonial gesture. In their study of reactions to consumer boycotts, McDonnell and
King (2013) demonstrate how firms employ prosocial claims to emphasize the broader
societal benefits of their activities. They argue that firms use prosocial claims with the
belief that doing so will offset the negative attention of consumer boycotts, by
emphasizing “the company’s positive features without giving credence to the boycotters’
grievances” (McDonnell & King, 2013: 391). Hence, for firms facing both a novel social
setting and social contestation, positive claims can be used as a persuasive response to
the contestation, thereby highlighting the positive attributes of the firm and its proposal to
deflect attention from the claims of the opposition.
For instance, when BHP Billiton first proposed the Cabrillo LNG Terminal in 2003,
Stephen Billiot, vice president of BHP Billiton LNG International, stated:
We understand California’s concern for its coastline and its communities
[…] BHP Billiton’s Cabrillo Port provides a unique and environmentally
friendly alternative to meeting the energy and environmental demands of
California. Natural gas is a more efficient and cleaner burning fuel than
coal or oil.
However, local opposition started mounting in the nearby Oxnard and Malibu areas. As a
result of local residents’ widespread discontent, the city councils passed a resolution
opposing the facility in 2005 but BHP’s CEO Chip Goodyear reiterated the positives:
We are in the leadership position in regard to the approval process and in
an environment like that you are going to get the first round of flak. If you
could open up another supply source into that market of clean energy, a
natural gas supply source, that would do wonderful things for their energy
diversity and price. California’s leaders recognize that and bringing in an
alternative supply from a safe place like Australia is hard to beat.

3.5.1.2

Negative topical claims

Firms can also dissuade the persistence of social contestation by directly countering the
issues underpinning the contestation. Hoffman (1999) provided compelling evidence
from the chemicals industry to show how issues can act as a powerful attractor in
configuring the interaction of firms and stakeholders. Specifically, issues can become the
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backbone of social contestation by providing an impetus for a more sustained conflict
between firms and communities. When there is sustained contestation, mass media
attention increasingly focuses on the negative aspects of firms’ core operations. The
media play an important role in what Kennedy (2008) describes as “market
sensemaking,” a process by which the products and services become increasingly
coherent as part of a shared understanding between the producers and the audiences.
However, when media stories focus more on the negative aspects, then these negative
elements become embedded in the shared understanding—a “collective vocabulary” of
sorts (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005: 30)—and firms may then wish to change these perceptions by
countering the damaging claims. In this context, using negative topical claims becomes
an appealing tactic (Desai, 2011; Elsbach, 1994; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012).
Contestation against a firm’s new proposal can occur on the basis of any issue, ranging
from quality of life (e.g., potential visual pollution), to broader societal concerns (e.g.,
potential environmental pollution), or even mortal fear (e.g., potential terrorist attacks).
For instance, the Weaver’s Cove LNG terminal faced public and visible opposition from
the city of Fall River, Massachusetts. In a public forum held in 2003, more than 200
people turned up to express their opposition. Among the issues raised were “potential
safety risks, increased traffic, and a scarred coastline”. As Alfred Lima, one of the local
residents, put it: “In the aftermath of 9/11, it is not enough to say that LNG has a good
track record.” A few months later, Fall River’s mayor sent a letter to Gordon Shearer, the
CEO of the sponsoring firm, asking him to “recognize and acknowledge the significant
community opposition to this project” and noting that they “are not wanted in this
community at that site.” The letter providing specific details of the issues, such as “the
spot, just north of the Brightman Street Bridge, is in a congested, urban, residential
neighborhood where the majority of citizens are opposed to the project” and accused that
the “the company is going behind the city’s back to speed up the permitting process.” In
response to these issues and accusations, Shearer stated:
Weaver’s Cove respectfully declines your suggestion that we withdraw
our application for authority to construct and operate an LNG facility now
pending before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). …
The company is following the normal schedule set down by FERC for the
27

review and approval of similar projects.… the 73-acre plot that Weaver’s
Cove has optioned is in an industrially zoned area that is reserved for
marine industrial use. Previously, the site served as a storage terminal for
petroleum products far more flammable than LNG that were trucked
throughout the region. In addition, prior contamination of the site restricts
future uses of the land.

3.5.1.3

Negative personal claims

As the attacks from local residents, elected officials, and the mayor of Fall River
intensified, the responses from Weaver’s Cove began to include elements directly
attacking the detractor, such as: “the mayor seeks an emotionally charged climate of fear .
. . rather than a rational analysis based on sound technical and scientific principles and
evidence.” This response illustrates that redirecting attention only toward the positives
(positive claims) or countering only the issues (negative topical claims) are not the sole
tactics available to mitigate community contestation.
In novel social settings, future issues cannot be fully anticipated, and the eligible
participants in the contestation arena are not fully known ex ante. So an indiscriminate
use of negative topical claims might even backfire as the firm’s proposal becomes more
transparent and hence susceptible to further negative evaluation by new detractors
(Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). Firms can then attempt to directly curtail the source of
contestation by disqualifying specific external constituents from the contestation arena.
The theoretical possibility of negative personal claims was raised by Oliver (1991: 146)
in her “typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures”, where she considers
attacks to be a form of defiance whereby organizations could “assault, belittle, or
vehemently denounce institutionalized values and the external constituents that express
them” (p. 157; emphasis added). However, subsequent empirical works have given little
attention to this aspect, with two notable exceptions. Elsbach et al. (1998) considered
intimidation as one of the two tactics aimed at preventing the escalation of patients’
initial requests for an audit of hospital billing practices. And in a more recent study,
James and Wooten (2006) examined plaintiff retaliation as one of two tactics used at a
particular stage in the resolution of a discrimination lawsuit.
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While these studies begin to flesh out Oliver’s (1991) theoretical insight, they do not shed
light on how negative personal claims, alone or in conjunction with other types of
rhetoric, can affect organizational outcomes for firms dealing with social contestation.
Besides, negative personal claims need not take the extreme form of intimidation or
public defamation that these works have considered, but could also involve questioning
the motives, capability, and role of certain community actors within the evaluation
process. Such questioning could be used to undermine the community actors’ position,
belittle them, or downplay their importance within the process by accusing them of
wrongdoing or creating misinformation. All these forms of negatively oriented claims
that directly target community members are intended to either dissuade them from further
participating in the contestation, or discredit them so that others will devalue their
opinion and claims. Put simply, these claims “delimit the population of those entitled to
take part in the struggle” (Bourdieu, 1993: 40).
In most social settings, who can and cannot participate in the contestation is mainly a
reflection of “who has a voice in determining institutional norms” (Hoffman, 1999: 354).
When these institutional norms are well understood, it is relatively easy to determine who
can legitimately participate in the contestation (Patriotta et al., 2011). However, when
firms enter a novel social setting, the institutional norms have not yet been negotiated or
commonly accepted, making it unclear who the legitimate participants are. In this
context, negative personal claims will take on strategic importance since they can
influence who is considered to be part of the institutional arena.

3.5.2 Repertoire of Rhetorical Responses
Commenting on sustainable development (SD) in a globalized setting, Scherer, Palazzo
and Seidl (2013:261) argue that “in the face of increasingly complex and heterogeneous
SD-related demands, corporations that employ a paradox approach, enabling them to
switch between or to employ simultaneously the three different legitimacy strategies, are
likely to be most successful in preserving their legitimacy.” This dilemma is also
encountered by firms facing social contestation. While not necessarily paradoxical, firms
still need to balance competing possibilities in deciding the rhetorical types to adopt in
the face of social contestation.
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When a firm counters the issues embedded within the contestation, it can potentially take
the focus away from the benefits promoted by the firm and can give greater salience to
the issues raised by hostile stakeholders. For example, Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) find
that issues in the chemical industry escalated when the industry insiders (rather than
outsiders) paid greater attention to certain critical events. Other events that had the
potential for becoming a major source of contestation did not escalate when only industry
outsiders paid attention. Countering potential issues that lack empirical credibility,
because they have not yet occurred, can thus be counter-productive for the firm. On the
other hand, not reacting to an intensifying contestation can draw attention of other critical
entities such as venture capital firms, potential suppliers, and potential customers.
Negative personal claims in such contexts becomes a proactive option that demonstrates
the nascent enterprise’s strategic intent as opposed to passive conformity (Oliver, 1991).
In the following, I explore how firms combine elements from the rhetorical repertoire
described above (consisting of positive claims, negative topical claims, and negative
personal claims) to implement rhetorical strategies in response to community
contestation. Importantly, I also examine the impact of these rhetorical strategies on a
proposal’s regulatory success—a crucial outcome when attempting to establish a foothold
in a new market.
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Chapter 4 - Methodology

4

Methodology

4.1 Methodological Orientation
In this study, I seek to integrate a disparate body of extant knowledge and at the same
time exploit the richness of the empirical context to produce novel theoretical insights.
More specifically, I seek to understand the complementarities between three components
of firms’ rhetorical repertoire, and how various configurations of these components affect
regulatory success. To “combine the empirical richness of the traditional case-study
approach with the inferential possibilities of large-N statistical studies” (McAdam &
Boudet, 2012: 25), and leverage both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the
data, I opted for the fsQCA methodology (Ragin, 2008a). In spite of its recent advent into
management and organizational scholarship, fsQCA has already resulted in rich
theoretical insights (see, for example, Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2013; Crilly, Zollo,
& Hansen, 2012; Fiss, 2011; Garcia-Castro & Francoeur, 2014; Greckhamer, 2015;
Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). Appendix B provides details of articles published using
QCA in the management journals Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Strategic
Management Journal (SMJ), and Journal of Management Studies (JMS), and in the top
sociological journals (American Sociological Review [ASR] and American Journal of
Sociology [AJS]), where QCA has been much more prevalent.
FsQCA, as a form of a set-theoretical approach that allows for a systematic, comparative
analysis of multiple cases, helps to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
specific outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012)—in this study, regulatory success. A
crucial motivation for using fsQCA is to investigate situations characterized by
“conjunctural causation,”—that is, “where single conditions do not display their effect of
their own, but only together with other conditions” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 6).
While necessary conditions are rarely found in the social sciences (a single cause is
almost never sufficient to explain complex social phenomena), fsQCA often identifies
sufficient conditions that illustrate empirically the notion of equifinality—the idea that
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multiple, alternative paths can lead to the same outcome. In fsQCA, each such path is
described as a configuration of conditions that must be present (or not) to obtain the
outcome.
I use the term condition to avoid potential confusion but other scholars have used terms
such as measures (Fiss, 2011), attributes (Greckhamer, 2015; Misangyi & Acharya,
2014), and causal conditions (Crilly et al., 2012; Ragin, 2008a). This varied usage often
reflects the specific utility of fsQCA in these studies, with some scholars using it for
hypothesis testing as an alternative to traditional regression-based methods, and others
using it as a complementary post-hoc analysis subsequent to hypothesis testing using
traditional regression. However, most of the research using fsQCA tends to use it as a
quantitative evolution of a multi-case qualitative method. As such, even the notion of
“causality” is very different from econometric methods and so the term causal condition
has a very different meaning in fsQCA.

4.1.1 Distinguishing fsQCA from Econometric Methods
For my thesis, fsQCA is well suited because of the three reasons that I highlight in the
beginning of this section: a) the integration of a disparate body of literature; b) the
complementarities among the three rhetoric types; and c) the ability to leverage both
qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Subsequently, I also introduced the notion of
conjectural causation and equifinality. Beyond these well-established reasoning for using
fsQCA there are other less evident advantages. As Hodson and Roscigno (2004: 689)
note, “QCA considers all observed combinations of causal factors and, with its
comparative algorithmic logic, eliminates redundant and superfluous information.” In a
sense, fsQCA helps establish order in an otherwise chaotic research context that social
scientists often face. The LNG import terminal context provides a qualitatively rich
environment to explore multiple potential theoretical implications but the flip side is that
reality is complex and messy.
Messy reality doesn’t fit well with the notion of causality that is at the heart of
econometric methods, which forces researchers attempt to find scenarios that
approximate the randomization of trials. Alternatively, researchers try to mitigate or
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eliminate what may be seen as problematic aspects of research, such as omitted variables,
selecting on the dependent variable, confounds, the omission of fixed effects,
simultaneity, etc. (for a detailed treatment, see Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive,
2010). Instead of trying to control or locate instrument variables, fsQCA embraces many
of the aspects that are scorned by econometric research. Ragin’s (2008a: 6) vision for an
alternate approach is one that “seeks a path that is not a compromise between quantitative
and qualitative, but one that transcends many of their respective limitations.” He further
lays out the four contrasting positions between fsQCA and econometric methods: “settheoretic versus correlational connections, calibration versus measurement,
configurations of conditions versus ‘independent’ variables, and the analysis of causal
complexity versus the analysis of net effects” (p. 6).
As an illustration, consider a bakery that bakes cakes and the outcome of interest is “good
cakes.” Now consider the extent of charring of the cake and sugar levels as the two
conditions under consideration. Using this as a hypothetical example I next elaborate the
three of the key differences mentioned above. I elaborate the calibration versus
measurement in a subsequent subsection on Calibration of Conditions (4.3).
Set-theoretic versus correlational connections: “Charring” is a sufficient condition to
determine a bad cake but low levels of charring do not imply good cakes. Correlational
statistics will consider good cakes and bad cakes as two ends of the spectrum, and a
significant negative correlation can potentially occur between charring and good cakes.
So the prescription would then be to keep charring as low as possible. However, settheoretical relationships are asymmetrical. All charred cakes are a subset of all bad cakes.
How low or high the charring is determines only how bad the cake is. On the other hand,
a complete absence of charring becomes a necessary condition for good cakes. In terms
of a set-relationship, the set of cakes without any charring exactly overlaps with the set of
good cakes. Alternatively, consider sugar levels and assume that higher sugar levels make
the cake better but also increase the risk of charring the cake. If we consider the
correlation between good cakes and sugar levels, we may find a low correlation because
sugar levels might also be associated with charred cakes. However, if we consider a settheoretic relationship, high sugar levels might well be a necessary condition for a good
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cake but good cakes are only a subset of cakes with high sugar levels because even
charred cakes can be a subset of high sugar levels. Thus, set-theoretical methods such as
fsQCA consider the positives (good cakes) and negatives (bad cakes) as asymmetrical
and treat them separately. Further, each case (a particular cake in my example) is treated
as a member of a set related to a particular condition (good cake, sugar content, and
charring). The relationship established is not one of correlation between these sets but a
set-subset relationship. Thus good cakes and bad cakes can both be subsets of cakes with
high sugar content, and charred cakes can be subsets of bad cakes. Notice that the
outcome interest is good cake (or bad cake) but the relationship with the two causal
conditions (sugar content and charring) is different.
Calibration versus measurement: As the above discussion illustrates, correlational
statistics might misrepresent certain relationships (a high negative correlation between
charring and good cakes) and hide others when they are relevant (no correlation between
sugar level and good cakes). Hence, fsQCA employs a process of calibration that can
incorporate a simple measurement but goes beyond just measurement. This process is
discussed further in a subsequent sub-section on calibration (4.3).
Configurations of conditions versus ‘independent’ variables: Charring and sugar levels
also demonstrate another difference in causal relationships between correlational
statistics and set theory. Strictly speaking, sugar levels and charring are not independent
so we cannot run a simple regression model where the goodness of the cake is the
dependent variable and the extent of charring and sugar levels are independent variables.
This is not a problem for set-theoretic relationships because it aims to capture a
configuration of conditions that act upon each other to determine the outcome. In this
illustration, when the outcome is a good cake, the complete absence of charring and
higher levels of sugar combine to determine the outcome. This reflects a qualitative
research mindset and, as Ragin (2008a: 147) notes, “The search for causally relevant
commonalities shared by a set of cases with the same outcome is often the very first
analytic move in case-oriented inquiry, despite the fact that this practice of ‘selecting on
the dependent variable’ is almost universally condemned by quantitative researchers who
think only in terms of correlations.” However, it is by selecting on the dependent
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variable, in this illustration a good cake, we find the combination of factors that makes it
good. Selecting on the dependent is considered an absolute sin in econometric methods.
Analysis of causal complexity versus the analysis of net effects: Further, this
configurational approach illustrates the utility of set-theoretic methods such as fsQCA,
where the aim is to understand the causal complexity based on configurations
(AbsenceOfCharring*HighSugarLevels). FsQCA is “intended not to isolate the net,
independent effects of single explanatory factors on a particular outcome, but rather to
identify the combinations of factors that bring about the particular outcome” (Bell et al.,
2014: 303). In this illustration, the aim is not to determine the impact of one additional
spoonful of sugar on the degree of goodness of the cake but to determine what makes a
good cake.

4.2 Data Sources
I compiled a list of proposed LNG import terminals from Reuters News’ list of proposed
North American terminals, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, Oil & Gas
Journal’s “Construction Updates,” “Gas-to-Liquid News,” and publications of federal
regulatory agencies.4 My search identified a total of 59 LNG import terminal proposals
for the period 2000 to 2013. Importantly, this list is exhaustive; that is, I have data on the
entire U.S. LNG industry over the entire period.
For each of the 59 proposals, I compiled a list of attributes from various sources,
including the LNG terminal’s websites, regulatory agencies, media reports, trade
journals, and related websites, and websites of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
that track energy projects.5 I also collated an extensive collection of news reports and

4

Namely, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or the FERC, and the U.S. Maritimes
Administration. I cross-verified this list with websites dedicated to tracking such proposals—Project No
Project, Energy Justice Map, and Sutherland LNG Law Blog.
5

When a website was defunct, I used Wayback Machine’s Internet archives.
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press releases using a combination of searches in ProQuest, Factiva, and LexisNexis.
Data were primarily collected from media reports, as they are known to play a critical
role in determining firms’ responses (Desai, 2011; King, 2008; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012;
Zavyalova et al., 2012).6 Press releases by firms were also considered because these are
available for public consumption in a manner similar to news articles and they also
present a channel for the firm to promote its agenda in case the news media doesn’t
consider its response as publication-worthy. To capture as many media articles as
possible, I used search terms that were a combination of terminal names and their
variants, sponsoring firms’ names, location (i.e., the name of the community), and the
terms LNG or liquefied natural gas. As I reviewed the media reports, I further refined the
search terms based on my in-depth qualitative knowledge of the proposals.7
During the initial search, no media outlet was excluded, so the same news item was often
duplicated across media outlets and across the source databases (i.e., ProQuest, Factiva,
and LexisNexis). I converted the articles to simple text files and eliminated both
duplicates and similar articles using the plagiarism detection software WCopyfind. This
process yielded a database of 16,201 media news reports. I manually analyzed the content
of each report to derive three categories of data: a) data indicating social contestation; b)
statements issued by representatives of the proposing firms; and c) any other information
deemed relevant to the particular proposal.

6

To ensure accuracy and comprehensiveness, I supplemented these data with local newspaper articles and
NGO blogs.
7

A sample search query (for Factiva): ((ChevronTexaco OR Chevron) near10 Pascagoula near10 (LNG
OR “liquefied natural gas”)) OR ((“Bayou Casotte Energy” OR “Casotte Landing”) AND (LNG OR
“liquefied natural gas”))
Terminal names (alternatives): “Bayou Casotte Energy” OR “Casotte Landing”
Sponsoring Firm (alternatives): ChevronTexaco OR Chevron
Location: Pascagoula
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I also consulted other data sources, including the various agencies of the U.S.
government;8 for company-specific information, I accessed Capital IQ, Wharton
Research Data Services (WRDS), PrivCo, and Mergent Online. I collected additional
county-level data through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) County Characteristics database for 2000–2007, and the National
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) database for NGO and charitable donations data.
Following previous research on communities (Boone & Ozcan, 2014; Greve & Kim,
2014; Lee & Lounsbury, 2015), I used county borders to define communities because of
the socio-economic dynamics that coalesce at the county level and the extensive data
availability at that level. Other more specific data sources are listed below in the
discussion on variables.

4.2.1 Case Selection
I restricted my analyses to the 41 (out of 59) proposals whose sponsors applied for
regulatory approval. As a robustness check, I looked for any systematic differences
between the 18 proposals with no application and the 41 with an application. Eight
proposals out of the 18 faced contestation at levels comparable or lower than the
proposals with an application, indicating that the sponsors of these 18 proposals did not
self-select out of the regulatory approval process due to heightened community
contestation and a fear of failing. In fact, the major reasons for not submitting an
application appear to be either an involvement by the sponsoring firms in other proposals,
or the lack of sufficient financial resources.
Appendix C summarizes the 41 cases of LNG proposals used in the fsQCA analysis in
three different forms: a table of some key data related to each case, a map of the U.S.
indicating the geographical location of the proposals, and a brief descriptive narrative of

8

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); the Maritimes Administration; the U.S.
Government Printing Office (GPO); the Energy Information Agency (EIA); the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA); the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
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each of these cases. As these descriptive narratives indicate, each individual case has
many different factors that can potential combine in different and complex ways to
determine regulatory success (and failure). This is exactly the kind of circumstance where
fsQCA is most useful as it combines the best of both the qualitative and quantitative
worlds. Traditional comparative case qualitative research relies on the researcher’s ability
to select the most theoretically relevant case studies for comparison. The utility of fsQCA
is that it algorithmically partials out the cases that are related to the causal combinations
of interest, from all other cases, which can probably be explained by other causal
combinations but are not related to the current theoretical focus. Hence, the number of
cases that finally make it to the causal recipes in the Findings section is much fewer than
the universe described in Appendix C. However, by considering the entire set of 41 cases,
fsQCA explicitly incorporates the possibilities for other solution pathways and thus
provides an equivalent of the control logic of econometric method but at the entire case
level (bundle of all attributes) and not for individual variables.

4.3 Calibration of Conditions
“Fuzzy sets resonate with both the measurement concerns of qualitative researchers,
where the goal often is to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation (that is, to
interpret variation), and with the measurement concerns of quantitative researchers,
where the goal is the precise placement of cases relative to each other” (Ragin, 2008b:
72). This occurs through the process of calibration where the qualitative mid-point
distinguishes relevant from irrelevant variations, and then a scoring mechanism is
employed to precisely place the cases relative to each other.
For each proposal, I determined the extent of set membership in each condition and in the
outcome (scored in the interval [0,1]) using an analytical process called “calibration”
(Ragin, 2008b), which takes into account both qualitative and quantitative information. I
constructed the conditions using combinations of measures so I could capture in a rich
way the multiple dimensions of the constructs, and thereby improve the validity of the
models. In fsQCA, calibrated scores above (below) the 0.5 qualitative anchor indicate
that a case is more inside (outside) than outside (inside) a given set. For instance, when
calibrating performance, firms generating net earnings would have scores between 0.5
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and 1 (indicating membership in the set of “successful firms”), whereas firms generating
a net loss would have scores between 0 and 0.5 (indicating being more outside the set of
“successful firms” than inside). I then followed best practices and used a combination of
theoretical and empirical knowledge to determine the location of the 0.5 anchor (Fiss,
2011). Once the midpoint was determined, the cases indicating presence in the set were
scored in the interval [0.6, 1.0], and the cases indicating absence were scored in the
interval [0.0, 0.4] using quantitative normalization and scaling. The specifics of the
calibration procedures are listed below for each condition.

4.4 Outcome: Regulatory Success
For a firm trying to establish a foothold in a new market, it is crucial to stay ahead of
competition during the regulatory process. When a firm is trying to gain approval for an
LNG terminal, delays in the regulatory process can lead to significant impacts in terms of
construction costs and gaining supplier and customer contracts. In this thesis, I chose to
not only consider the eventual success in gaining the approval but also focus on how
quickly the firms progressed through the regulatory process. To determine these two
aspects of the process (final approval and speed of the process), I considered major
milestones in the regulatory process. Based on the information provided by the two main
federal regulators (the FERC and the MARAD), and the significance attached to
regulatory events in firms’ press releases and trade journals, I identified the following
milestones: Filing of application, Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), and Approval (Certification) of the terminal
proposal. I classified the proposals based on the number of milestones achieved. I used
the 0.5 qualitative anchor for the calibration to distinguish between approved and nonapproved proposals.
Specifically, all 26 approved proposals (i.e., those that passed all four milestones) were
calibrated in the interval [0.60, 1.0]. I used the average number of days elapsed between
milestones to calibrate these projects within this interval, with the projects that
progressed most quickly receiving a score of 1 and the slowest projects scoring 0.60.
Non-accepted projects were also calibrated using average duration with the following
intervals: for the four proposals that gained FEIS but not the final approval (three
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milestones), the interval is [0.30, 0.40]; for the four proposals that reached only the DEIS
milestone (two milestones), the interval is [0.20, 0.29]; for the seven proposals that
achieved only the first milestone, the interval is [0.10 to 0.19].9 Within each milestone
category a normalized score was calculated for every project using the following formula.
(𝑋 − 𝜇 )
𝜎
Where X is the days between milestones for that particular project, 𝜇 is the average
across all projects within the milestone category as the project under consideration, and 𝜎
is the standard deviation across all projects within the same milestone category. The
rescaling of the normalized scores was achieved using the following formula.
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 − 𝑀𝐴𝑋 (
)
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦
∗ 0.4
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
𝑀𝐼𝑁 (
) − 𝑀𝐴𝑋 (
)
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 )
(
+ 0.6

The main part of this formula simply changes the scale from 1 to 0, when the values are
ordered from low to high (for an example, see Table 2 below). For values ordered from
high to low, the formula changes by interchanging MIN and MAX. Multiplying by 0.4
rescales the [0,1] interval to the [0, 0.4] interval. This would be the lower interval of
calibration for fsQCA analysis that relates to absence of outcome and follows the typical
convention of having an upper bound of 0.4. Since [0.6, 1] is the upper interval of
calibration by convention, the addition of 0.6 in the above formula shifts this scale to the
upper interval. In Table 2 below, for example, the above formula was used for all
proposals that gained regulatory approval (number of milestones – 4). The MAX value of

9

Only three proposals, which didn’t receive approval, were still ongoing when our data collection ended.
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normalized score was 2.41, which corresponded to Bienvelle as it took longer than other
approved projects. MIN value was for GulfGateway as it took the least amount of time
for approval.
This process of determining the calibrated score for each of the projects captures the
qualitative and quantitative differences between the projects. The qualitative differences
are captured in two ways: a) projects that achieved four regulatory milestones (obtained
the final approval) are considered as success and scored above 0.5; b) among those
projects that didn’t attain final approval, a distinction is made on the basis of the number
of milestones they managed to obtain before exiting from the regulatory process.
Quantitative differences within each milestone category are based on average milestones
days and calculated using the two formulas shown above. These considerations ensure
that the context-based subjectivity in the calibration process is restricted to a choice of
categorizing the projects (based on milestones achieved) but the fine-grained calibration
between projects within a given category is achieved through numerical differentiation.
The following table lists the projects and the corresponding score assigned.
Table 1: Calibration of Regulatory Success
PROJECT
GULFGATEWAY

NUMBER OF
MILESTONES
4

DAYS BETWEEN
MILESTONES
98.00

NORMALIZED
SCORE
–1.53

CALIBERATED
SCORE
1.00

INGLESIDE

4

134.50

–1.17

0.96

CREOLETRAIL

4

142.25

–1.10

0.96

GULFLANDING

4

160.00

–0.92

0.94

VISTADELSOL

4

172.75

–0.80

0.93

GOLDENPASS

4

186.00

–0.67

0.91

NEPTUNE

4

192.50

–0.61

0.91

CORPUSCHRISTI

4

193.00

–0.60

0.91

CAMERON

4

197.50

–0.56

0.90

PORTARTHUR

4

197.50

–0.56

0.90

CASOTTELANDING

4

205.00

–0.48

0.89

LNGCLEANENERGY

4

212.00

–0.42

0.89

CROWNLANDING

4

232.50

–0.22

0.87

NORTHEASTGATEWAY

4

244.50

–0.10

0.85

PORTPELICAN

4

245.00

–0.09

0.85

CALHOUN

4

257.25

0.03

0.84

SPARROWS

4

274.25

0.19

0.83
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PROJECT

NUMBER OF
MILESTONES
4

SABINEPASS

DAYS BETWEEN
MILESTONES
276.25

NORMALIZED
SCORE
0.21

CALIBERATED
SCORE
0.82

PORTDOLPHIN

4

278.25

0.23

0.82

WEAVERS

4

294.25

0.39

0.81

BROADWATER

4

306.75

0.51

0.79

MAINPASS

4

323.50

0.67

0.78

BRADWOOD

4

325.75

0.70

0.77

FREEPORT

4

481.50

2.22

0.62

JORDANCOVE

4

485.50

2.26

0.62

BIENVILLE

4

501.50

2.41

0.60

BEACON

3

217.67

–1.03

0.40

COMPASS

3

248.67

–0.66

0.39

CALYPSO

3

314.67

0.12

0.36

CABRILLO

3

436.33

1.57

0.30

PEARLCROSSING

2

164.00

–1.47

0.29

PORTAMBROSE

2

404.50

–0.25

0.26

SES

2

547.00

0.47

0.23

DOWNEASTLNG

2

702.00

1.25

0.20

OCEANWAY

1

212.00

–1.15

0.19

CLEARWATER

1

316.00

–0.92

0.19

SAFEHARBOR

1

427.00

–0.66

0.18

OREGONLNG

1

646.00

–0.16

0.17

LIBERTY

1

902.00

0.42

0.15

QUODDYBAY

1

931.00

0.49

0.15

CALAIS

1

1591.00

1.99

0.10

4.5

Main Conditions: Firms’ Rhetorical Responses

I used my database of media reports to capture firm rhetoric. To measure positive claims,
negative topical claims, and negative personal claims, I aggregated media statements
around comparable “claim segments,” using the shorter of the following two time
windows: a) from the first reported date of the particular rhetorical response explicitly
identified in the media report until the next incident of contestation or b) from the first

42

reported date of response to the fifth day of response.10 Since the dataset of 41 proposals
also has counterfactual cases with low or no contestation, I considered instances of usage
of these three rhetoric types without any related contestation event. There were only a
few rare instances where negative claims (personal and topical) were used proactively but
there were many more instances of positive claims without a related contestation event.
Such claims were often issued as a part of press release.
I identified a total of 1,627 claim segments and manually coded each claim segment for
the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of any of the three rhetorical tactics: positive
claims, negative topical claims, and negative personal claims. The categorization of
rhetoric into the three types (positive claims, negative topical claims, negative personal
claims) based on the stream of literature summarized in Appendix A also aided me in
coming up with an initial coding scheme for analyzing the rhetorical segments in the
data. Further refinements to the coding scheme occurred as I built into it the nuances of
the LNG context. The detailed coding protocol and examples of coded text can be found
in Appendix D. Since a negative personal claim is relatively understudied within the
literature on firm rhetoric, I also carried out an inductive categorization of the various
sub-types, which is detailed in Appendix E.
To assess the extent to which a particular rhetorical tactic was used consistently over time
by a firm, I looked at a combination of the following measures: the total count of rhetoric
use; the ratio between the use of a rhetorical tactic and the use of all three tactics; the
number of years during which a particular tactic was used; and the ratio between the
number of years of use and the total number of years the proposal was in vogue. Each of
these measures was first calibrated in the interval [0, 1], and aggregated for every
proposal. For the two dissuasive rhetorical tactics (negative topical claims and personal

10

The choice of using five days as the maximum window reflects findings by Lamin and Zaheer (2012)
that media attention becomes insignificant after day five.
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claims), the proposals that showed no use were coded 0, and the other proposals were
calibrated in the interval [0.6, 1.0].
Since positive claims were present in all cases, I graphed the distribution of values for the
four above measures to see whether any inflexion points represented “qualitative”
differences (see graphs below). Since the distributions were fairly monotonic, I decided
to use average values to identify the 0.5 qualitative anchor, and used deviation scores
from that anchor to create the proposals’ scores.
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Figure 5: Graph of Positive Claims Total Count
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4.6 Contextual Conditions
To understand when firms used particular rhetorical strategies, I created conditions that
captured essential features of the context surrounding the proposal, both at the
community level and the firm level. When I interpreted the results, these conditions
allowed me to explain when certain rhetorical strategies were more likely to be used, and
their likely consequences.

4.6.1 Community Level
Sustained community contestation captures the presence of long and intense episodes of
contestation. The expectation is that sustained community contestation would create
additional incentives for firms to use rhetorical strategies. Media reports were manually
coded for incidents of contestation (see Appendix F for details). Using these incidents, I
created separate measures to capture the length and intensity aspects of the contestation:
total number of contestation events, average number of contestation events over the
proposal period, number of contestation events in the final year, number of years when
contestation occurred, and ratio of number of years when contestation occurred to
number of proposal years. I calibrated these measures individually in the interval [0.6; 1]
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when contestation existed (the closer to 1, the longer and more intense the contestation),
and coded as 0 when no contestation occurred.
Community need for the proposed terminal captures aspects that make the proposal
appealing to the community in terms of economic benefits. The expectation is that
community need would decrease the appeal for the sponsoring firm of using rhetorical
strategies, given the favorable bargaining situation created as a result of a strong
community need. I used measures of the county’s unemployment rate, per capita income,
and the state’s natural gas prices to create the community need condition (for details, see
Table 2 below).
Table 2: Condition - Community Need for Project
Variable

Description

Values/Scaling logic

Unemployment
rate

County-level unemployment Average was used for mid-point
rate. 2000 used as the year
based on graphical examination
for calibration. The higher
of the data.
the unemployment rate, the
greater the community’s
need for the project.

Per capita
income

The lower the per capita
income, greater the need for
the project.

Average was used for mid-point
based on graphical examination
of the data.

Natural gas
prices

Natural gas prices affect the
local heating, electricity,
and industrial costs.
Average costs for 2000–
2013 were used.

An average value of natural gas
prices across the U.S. was used
because the pipeline
infrastructure is interconnected.
Anything below the U.S. average
price indicates that sufficient
supply already exists for local
needs.
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4.6.2 Firm Level
Resources and capabilities capture the firm’s ability to deliver on the claims related to its
proposal. To construct this measure, I used the indicators shown in Table 3.11 The
proposals situated above the midpoint (0.5) had sponsoring firms with above-average
capabilities to manage media and public perceptions (measures used: Harris reputation
rankings and whether the firm was publicly listed), related industry capabilities (firms in
the oil and gas sector), and financial resources (revenues).
Table 3: Condition - Resource and Capabilities
Variable

Description

Values/Scaling logic

Public

Publicly listed firms have the
appropriate infrastructure and
experience for managing
public opinion.

For every sponsoring firm, this value
was coded as a binary. For a given
project, the value could vary between 1
and 0 because of the time-based
weightage. Purely private projects were
calibrated to 0. All other projects were
calibrated above the midpoint [1, 0.60].

Oil and
gas firms

Firms directly involved in the
oil and gas sector will likely
have the expertise and
connections needed for a
successful project.

Same logic as above.

Harris
reputation
rank

Firms appearing in Harris
reputation rank are likely to
have the capability to manage
expectations.

The reputation rank was weighted by
time for every sponsoring firm. All
projects without firms in the rankings
were coded zero. The rest were
calibrated above the midpoint [1, 0.60].

Revenue
in the year

For every firm involved in the
project, its financial ability
was estimated on the basis of

Revenue values were graphed. The
difference between the average and
inflexion point in the graph was just

11

When there was more than one sponsor firm, I used a weighted average based on the ratio of time period
for which each of those firms was involved in the project to the total time period for the project in the
proposal stage.
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Variable

Description

Values/Scaling logic

of entry

revenue during the year of
entry.

five projects, so the average was used
as mid-point.

Project design advantages capture a proposal’s design aspects that are community
friendly. This reflects findings in previous NIMBY research that characteristics of
facilities can significantly influence the nature of firm-community interactions (Grant et
al., 2010). I relied on my deep understanding of the context and perusal of the regulatory
application documents to construct this condition. For this condition, the proposals
calibrated above the 0.5 qualitative threshold have design advantages that are clearly
aimed at being friendlier to the community (and those calibrated below can potentially
harm the community). For instance, Neptune was an offshore proposal, and, as Tractebel
LNG CEO Rick Grant put it, “the general location for the port does not require any
precious coastal land and limits aesthetic impacts.” To ensure that the facility was “welldesigned, safely constructed and expertly operated,” they used closed-loop technology
(which had the least environmental impact) and constructed the facility at a size lower
than the average offshore LNG terminal. Table 4 below summarizes the indicators used
to capture project design advantages.
Table 4: Condition - Project Design Advantages
Variable

Description

Values/Scaling logic

Onshore

LNG terminals can be onshore or offshore.
Onshore LNG terminals are constructed
immediately adjacent to the coastline and
offshore LNG terminals are constructed in a
deepwater port on the high seas (e.g., an oil
rig). Onshore LNG terminals are cheaper to
build but are more likely to invoke a
NIMBY-type contestation. Firms proposing
offshore terminals explicitly promoted them
as a safer alternative to onshore terminals.

A binary variable:
offshore coded as 1;
onshore coded as 0.

If onshore,
distance to
the most
proximate

For onshore facilities only, the distance was
calculated to the most proximate city or
town, using visual analysis data provided by
the firm and by energyjustice.net. A
combination of UPS rural zip codes and a

The distance values
were graphed. Two
projects were outliers,
but the others followed
a smooth curve, so the
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city

population cut-off of 5,000 were used to
average was used as
determine the nearest city or town. Only
mid-point.
onshore facilities were considered because
offshore terminals are located tens of miles
into the ocean. For offshore terminals, the
proximity to a city or town is less of a design
concern than the impact on ocean-based
activities.

If
offshore,
technology
used

The technology used for regasification of
LNG to natural gas in offshore facilities has
an impact on fisheries in the surrounding
ocean. Closed-loop facilities have the least
impact but are more expensive because some
of the converted natural gas is used to reheat
the LNG. The open-rack system uses the
relative warmth of the seawater for
regasification. In the heat exchange, the
seawater cools and has the potential to kill
the fish larvae. Between these two extremes
is the HiLoad technology, which greatly
minimizes the impact on fish larvae.

Open rack was coded
as 0, HiLoad as 0.5,
and closed loop as 1.
As this coding is added
to other variables I
didn’t change the 0.5
mid-point of HiLoad.

Facility
size

Facility size indicates the maximum amount
of natural gas in terms of billions of cubic
feet per day that can be processed by the
facility on any given day after the LNG is
regasified.

Because of design
differences, the values
were scaled separately
for onshore and
offshore terminals.

4.7 Analysis
I used the fsQCA 2.5 software (Ragin & Davey, 2014) to conduct my analyses using a
fuzzy truth table algorithm (for a mathematical interpretation of the algorithm, see
Mendel & Korjani, 2013).The first step is to assess necessary conditions, which indicates
whether a particular condition occurs for all cases that enjoy regulatory success.
Following best practice, I used a 0.90 consistency cutoff to determine whether the factor
was a necessary condition. I then looked for sufficient conditions, which occur as
combinations of conditions (or “configurations”), using the software’s fuzzy truth table
algorithm and the commonly accepted cutoff values of 0.80 for raw consistency and 0.75
for proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014).
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5

Findings

5.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
I did not find any necessary conditions that were above the 0.90 consistency cutoff—
which is not uncommon in fsQCA and simply means that regulatory success is not
explained solely by any single factor, but rather by multiple “paths” (and each “path” is a
sufficient configuration of conditions). The sufficiency analyses yielded robust solutions
for explaining the regulatory success among the 26 proposals that were approved, but the
analysis did not yield solutions for explaining the regulatory failure of the other 15
proposals (i.e., I did not find a solution with an acceptable raw consistency and
proportional reduction in inconsistency [PRI] score). Hence, I discuss only the
configurations sufficient for regulatory success. Of the six configurations that resulted
from this sufficiency analysis, two configurations had very low unique coverage (less
than 0.05) and were each represented by only one case (i.e., one proposal). For the sake
of conciseness, I show only the four main configurations.

5.2 FsQCA Solutions: Configurations of Conditions
The results table below should be read column wise. The symbol ● represents the
presence of a condition, and the symbol ○ represents its absence. If neither is indicated,
that particular condition is not relevant for the causal pathway considered in that solution.
Each column presents a solution (configuration of conditions) that was algorithmically
derived by fsQCA software utilizing the cases provided (for a mathematical elaboration
of the algorithm, see Mendel & Korjani, 2013).
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Table 5: Configurations Sufficient for Regulatory Success12
S1
Response strategies

S2

Avoidance rhetorical
strategies

S3

S4

Counterattack rhetorical
strategies

Dissuasive rhetorical
responses
Negative personal claim

○

Negative topical claim

○

●

○

○

●

●

Persuasive rhetorical
response
Positive claim

○

○

Contextual conditions
(community)
Sustained community
contestation

●

Community need

●

●

○

Resources and
capabilities

●

●

●

●

Project design
advantages

○

○

○

●

Raw coverage

0.30

0.31

0.23

0.22

Unique coverage

0.07

0.11

0.08

0.05

●

●

Contextual conditions (firm)

12

Coverage indicates the proportion of outcomes explained by a given solution (e.g., a coverage score of 1
would mean the solution explains all the cases). Consistency indicates the extent to which proposals with
high membership in a given solution have similar properties (i.e., it captures a solution’s internal validity).
Both coverage and consistency are scaled between 0 and 1.
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Consistency
Number of cases

S1

S2

S3

S4

0.95

0.95

0.88

0.93

6

6

6

3

Solution coverage

0.65

Solution consistency

0.92

As Grant et al. (2010: 487) note, fsQCA treats “cases as combinations of attributes
[conditions] and use[s] Boolean algebra to derive simplified expressions of combinations
associated with an outcome.” For instance, solution S1 can be expressed as:
~NegativePersonalClaim*SustainedCommunityContestation*CommunityNeed*
Resources&Capabilities*~ProjectDesignAdvantages
The ~ (tilde) symbol is used in this representation to explicitly indicate the absence of a
condition (equivalent to the symbol ○ in the table above), and the * indicates the
combination of the conditions. This combination doesn’t have the conditions
NegativeTopicalClaims and PositiveClaims because across the cases associated with
solution S1 were instances where some projects used PositiveClaims and others didn’t. In
set-theory language, there were some cases with membership in the set representing the
presence of PositiveClaims and others had membership in the absence of PositiveClaims.
So the influence of PositiveClaims on the outcome in solution S1 was ambiguous and
hence was dropped from the solution configuration. The extent of membership in the
presence and absence sets will also have a bearing on whether the fsQCA algorithm
keeps or removes PositiveClaims from the configuration (the same would happen with
NegativeTopicalClaims).
The Boolean logic can be explained as follows. Consider an outcome Y and three
conditions A, B, and C that can potentially determine this outcome. The corresponding
absence is indicated by ~Y, ~A, ~B, and ~C respectively. Suppose I have two cases: one
where outcome Y occurs under the combination of conditions A*B*~C and another
where Y occurs under the combination A*~B*~C. Combining the two cases in Boolean
algebra would yield: A*B*~C + A*~B*~C. The + (plus) sign denotes an OR in Boolean
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algebra and in QCA it simply means there are two alternative pathways for Y to occur.
This Boolean expression can be further reduced as follows:
A*B*~C + A*~B*~C => A*~C*(B + ~B) => A*~C*(1) -> A*~C
This reduction of the expression can be performed in an unambiguous manner for crisp
sets, where a case is either a member (score of 1) or not a member (score of 0) of a
particular condition’s set. In fuzzy set, it is a bit more complicated because a calibrated
range of values is used to indicate presence [0.6, 1] and absence [0, 0.4]. So the
simplification of (B + ~B) need not always yield a 1. If one case has a membership score
of 0.95 in the set for B and another has a score of 0.05, then the situation is quite close to
having scores of 1 and 0, indicating clear presence (B) and absence (~B). However, if the
second case has a score of 0.4, then it is slightly below the 0.5 threshold and indicates
that it is barely absent (~B). In that circumstance the expression (B + ~B) is more
inclined toward indicating presence (B). The final reduced expression in that instance
will be A*B*~C and not A*~C.
In the results shown above, using all the 41 cases fed into the software, fsQCA
algorithmically determined that the four solutions (the configuration of conditions) are
best justified by the empirical data provided. From the fsQCA algorithm’s perspective, a
condition related to a firm’s rhetoric is no different from a community need. However,
based on my empirical and theoretical knowledge, I can separate the combination of
conditions related to rhetoric as a firm’s rhetorical strategy and the rest as the contextual
conditions that form the backdrop for the usage of these strategies. For instance, when
solution S3 is expressed as a raw combination, I have:
NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim*SustainedCommContestation*
~CommunityNeed*Resources&Capabilities*~ProjectDesignAdvantages
However this can also be expressed as
(NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim) *
(SustainedCommunityContestation*~CommunityNeed*Resources&Capabilities*
~ProjectDesignAdvantages)
Where (NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim) denotes a rhetorical strategy
employed when facing the contextual conditions denoted by:
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(SustainedCommunityContestation*~CommunityNeed*Resources&Capabilities*~Projec
tDesignAdvantages).
Thus I have four different rhetorical strategies:
S1: ~NegativePersonalClaim
S2: ~NegativePersonalClaim*~NegativeTopicalClaim*~PositiveClaims
S3: NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim
S4: ~NegativePersonalClaim*NegativeTopicalClaim*~PositiveClaims
Again, the ~ (tilde) symbol explicitly indicates absence and the * indicates the
combination of the conditions employed in the presence of four different contextual
conditions in order to gain regulatory success. The solutions are named after the four
rhetorical strategies but it is also necessary to keep in mind that they are only employed
when faced with four different combinations of contextual conditions. Solutions S1 and
S2 can be described as containing “avoidance” rhetorical strategies, wherein firms avoid
drawing additional attention by making public statements. S2 contains an extreme form
of avoidance strategy, wherein all three rhetorical tactics are absent. Interestingly,
proposals in both configurations are also characterized by a clear community need,
suggesting that firms may avoid rhetoric when they believe that the community need for
the proposal may be sufficient for regulatory success. Further qualitative analysis of the
cases associated with S1 reveals that they experienced relatively lower levels of
contestation, while cases associated with S2 were a mix of low or no contestation. Taken
together, S1 and S2 indicate that overly assertive rhetorical strategies are not required to
influence the regulatory outcome when community need is high and contestation
intensity is low.
By contrast, solutions S3 and S4 contain within them clear “counterattack” rhetorical
strategies implemented in response to community contestation and characterized by no
clear community need for the proposal. S3 contains an extreme form of counterattack
strategy, wherein both issues and detractors are targeted, in situations where the proposal
lacks design advantages. In S4, when the proposal has design advantages, issues are
countered using only negative topical claims. This response suggests that firms do not
feel the need to deflect attention (toward positive attributes) or attack their detractors
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amidst community contestation when their proposal’s design offers clear benefits to the
community.

5.3 Variations in Rhetorical Strategies
I conducted further qualitative analyses of the cases associated with these four solutions
to shed light on the impact of contextual conditions on the choice of a particular
rhetorical strategy.13 At this stage, note that the only commonality among all solutions is
the positive role played by firm resources and capabilities. While I would expect firms
with the relevant capability and resources to use positive claims to manage perceptions, I
find, quite surprisingly, that positive claims are avoided in two solutions (S2 and S4), and
seem to be irrelevant in the other two (S1 and S3) in terms of explaining regulatory
success. This finding indicates that firms with a solid resource and capability base do not
feel the need to promote these advantages to the community in response to contestation.

5.3.1 S1: Mild Avoidance Strategy
S1 indicates a mild form of avoidance strategy. This strategy calls for an explicit absence
of negative personal claims, irrespective of the presence or absence of the other two
rhetoric types. A closer examination of the proposals associated with this strategy
indicates that they were all present in the Gulf of Mexico, which was perceived as LNGfriendly, and in communities that needed the proposals for economic reasons. So the
firms probably expected little resistance, and may have chosen to simply wait out the low
levels of contestation for the larger economic reasons to prevail. In such cases, negative
personal claims may be perceived as being unnecessary.

13

As a part of this analysis, I checked whether the cases associated with the solutions were different in
terms media attention levels. I randomly selected incidents of contestation along with firm responses for
each of these cases and counted media mentions using ProQuest, Factiva, and Lexis-Nexis. I did not find
any consistent pattern of excessive media attention for these cases (i.e., the same incident reported several
times by multiple media sources).
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5.3.2 S2: Extreme Avoidance Strategy
S2 indicates an extreme form of avoidance strategy, wherein the firms maintain radio
silence and rarely use any of the three rhetorical types. Theoretically, I can draw parallels
to concepts such as the “opacity” that firms employ when facing potential scrutiny by
interest groups (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012) or going “under the radar” to avoid potential
risks emanating from disclosure of private information to regulators (Desai, 2015). Such
strategies may be employed by firms that feel the need to hide something, which, in this
study, may represent the inherent disadvantages of the terminal design. A comparison of
S1-S2 with S3 also reveals that community need distinguishes whether the firm
undertakes avoidance or attack. While previous research has indicated the high risk in
disclosing unnecessary information (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Desai, 2015), this
comparison reveals that the non-disclosure can also be driven by low gain. If the proposal
already has the potential for community acceptance because of the community need for
the terminal, then the gains achieved by over-selling the project are minimal.

5.3.3 S3: Extreme Counterattack Strategy
The polar opposite to extreme avoidance (S2) is an extreme counterattack strategy (S3),
wherein the firms not only counter issues with negative topical claims but also directly
counter the detractors using negative personal claims. Even though these proposals are
backed by capable firms, community need and design advantages are distinctly absent.
The firms cannot simply counter the issues using rhetoric without the empirical validity
provided by community need and design advantages. On the other hand, firms cannot
simply counter the detractors because even if the detractors can be dismissed and
dissuaded, others will see the validity of their arguments. Thus, a dual-pronged rhetorical
strategy helps the firm create doubts that the regulator can use as a basis for not
dismissing the project.

5.3.4 S4: Mild Counterattack Strategy
S4 points to a mild counterattack strategy, wherein firms counter the issues using
negative topical claims, but avoid using negative personal claims and positive claims.
The cases associated with this configuration also enjoyed relatively lower levels of
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contestation, in line with S1 cases. Whereas firms in S1 adopted a mild avoidance
strategy, expecting the community need to prevail and avoiding further emphasis on
design disadvantages, firms in S4 are in a more comfortable position due to design
advantages. Consequently, firms in S4 can counter the issues to ensure that the regulator
has no doubt about the design advantages. At the same time, these firms exercise caution
and avoid employing the entire repertoire of claims, perhaps for fear of unnecessarily
fueling contestation, currently at a relatively low level.

5.4 Summary of Findings
Tracking the impact of words in a macro social setting is a difficult endeavor because of
the multitude of factors that can intervene between expression of these words and the
impression they create. My research design has two advantages in this respect. Firstly,
since the terminals are only proposed and not yet built, there have been no material
interactions between the communities and the terminals. This setting enables actors to
undergo “interpretive processes whereby choices are imagined, evaluated, and
contingently reconstructed by actors in ongoing dialogue with unfolding situations”
(emphasis added, Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 966). When the terminal is only proposed,
the rhetoric becomes central in both shaping the imagination of what the terminal means
and engaging with the “unfolding situation.” Secondly, fsQCA allows me to focus on the
particular conditions that are of theoretical importance and allows the cases, as bundles of
these conditions, to become “controls” for each other instead of having to resort to a long
list of control variables. However, having an advantageous research setting doesn’t
completely explain the surprising aspect of these findings that the use (or avoidance) of
any kind of publicly visible firm rhetoric should matter at all to the regulatory success.
This seemingly surprising impact of rhetoric on regulatory success can be best
understood in terms of threats to the regulatory process and the combination of contextual
conditions.

5.4.1 Threats to the Regulatory Process
As shared in the Regulatory Process subsection of Chapter 2, Linda Godfrey (a
community activist) commented: “My impression is that FERC is primarily interested in
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representing the developers and the industry, and the role that citizens have in this
process is unconscionable in a democracy.” This anecdotal evidence suggests that
community contestation that remains unchecked can become a threat not only to the
specific proposal under consideration but to the entire federal regulatory process. While
such comments were not prevalent in every contested proposal, even a sporadic utterance
in a couple of proposals would create the potential for being perceived as unfair across
proposals handled by the same federal regulatory agency. With this potential in the
background, the firm’s usage of dissuasive rhetoric (a counterattack strategy) offsets and
creates ambiguity around the voice of the detractors in the public discourse space. Since
this is a novel social setting, these detractors haven’t yet established that they really have
“a voice in determining institutional norms” (emphasis added, Hoffman, 1999: 364), and
a counterattack strategy from the firm prevents them from firmly establishing this de
facto voice. Assuming the guise of fairness in the regulatory process then becomes much
more palatable as and when the firm gains regulatory success.

5.4.2 Combination of Contextual Conditions
The second element to be considered when examining the impact of firm rhetoric on
regulatory success is that the success is not arbitrary but is discriminating of the various
combinations of the contextual conditions. Any one condition doesn’t necessarily ensure
that regulatory success is achieved because it is the specific combination of conditions
that enables a particular rhetorical strategy to enable regulatory success. This aspect can
only be discerned using configurational approaches such as fsQCA and cannot be
effectively achieved using traditional econometric methods. Traditional econometric
methods can at best consider a three-way interaction and do not consider the asymmetry
in the variables. For instance, the three solutions with sustained contestation can be
reversed, and the conclusion would be that lack of sustained contestation would actually
lead to regulatory failure. However, with fsQCA, regulatory success and failure are
treated asymmetrically and so is the sustained (or lack of) contestation. The reversal of
one specific condition (e.g., a sustained condition) in isolation doesn’t necessarily reverse
the outcome. Thus, a specific rhetorical strategy impacts regulatory success only when
there is a corresponding combination of presence (or absence) of contextual conditions.
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6

Discussion

This thesis aims to understand how firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to communitylevel market entry conditions, and how do these strategies affect entry outcomes? I
defined success in terms of the regulatory process and focused on the rhetorical strategies
the firms implement to counter contestation in order to achieve regulatory success. Based
on extant literature I identified three distinct types of rhetoric: positive claims, negative
topical claims, and negative personal claims. Firstly, my findings indicate that firms
counter contestation using four configurations of these rhetorical types—two avoidance
strategies and two counterattack strategies. Secondly, these findings demonstrate that any
of these four strategies can be sufficient conditions for regulatory success in combination
with certain characteristics of the proposal, the sponsoring firm, and the community.

6.1 Tangible Consequences of Rhetoric During Social
Contestation
A common criticism of firm rhetoric is that it amounts to lip service, and has little impact
on tangible strategic outcomes (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). This study extends recent
research showing that seeks to demonstrate tangible impact of rhetoric. To date,
researchers have considered the impact of rhetoric amid social contestation in the form of
interactions between three main types of actors: proponents (e.g., firms), opponents (e.g.,
contesting communities), and infomediaries (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009). Scholars
have provided evidence that the rhetoric of opponents can inflict a serious impact on
proponents, such as destabilizing an entire industry (Hoffman, 1999; Maguire & Hardy,
2009). Often, the mass media play the role of an infomediary by amplifying the
opponent’s rhetoric, which can lead to specific firm actions, such as deliberately hiding
controversial practices (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012). The media can also play the role of an
opponent by deliberately adopting a negative tenor toward certain industries, sometimes
pushing firms to divest assets from these contested sectors (Durand & Vergne, 2015).
Consequently, firms often adopt rhetorical strategies aimed at managing media coverage,
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especially in the aftermath of a wrongdoing or an accident (Desai, 2011; Zavyalova et al.,
2012).
So, while scholars have some understanding of the impact of opponents’ rhetoric on
firms—including through the lens of the media—and of the direct impact of media
rhetoric on firm strategy, little is known about the impact of firms’ own rhetoric on
tangible strategic outcomes. My study begins to fill this gap by showing which rhetorical
strategies can lead to regulatory success when firms seek to establish a foothold in a new
market characterized by community contestation.

6.2 Non-market Strategies Leading to Regulatory Success
Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh (2006) hint at potential ways in which rhetoric can
be used as a non-market strategy for utilities seeking regulatory approval for their
proposed rate change. They demonstrate that oppositional interest groups, such as unions
or environmental activists, can mobilize the media to negatively affect a utility’s
regulatory success—not unlike community contestation in the context of this thesis. They
speculate that some firms may have developed a capability to deal effectively with policy
makers, but do not elaborate on the nature of that capability. This study gives substance
to that capability by providing evidence that firms can successfully implement rhetorical
strategies that contribute to regulatory success.
In a more recent work, Gurses and Ozcan (2015) consider a different type of contestation
in the broadcasting industry—between incumbent firms and new entrants (pay TV
services). They find that to be successful in influencing the regulator, the firm needs to
create a “window of opportunity to grow” by “aligning their product or service with the
interests of incumbents and the dominant frame of the regulators” (p. 1710). Once firms
have grown and established a widespread positive public opinion, it will be too late for
the incumbents to influence the regulators. The avoidance strategies highlighted in my
findings are similar, to the extent that they address eschewing direct confrontation.
However, unlike industry incumbents, communities do not always feel threatened by new
entrants, and the NIMBY effect does not always prevail.
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As my findings demonstrate, when a clear community need exists for the proposals, what
matters to firms is not so much hoodwinking the community and the regulator through
carefully crafted rhetoric as it is avoiding unnecessary attention by shunning certain types
of rhetoric. Thus, this study provides an interesting counterpoint to prior research, which
often “assume[s] that firms always benefit from a highly publicized response, provided
that they are portrayed in a positive light and that audiences lend credibility to managers’
commitments” (Durand & Vergne, 2015: 1218). My findings paint a very different
picture, with none of the four successful rhetorical strategies requiring the presence of
positive claims (see Table 2 above). This finding indicates the need for scholars to shift
their focus of rhetoric research from positive to negative claims, given that the latter
appear to be more consequential in market entry situations.

6.3 Rhetorical Responses to Social Barriers to Entry
Market entry decisions such as entry timing (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015) are
meant to address the barriers to entry posed by industry structures (Porter, 1981) and
incumbents (Fligstein, 1996) but scholars are increasingly recognizing the roles played by
regulatory mechanisms (Dean & Brown, 1995; Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014),
political environments (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008), and communities (Vasi et al., 2015)
in terms of creating impediments to entry. To capture this notion, I introduce the term
social barriers to entry, defined as the set of impediments imposed by non-market actors
that firms need to overcome to establish a foothold in an industry. Scholars have
previously considered other forms of social barriers. For instance, Hoffman and Henn,
(2008: 404) explore barriers at multiple levels including “how barriers to green
construction can be perpetuated by rules, norms, and beliefs at the institutional level”. In
their integration of market and non-market strategies in utilities industry, Holburn and
Vanden Bergh (2014: 451) point out how “incumbents to seek support for legal or
regulatory barriers that prevent competitive entry”. Similarly, Flammer (2015: 1471)
argues that “by stepping up their social and environmental initiatives, companies can
differentiate themselves and establish a ‘soft’ trade barrier disadvantaging their foreign
competitors”. In this thesis, I consider community contestation as a form of social barrier
to entry because of its potential to derail the regulatory process during the entry process.
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Empirical work on community contestation has considered industries such as radio
stations (Greve et al., 2006), banks (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), and big-box retail
stores (Ingram et al., 2010). Clashes between firms and communities should be expected
to be even more intense when firms are location-constrained—that is, when firms
propose new projects with no (or very few) alternative locations, due to the required
complementarities between the project and specific geographical features (e.g., the need
for a coastal location next to a river and an industrial harbor). Because firms entering the
LNG imports industry were trying to establish a foothold in a specific geographic
location chosen for its economic advantages, they couldn’t simply exit from the
contestation (Ingram et al., 2010) and were forced to design strategies to overcome them.
Rhetoric becomes a powerful tool in this endeavor because of its visibility to other nonmarket entities (e.g., the federal regulator) and to such market actors as investors,
suppliers, and customers—thereby potentially eliciting further support by providing a
rationale in defense of the firm.

6.4 Prevalence of Negative Personal Claims
To demonstrate the empirical prevalence of negative personal claims, in this subsection I
share a few examples outside the LNG context of this thesis.
Electronic cigarettes faced intense contestation over their classification as a type of
cigarette (along with its harmful effects) or as a type of cigarette alternative such as
nicotine patch. The online retailer www.ecigaretteschoice.com issued a series of press
releases in 2010 directly attacking the stakeholders contesting the industry claims. An
excerpt from one such press release is given below:
So why are e-cigarettes in the bull’s-eye of politicians when public
health organizations are declaring them lifesavers? Either the
politicians don’t understand the ramifications of the legislation they
seek to pass or they have a total disregard for the health of the
American people. Allowing cancer causing tobacco cigarettes to remain
on the market while opposing and or banning e-cigarette sales as a
viable alternative is the equivalent to Genocide. Smoking touches
almost every family in this country. Playing political games with
millions of lives will play out in the court of public opinion and surely
unseat some shady politicians in November. (2010)
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In 2010, Raphael Pirker’s video of the Statue of Liberty taken from a drone went viral,
giving him the idea to start the company TBA Avionics, which manufactures and sells
commercial drones for taking aerial videos and pictures. However, in 2011, the U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) fined him $10,000 for flying too close to
buildings in shooting a promotional video for the University of Virginia. Instead of
paying this relatively small amount, Pirker chose to disapprove of the FAA. He argued
that FAA had no legal authority to regulate the drone because it is a model and not an
actual aircraft with a person inside. He further challenged the legitimacy of FAA by
pointing out that it relied “on internal orders and its 2007 Policy Statement, rather than on
any validly issued regulations” (MacPherson, 2014). Similarly, in the early years of
Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) or Internet telephony, Vonage CEO and founder,
Jeffrey Citron, publicly started challenging attempts to control his company’s growth,
which he described it as “regulatory alarmist … jumping the gun a little bit” and wanted
market forces to play out (2003). When it was rumored that the state of California was
considering an appeal of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) order
exempting VoIP from state public utility regulations, Citron stated, “If California should
proceed with litigation, I would fight that. How many victories do I need before people
know this is the way it’s going to be?? (2004).
Recent waves of contestation by taxi companies and regulators in Europe, Canada, and
the United States against app-based ridesharing services such as Uber, Lyft, and
Sidecar represent an interesting example since they were met by the type of disapproval
examined in this dissertation. Instead of trying to appease hostile stakeholders, Uber’s
CEO has publicly called the taxi industry “a protectionist scheme,” declared the
California government “unaccountable,” and said his “opponent [was] an a--hole named
taxi.”14

14

http://pando.com/2012/10/24/travis-shrugged ; http://www.ibtimes.com/uber-ceo-travis-kalanickdeclares-war-taxi-industry-interview-video-1592433
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All the major theories in organizational and management scholarship, such as
institutional theory, resource dependence theory (RDT), stakeholder theory, and
categories research, have considered the positive consequences of positive evaluations of
firms and have mostly assumed that because of the negative consequences of negative
evaluations, firms will try to avoid or prevent them as best as they can. However, an everincreasing scholarship focusing on the impacts of stigmatization and other forms of
negative evaluations of firms has demonstrated the theoretical utility of considering
negative evaluations as a concept distinct from positive evaluations, and not merely a
different end of the continuous scale (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Maguire & Hardy,
2009; Vergne, 2012). The prevalence of negative personal claims in many real-life
situations indicates that research on negative evaluations should be extended into
domains where the firm becomes the evaluator, instead of being just a passive target of
evaluation. I consider this dissertation as a small step in that direction.

6.5 Research Limitations
While the LNG industry context includes specificities that may limit the generalizability
of my findings—such as geographical constraints and the particular nature of the U.S.
regulatory process—it provides a rather “clean” setting for observing a rich variety of
rhetorical strategies and assessing their impact. I see exciting opportunities for future
research to examine rhetorical strategies in different industry settings, in combination
with entry mode and entry timing tactics, so as to provide a fuller picture of entry strategy
in the presence of social barriers.
Another limitation of the current work is the broad rhetorical categories used in the
fsQCA analysis. Although the actual coding of the data was done at a more fine-grained
level, this broad categorization was required both for providing theoretical integration
and because of some limitations of fsQCA. Since fsQCA uses Boolean algebra, the
number of cases needed for generating results increases with the number of conditions
utilized. For example, consider two conditions A and B that are used in analysis of the
outcome variable X (the absence is denoted by the lowercase letters a, b, and x). All
possible combinations of A and B would be AB, Ab, aB, and ab. So ideally 4 (or in
binary terms, 22 ) cases would be needed to represent each of these configurations.
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However, in social sciences, it is not always possible to find cases that represent all
possible combinations, which leads to the problem of logical remainders called limited
diversity—“the set of all logically possible combinations of conditions for which either
no or not enough empirical evidence is at hand” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 151).
The Quine-McClusky algorithm in the fsQCA software greatly reduces this problem
(Mendel & Korjani, 2013) by utilizing the observable cases to the fullest extent possible
but it is still desirable to keep the number of conditions to as few as possible; hence, the
need for the aggregation of data.
Another potential limitation of this research design is that it considers rhetoric but not the
traditional non-market strategies and corporate political activities such as lobbying,
astroturfing, and campaign contributions. Fortunately, fsQCA does not work on the basis
of the control logic of correlational statistics; “unlike variable based methods that are
founded on the notion of unifinality and seek to estimate a single recipe for all cases
under examination, QCA methods explicitly take the idea of equifinality into account,
allowing different subsets of cases to produce the same outcome” (Grant et al., 2010:
487). Thus, the inclusion of other types of non-market strategies will likely create other
potential paths to achieve the same outcome but doesn’t negate the existence of the
configurations that are considered without those other non-market strategies. However, to
provide a more holistic picture of firm responses to community contestation, I develop a
broader theoretical typology of possible firm actions in the next section.
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Chapter 7 – Situating Rhetoric within a Broader Typology of
Firm Responses

7

Situating Rhetoric within a Broader Typology of Firm
Responses

In this section, I address one of the research limitations highlighted in the previous
section, the other potential responses to social contestation available within the firm’s
repertoire of actions. The main thrust of this thesis is to analyze the impact of the various
rhetorical contests between the opponents and proponents of the proposed LNG terminals
because the terminal is not yet built and words have considerable impact. Specifically,
the impact of these rhetorical contests on the regulatory approval process was
demonstrated by the findings of the fsQCA and theoretically elaborated in the Discussion
section (Chapter 6). A focus on rhetorical contest is necessary to understand the longterm dynamics of a sustained contestation, and the structured pattern of results generated
by the fsQCA helped me in providing a focused theoretical elaboration. However, my
investment in understanding the narrative related to each case (see Appendix C) also
helped me recognize that firms often undertake other types of actions in an attempt to
deal with the institutional complexities of social contestation. By institutional
complexities, I refer to the concurrent pressures exerted due to the presence of
“multilevel, polycentric systems” (Ostrom 2010: 2), which suggests that “institutions
originate from multiple (poly) rule-setting centers such as governments, associations, and
communities” (Batjargal, Hitt, Texas, Jiao, & Webb, 2013: 1025). Hence, to provide a
holistic understanding, in this section, I develop a broader theoretical typology of the firm
actions on the basis of qualitative analysis of all the 59 LNG terminal projects. Such a
typology helps link the rhetoric to a broader set of options available to the firm and hence
can become the basis for future research to uncover other aspects of how firms try to
overcome community opposition in their efforts to succeed in their market entry process.
Thus, this section serves two purposes: a) to situate rhetoric within a broader typology of
firm reactions and b) to create a template to guide my future research endeavors. Hence, I
start this section with extant literature to guide the creation of this typology and I end
with a discussion of my future research directions based on this typology.
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7.1 Theoretical Basis
When firms enter a novel setting, they face the uphill task of building credibility and
widespread social acceptance, so they employ a variety of legitimation strategies (Aldrich
& Fiol, 1994). Examples of such strategies include building collective identities,
employing symbolic/cultural narratives, painting an optimistic future, establishing
connections with other areas, and obtaining third-party endorsements (Garud et al., 2014;
Perretti, Negro, & Lomi, 2008; Ruef, 2000; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Sine, Robert J.
David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007). Some of these legitimation processes are more covert than
overt, in the sense that firms actively avoid drawing attention toward themselves or their
established identity. For instance, firms can avoid direct attention until the legitimacy of a
new category of economic activity is firmly established by using such strategies as
directing attention toward the collective (Navis & Glynn, 2010) or using pseudonyms to
avoid recognition by potential detractors (Phillips & Kim, 2008). Similarly, firms can
also adopt overt or covert legitimation strategies when they face social contestation. For
instance, they can swerve from direct conflict through asset divestment (Durand &
Vergne, 2015), which is a more covert legitimation strategy than making public claims
about the societal benefits the firm brings (Elsbach, 1994).
In contrast to legitimation strategies, delegitimation strategies seek to eliminate specific
external constituents from the social evaluation process (Bourdieu, 1993; Lamont, 2012)
by covertly or overtly undermining them. Publicly visible rhetoric that directly attacks the
specific external constituent (Oliver, 1991) is a very overt delegitimation strategy. Overt
delegitimation strategies are meant to dissuade certain external constituents from
continued participation in the evaluation process, whereas covert delegitimation strategies
undermine multiple external constituents by not including them in the evaluation process
altogether or by undermining them in ways that are not easily discernible. Firms can
employ a covert delegitimation strategy by using various political activities such as
lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving doors in an attempt to influence policy
decisions behind closed doors. These strategies have been extensively studied within the
research stream of corporate political activity (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004).
Empirical work in this area has focused on highlighting the resultant benefits (e.g.,
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Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), the role of corporate elites in facilitating some of
the strategies ( e.g., Mizruchi, 1989), and specific political environments that enable
certain strategies ( e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2003).
In combination, these literature streams provide the basis for developing the typology
along two dimensions—covert/overt and legitimation/delegitimation. The details of the
mappings between specific firm actions and this typology follow.

7.2 Data and Analysis
The extensive database of qualitative and quantitative information I collated for each of
the 59 LNG terminals provides multiple types of actions from the sponsoring firms. I
studied each of these 59 cases to develop a narrative of how the projects proceeded from
announcement to the construction/exit stage. Within each of these projects, I located
specific actions by the firms. Many of the overt actions became evident because of the
associated firm rhetoric or the community reaction to the action, or both.
Some of the cases in my database also hinted toward many covert actions that were not
easily evident in the public rhetoric. I used other data sources to unearth some of the
more covert actions undertaken by the firms. I obtained details about campaign financing
from the Sunrise Foundation, which collates data from the U.S. Federal Election
Commission (FEC) and other local agencies. It also provides additional data types such
as lobbying and participation in U.S. federal committees. In one specific instance, data
from NorthernStar Natural Gas Inc.’s bankruptcy filing provided evidence of other types
of covert actions.
I extended the inter-case comparison of qualitative research analytical paradigm by
conducting a qualitative comparison of the actions to determine the extent of
covertness/overtness and legitimation/delegitimation inherent in these actions. Similar to
Fiss (2011: 395), I followed Doty and Glick's (1994: 232) definition of typologies as
“conceptually derived interrelated sets of ideal types [that] identify multiple ideal types,
each of which represents a unique combination of the organizational attributes that are
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believed to determine the relevant outcome(s)”. While Fiss (2011) sought to classify
organizations into a typology, my aim is to classify organizational actions.
I utilized the rhetorical actions of the firms as ideal type actions for each of the four
categories: covert legitimation, overt legitimation, covert delegitimation, and overt
delegitimation. Rhetoric as an ideal type provides a good starting point for categorizing
other actions for many reasons: a) rhetoric often accompanies many firm actions and at
times the non-accompaniment of rhetoric along with a particular action is interesting in
itself; b) the understanding gained from the analysis of rhetorical data, as a part of the
fsQCA, helps in comparing rhetoric with other actions; and c) using rhetoric as an ideal
type for comparison is also in line with the explicit goal of this section - situating rhetoric
within a broader typology of firm responses.

7.3 Extended Typology of Firm Responses
Based on the qualitative analysis of firm responses and the theoretical framework
discussed above, I categorized the various firm responses into a typology that had two
dimensions: overtness/covertness and legitimation/delegitimation. The table below shows
the various firm responses under the four resultant categories.
Table 6: Typology of Firm Responses
Overt Legitimation
• Positive claims rhetoric
• Experiential interactions:
presentation; simulations
• Monetary incentives: remediation
and mitigation funding; community
funding
• Community benefits agreements
Overt Delegitimation
• Negative personal claims rhetoric
• Legal action and appeals
• Third-party attacks

Covert Legitimation
• Extreme rhetoric avoidance
strategy
• Location choice
• Push polling
• Astroturfing

Covert Delegitimation
• Negative topical claims rhetoric
• Lobbying
• Political linkages: campaign
financing; revolving doors
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7.3.1 Overt Legitimation
Much of organizational and management literature has sought to understand how firms
overtly seek legitimation for their economic endeavors. Legitimation requires firms to
gain widespread social acceptance, and overtness requires that it be expressed publicly to
gain acceptance from a broad set of stakeholders. Hence, overt legitimation tactics can be
defined as those actions that are intentionally public in an effort to gain the widest
possible social acceptance for the firm and its activities. A burgeoning area of inquiry
into overt legitimation has been the use of positive claims rhetoric both in novel social
settings (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009; Weber et al., 2008) and in the face of contestation (Elsbach et al., 1998; Zavyalova
et al., 2012). I use positive claims rhetoric as an ideal type overt legitimation tactic for
the purpose of analytical comparison and categorization of other actions.
I previously defined positive claims rhetoric as a persuasive response to the contestation,
which highlights the positive attributes of the firm and its proposal to deflect attention
from the claims of the opposition. The persuasive aspect of the positive claims indicates
that these actions are intended to completely minimize any form of adverse blowback
because they are not countering, either the issues or the stakeholders themselves, but are
clearly seeking to gain a widespread endorsement without antagonizing anyone. Positive
claims rhetoric is also overt, as the rhetoric is made publicly and without any guise
around its intention—to seek widespread acceptance. The other types of overt
legitimation tactics are unambiguously publicly visible with the clear intention of
persuading a wider audience to support the firm and its activities. However, some of
these tactics, such as monetary incentives, may have a greater potential for adverse
reaction than a positive claims rhetoric.

7.3.1.1

Experiential Interactions

Presentation and simulations are helpful in settings such as the LNG industry where the
physical characteristics of the substance become a contestation theme. For example, the
LNG Clean Energy project that was proposed in Pascagoula, Mississippi, brought a
canister of LNG to their presentation and they demonstrated how the vapors catch fire

71

and burn instead of explode. Computer simulations are also useful alternatives when such
physical presentations are not possible or are cost-prohibitive. For example, the
Downeast LNG project in Maine enlisted the help of Eastport pilots to demonstrate on a
computer how they could guide the LNG vessels safely into Passamaquoddy Bay, which
was along the way to the proposed location for the terminal.
These tactics can be considered as utilizing epistemic objects or boundary objects. An
epistemic object can be considered to be a representation of the current knowledge but
also lends itself as an “object of enquiry” and “these objects are not things with fixed
qualities but rather are open-ended projections oriented to something that does not yet
exist” (Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005: 438). Since the LNG terminal doesn’t yet exist, the
demonstration of the burning properties of LNG and the simulation of LNG vessel
navigation become epistemic objects that can potentially be “generators of new
conceptions and solutions and can be regarded as a central source of innovation and
reorientation in societal practices” (p. 428). In this sense, these tactics can also be
considered as employing boundary objects that can potentially transcend the divide
between business and society. Carlile (2002: 442) defines boundary objects as “a means
of representing, learning about, and transforming knowledge to resolve the consequences
that exist at a given boundary.” However, the way these boundary objects are employed
can determine whether these objects are used “to establish, expand, reinforce, or
undermine boundaries” (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010: 194). Tactics such as
demonstrations, presentations, and simulations provide an opportunity for interactions
based on boundary objects that trigger visual and experiential stimuli rather than just
verbal stimuli. Hence, firms can potentially use boundary objects in such arenas to
“establish a shared context” (Carlile, 2002: 442) that can break down the boundaries
between the firm and community, and increase the prospects for legitimation.

7.3.1.2

Monetary Incentives

In the context of LNG terminals, where the facility may have a physical environmental
impact, monetary incentives can often include some form of an anticipatory funding for
potential future environmental harm (remediation and mitigation funding) or funding can
be directed toward boosting the community around the facility (community funding).
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These two types of monetary incentives can be considered as covering two ends of the
spectrum—community costs and community benefits—which may be accrued in the
future, due to the firm’s activities in the community.
Remediation and mitigation funds were set up by some LNG terminal projects to
explicitly assuage any potential negative fallouts such as accidents from the proposed
LNG terminals. Funds were also set up to provide extra equipment and personnel for the
local fire departments. Some terminals proposed mitigation funds for the potential
environmental impact because of the day-to-day operations of the terminal. For example,
the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal in Oregon pledged $59 million toward the
protection of salmon habitats that would be affected by the navigation of LNG vessels
along the Columbia River.
Community funding was set up by some terminals to fund community infrastructure such
as local schools, ferry terminals, or cell towers that were neither necessary for the
functioning of the LNG terminal nor faced any threats from the LNG terminal. Other
LNG terminals agreed to forgo any tax benefits or exemptions so that the local
governments could explicitly use the tax revenue to fund various community needs.
Monetary incentives, such as remediation and mitigation funds, and community funding,
can become double-edge swords. They are overt legitimation tactics because of the public
visibility of these actions and their persuasive nature in terms of the expressed intent to
gain widespread acceptance. However, unlike positive claims rhetoric, monetary
incentives carry a risk of blowback. For instance, the Broadwater LNG terminal project
set up a $15 million community fund that was to be distributed between the Town of
Riverhead ($2.5 million), Suffolk County ($2.5 million), and Riverhead school district
($10 million). Philip Cardinale, the town supervisor for Riverhead, described it as a “hush
money and that it was a “payment in lieu of safety.” He further emphasized the point by
stating, “the safety of our residents is not for sale.”
Zelizer (1989), in her study of usage of money by married women in the U.S. from 1870
to 1930, expounded the social meaning attributed to money and argued for moving
beyond a mere utilitarian or rational interpretation of money. In a similar vein, Belk and
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Wallendorf (1990: 35) note that “the interpretation of money as either sacred or profane
depends on its sources and uses and that traversing the boundaries between the sacred and
the profane is possible only with attention to proper context and ritual.” Utilizing a more
micro and psychological perspective, Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) argue that whether
money is seen as an incentive (as a motivator to do better for oneself) or as a disincentive
(“undermining interpersonal harmony,” p. 1154), it is based on the “same underlying
process: Money makes people feel self-sufficient and behave accordingly.” This doubleedged nature of money becomes apparent, whether we take a macro perspective (sacred
vs. profane) or a micro perspective (incentive vs. disincentive). So monetary incentives
proposed by firms can work if they lead the entire community to feelings of selfsufficiency but can become a source for conflict among the community members even if
just a few view the monetary incentives as profane.

7.3.1.3

Community Benefits Agreements

Oregon LNG signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the local government
detailing commitments related to the environment. They also made commitments with
local construction unions for hiring local workers. These explicit agreements with
communities that commit a firm toward achieving common good such as “economic
(employment, financial), social (mandated hiring of certain groups, affordable housing)
or environmental (air quality, open space, and conservation)” have been described as
community benefits agreements (CBAs) by urban planning scholars (Baxamusa, 2008:
263). These scholars also point out that the effectiveness of these CBAs is often
dependent on how broad a coalition of community interest groups is built to support the
CBA. CBAs can thus potentially become a chicken and egg problem, whereby the CBA
might be needed to build a broad coalition of support, but without a CBA, a broad
coalition may not be possible.
The need for such a broad coalition becomes apparent in the in-depth case study by Saito
and Truong (2015) of the L.A. Live sports and entertainment district, which in 2001 had
one of the first comprehensive CBAs in the U.S. The coalition built around this CBA had
“five unions (all nonbuilding trade unions), 21 community organizations, and over 300
residents” (p. 272). The authors trace the coalescing of multiple groups to factors such as
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“the growing influence of unions, community organizations, and the Latino population”;
“the community organizational infrastructure with the legal and technical expertise
necessary to negotiate a CBA”; and “community organizations that had extensive
experience with housing and job training and hiring programs.” (p. 283) Thus, the CBA
came to fruition because of a social structure that favored job creation, and an existing
community infrastructure and capability that could be leveraged for job creation and
housing (two critical components of the CBA). Such a favorable intersection of
conditions may not always exist, and firms may need to work toward constructing some
of them.
Parts of the CBA, such as vocational support, can sometimes be implemented without a
formal governing agreement. For instance, Clearwater Port LLC, sponsor of the
Clearwater LNG project, along with the California Maritime Academy of Vallejo, CA
created a continuing education program. This program was meant to improve the training
of personnel in the transportation and handling of LNG. The Clearwater LNG terminal
was proposed very close to the academy’s location. However, given the complexities
involved in structuring a comprehensive CBA, firms may be tempted to implement
elements of CBA independently and may miss an opportunity to build a broader coalition
of support. While CBAs appear to be a sort of golden standard for overt legitimation,
their rarity suggests that it is either not easy to build the coalition necessary for the CBA
or firms might get tempted to opt for run-down versions without achieving much out of
them.

7.3.2 Covert Legitimation
Unlike the overt tactics discussed above that firms use to publicly seek widespread
acceptance, covert tactics are mean to avoid any form of controversy or social
contestation. The extreme avoidance strategy that was discussed in the fsQCA findings
section (Chapter 5) is one such form of covert legitimation. The assumption from the
firm’s perspective is that there is already a widespread community acceptance or it can
choose a community where the likelihood for widespread acceptance is greater, and then
the tactic is to ensure that the presumed acceptance is not jeopardized. Extreme avoidance
strategy, discussed in the fsQCA findings section (5.3.2), is a passive tactic in the sense
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that the firm is opting out of the possibility for publicly sharing information related to the
firm’s activities. However, other forms of covert legitimation tactics are more active in
the sense that firms are opting in to carry them out. Some of the covert legitimation
tactics came to light because of leaks to media outlets or investigation by opposing
stakeholders. These revelations led to further blowback and highlights the dangers of
employing covert tactics. Covertness can be considered a form of deception.
Firms may be motivated to deceive external audiences for multiple reasons. Phillips and
Kim (2008), in their study of early jazz markets, consider pseudonyms as deceptions by
firms that were already established before the advent of jazz to overcome two types of
identity threats: “(1) their association with profitable, but illegitimate products and (2)
actions of newer entrants that blurred the incumbent firms’ identity” (p. 481). The
profitable but illegitimate product in their case was the so-called lowbrow jazz, “typified
by African-American and Creole musicians in smaller improvisational groups” (p. 482).
Thus, works of “Louis Armstrong and His Savoy Ballroom Five” was sold under the
pseudonym of “Eddie Gordon’s Band”!
Selling Louis Armstrong’s works under a pseudonym may not be unethical but Kilduff,
Galinksy, Gallo, and Reade (2015) in their experimental design considered deception as a
form of unethical behavior when it came to extreme rivalry among competitors. In their
experiments (study 2), the “dependent measure involved a choice between telling the
truth and telling a lie for purposes of self-gain” (p. 24). For Crilly, Hansen, and Zollo
(2016) in their study of corporate sustainability, deception is a form of decoupling
between actions and statements. Through their analysis of language structures, they
sought to answer the question “Can firms deceive their stakeholders, by failing to deliver
on their commitments to undertake sustainability practices without being detected?” (p.
705). A faithful implementation is indicated by “exclusive language (a category of words
consisting mainly of conjunctions, prepositions, and negations, such as ‘versus,’ ‘but,’
‘only,’ ‘not,’ ‘if,’),” and deception is indicated by inclusive language (a second category
of words, mainly conjunctions, prepositions, and some adverbs, including “and,”
“additionally”) (p. 711).
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Thus, covertness and the intentional deception associated with it can span the entire
spectrum from ethical (selling Louis Armstrong recordings) to unethical (outright lying).
To capture this range of covertness and its associated deception, I next present each of the
firm covert legitimation tactics (location choice, push polling, and astroturfing) in order
of an increasing scale of “questionable tactics.”

7.3.2.1

Location Choice

Location choice in the form of explicitly choosing certain locations with the expectations
that the local community will not contest the project is an active strategy but can be
demonstrated with varying degrees of covertness. In some instances, firms openly
acknowledge that this choice of location was a part of a deliberate decision-making. For
instance, speaking at an industry conference in Houston in 2005, Steve Lawless, manager
of LNG stakeholder relations and permitting for ConocoPhillips, said that, “a site should
be as invisible as possible.” He went on to describe the Freeport LNG terminal, in which
Conoco had obtained capacity, in the following manner: “The area has a small population
and is heavily industrialised. Introducing a new LNG terminal in that environment caused
little cultural disruption to a community already accustomed to chemical plants.”
In my dataset, while there were some instances of such open admissions and some
instances of industry experts speculating avoidance of community contestation as a
reason for location, this tactic was often covert because firms did not publicly proclaim
that the choice of location was based on a calculation of zero contestation. In certain
cases, the regulatory filings by the project contained sections where alternative terminal
locations were discussed and it became apparent that the chosen location was expected to
pose little community contestation. In other instances, the need to avoid community
contestation became apparent when taking into consideration the location’s lower
economic viability and competitive dynamics (other more advanced LNG terminal
proposals in the proximity).
So it is possible that firms can combine social aspects with economic aspects when
making resource decisions such as location choices (Oliver, 1997). The tricky part though
is that not all firms are capable of managing the social aspects as well as they manage the
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economic aspects. For instance, Bradwood Landing LNG terminal in Oregon explicitly
chose a site because of its remoteness. As Gary Coppedge, vice president of permitting
and development for Northern Star, explained during the announcement of the project:
“We were looking for a site that was very remote and that had easy access to the market,
but our primary concern was the safety.” In spite of a careful location choice, the firm
faced unanticipated high levels of sustained contestation. This incomprehensibility and
unpredictability of community contestation is also evident in the study of Walmart store
proposals by Ingram et al. (2010). One would expect that a firm with the kind of
experience and capability that Walmart has would have been better prepared to predict
community contestation. However, Ingram et al. (2010) find that Walmart uses store
proposals as a probe to assess whether the community would actually protest a store
opening.
Location choice can be a good avoidance strategy provided that the firm has the
capability to comprehend and predict future community reactions. However, for locationconstrained industries such as LNG import terminals, the number of locations to choose
from is often limited. The firm will also likely be making a trade-off between future cash
flows and a smoother entry without community contestation. So location choice based on
more favorable social conditions at the cost of less favorable economic conditions may
not always be perceived as the most viable strategy.

7.3.2.2

Push Polling

Push polling is a tactic whereby the firm employs an external agency to conduct a
disguised survey with leading questions that makes the LNG terminal look beneficial.
These covert tactics often go undiscovered but when they are discovered, as in the case of
the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal, the community can feel betrayed and this tactic
might lead to the opposite effect of what it was intended for. NorthernStar Natural Gas,
the sponsoring firm of the Bradwood Landing LNG terminal, employed Portland-based
polling company RDD Field Services to elicit opinions from local residents who were
planning to participate in a referendum for approving the pipeline route to the proposed
terminal. An investigation by the local newspaper, The Daily Astorian, brought forth
some of the “push polling” aspects of this telephonic survey:
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Several county residents who told pollsters they planned to vote “no”
on the measure were given a list of reasons to support LNG: increased
tax revenue, job creation, cheaper natural gas and salmon population
enhancement. Then they were asked if they would change their vote on
the ballot measure.
Coughlin and others [local residents] who took the poll said the
statements detailed many specific benefits of the Bradwood project,
including the number of construction and permanent jobs the facility
would require and the amount of tax revenue the project would
generate in the county. The poll included a few less specific statements
attributed to project opponents about the gas from the LNG terminal in
Oregon going to California and the potential safety hazards of LNG.
On one hand, push polling can be considered as an exercise in informational brokerage
where the polling company is transferring information of the benefits of the projects from
the firm to the community. However, as Burt (2007: 119) noted “secondhand
brokerage—moving information between people to whom one is only connected
indirectly—often has little or no value.” The risky aspect of such tactics is that it can
quickly become perceived as a deception, as was the case with Bradwood Landing’s
illustration above.

7.3.2.3

Astroturfing

The bankruptcy filing of NorthernStar Natural Gas Inc. indicated that it owed $76,000 to
Energy Action Northwest, which was a pro-LNG NGO that openly supported
NorthernStar’s Bradwood Landing LNG project. While the support of Energy Action was
overt, its linkage with NorthernStar was covert and came to light only because of the
bankruptcy filings. Scholars have used different terms to describe such firm tactics,
including astroturfing (Kraemer, Whiteman, & Banerjee, 2013), corporate-sponsored
social activism (McDonnell, 2015), countermovements (Ingram & Rao, 2004), and
grassroots lobbying (Walker, 2012). These terms are not perfectly interchangeable as
there are some differences in the way the firms actually implement these tactics. For
instance, Rao, Morrill, and Zald (2000) distinguish between countermovements and
astroturfing, by characterizing countermovements as a form of identity theft that
“emulate[s] organizations founded by its opponents” and astroturfing as a more covert
form “in which environmental ‘grass-roots’ organizations are funded by corporations as a
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strategy to inject more moderate environmental ‘concerns’ into a political process” (p.
266). While the degree of covertness may vary between these tactics, the ultimate goal is
to mirror the activists opposing the firm and to demonstrate that other citizens at the
grassroots level do not share the opinions of the firm’s opponents. Most of the times,
such a groundswell of community support for the firm is just an orchestrated myth
because it is an “artificially induced grassroots activism” (Etzion, 2007: 654).

7.3.3 Overt Delegitimation
In this thesis, I introduced the notion of negative personal claims rhetoric that is used to
dissuade or counter stakeholders directly by pointing toward their negative attributes. See
the detailed discussion of the negative personal claims in previous sections—3.5.1.3 for
clues provided by extant literature, and 6.4 for anecdotal evidence from other contexts
outside the LNG industry. Negative personal claims rhetoric is very high on the overtness
dimension as it is a publicly visible and unambiguous expression of the firm’s sentiment
towards its detractors. Using negative personal claims rhetoric as an ideal type for
comparison I was able to identify two other firm actions that can be considered as
expressions of overt delegitimation.

7.3.3.1

Legal Action and Appeals

Legal action and appeals can be used by firms to explicitly dissuade certain stakeholders
from using existing laws by either filing a lawsuit or using a legal appeals process to
supersede any agency at the local level. For instance, Baltimore County enacted a new
county zoning rule that would have prevented AES Corporation from building its
proposed Sparrow Point LNG terminal. In response, AES filed a lawsuit in a federal
court, arguing that the local zoning ordinance was superseded by the Natural Gas Act that
gave the FERC the sole authority for approval of the LNG terminal. As Kent Morton,
project director for AES, described, “the county’s zoning rule is in conflict with federal
rules because it deals specifically with LNG terminals. The law carves out an exception
that bans LNG in an otherwise industrial area. It’s strictly a matter of law.”
Legal actions by stakeholders and legal costs incurred by firms are considered to be
deterrents for certain firm behaviors. Eesley and Lenox (2006: 772) argue that civil suits
80

“will have an increased chance of the firm yielding to a requested change because of the
direct risk of financial losses imposed by a credible third party (the judiciary).” Bartley
and Child (2011) in their study of the anti-sweatshop movement consider lawsuits’
secondary damages because of the impact they have on investors and other “evaluators of
corporate reputation” as they “may be more sensitive to campaigns that include lawsuits
because they introduce the risk of concentrated damages and undermine perceptions of
the firm’s legal propriety” (p. 431).
Also recognized by extant literature is that lawsuits are arenas for “elite participation”
(den Hond & de Bakker, 2007: 911) where “who is authorized to participate in the legal
process reflects who has a voice in determining institutional norms” (Hoffman, 1999:
354). The LNG context of this thesis provides an extension of this elite participation
perspective. As the example above indicated, legal actions and legal appeals initiated by
the firms sponsoring LNG terminals were often used to circumvent community
opposition, especially when they co-opted the local political and government entities. In
this form, legal actions and appeals can become tactics for overt delegitimation that
denies certain stakeholders a right to participate in the evaluation process.

7.3.3.2

Third-party Attacks

Firms can engage a third party to attack a contesting stakeholder instead of directly
attacking them. Oftentimes these third parties are interest groups such as industry
associations that represent the firm’s industry or industry/trade associations that benefit
from the firm’s economic activities. So there is a clear and visible linkage with the firm
but the degree of overtness is not as high as negative personal claims rhetoric that the
firm itself uses. For the LNG industry, there was no clear representative industry
association because of the diversity in the kind of firms that participated in the import
terminal proposals, including upstream oil and gas (O&G) giants such as Chevron and
Conoco; smaller independent O&G firms such as Cheniere Energy; construction and
engineering firms such as Cianbro; downstream consumers of natural gas such AES
Corporation; and many entrepreneurial and startup firms. The Center for LNG (CLNG)
purported itself as the representative industry association but Cheniere Energy, which had
one of the greatest number of LNG import terminal proposals, left the group in 2006.
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Explaining this decision, Stan Horton, Cheniere Energy’s chief operating officer, stated,
“The Center for LNG’s positions on issues affecting the nascent North American LNG
industry differ in many cases with those held by Cheniere Energy. In an effort to maintain
a consistent message to our stakeholders, we have terminated our membership in the
organization.”
In the context of my study, oftentimes, the third-party attacks against the firm’s detractors
were carried out by local trade unions that were hoping to gain jobs because of the
terminal proposals. This tactic did not have the same weight as the firm’s negative
personal claims because these third-party attacks were often only reported second-hand in
the local media, when the firm’s spokesperson mentioned the attacks in their rhetoric.
Thus, a collective identity formation may not only be necessary for the legitimation of an
emerging sector (Clegg, Rhodes, & Kornberger, 2007; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011)
but might also be useful in the overt delegitimation of certain detractors.

7.3.4 Covert Delegitimation
The negative topical claims explored in my main analysis can be considered as a weak
form of covert delegitimation because they seek to counter the issues raised by the
stakeholders. Also, since it is a publicly visible discourse, it is not completely covert. The
covertness dimension is evident only when we compare negative topical claims with
negative personal claims, which are far more direct in targeting the stakeholders. The
covertness of negative topical claims rests on an assumption that they share the same
intent as negative personal claims, discrediting the opposing stakeholders, but do so in an
indirect manner. Stronger forms of covert delegitimation tactics are explored by the
Corporate Political Activity (CPA) literature (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lux, Crook, &
Woehr, 2011). I consider CPA as delegitimation tactics because they explicitly seek to
exclude certain stakeholders from the evaluation process. Even though there is much talk
in popular press about the undue influence that firm’s exercise through CPA, the
discourse tends to remain at a generic level and very rarely are specific firms mentioned
and even rarer are mentions of specific circumstances of these firms. I consider CPA
tactics of specific firms as covert because for most part they are hidden from public
scrutiny unless an activist or a media outlet decides to dig deeper. For instance, in my
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dataset there is LNG import terminals related lobbying data for 14 different firms, many
of whom were sponsoring multiple proposals. However, media articles related to only 3
projects mentioned in the passing about lobbying by the project or hiring a lobbyist or
indicated someone to be working as lobbyist for the project. Based on the empirical data
from the LNG import terminal context, I discuss two main types of these CPAs used as
covert delegitimation tactics – Lobbying and Political linkages.

7.3.4.1

Lobbying

Lobbying is a covert tactic because it is often not immediately apparent, and although
federal lobbying data are collected by the FEC, these data are often not immediately
available, and when they are available, are often not easily accessible to the general
public. The details of the actual issues that are lobbied for are also not easily available.
For instance, the following are some of the descriptors used in the lobbying data for LNG
terminals.
Table 7: Details Provided in Lobbying Data
Firm (Project)

Issue descriptor

BP (Crown Landing
Terminal)

“Construction of a liquefied natural gas terminal in
southern New Jersey”

Bradwood Landing

“To amend the Natural Gas Act to modify a provision
relating to the siting, construction, expansion, and
operation of liquefied natural gas terminals”

Sound Energy Solutions

“All federal issues related to the development of a
liquefied natural gas terminals”

Lobbying is a delegitimation tactic because it seeks to undermine the participation of the
community members in the regulatory evaluation process and “aims to influence public
policies by gaining politicians’ support for the firm’s favored policy positions” (Choi, Jia,
& Lu, 2015: 160). However, the impact of lobbying is not always easy to discern except
in some instances. For instance, Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009) find that
lobbying has some influence in reducing effective tax rates; and Kang's (2016) analysis
of lobbying to influence energy policies in the 110th US congress indicates that while
lobbying may only marginally increase the probability of successfully getting a policy
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through, the returns are very high when they succeed in getting the policy through. Choi
et al., (2015: 160) attribute the effectiveness of lobbying to two key concepts – a) entry
points: “policymakers who are sympathetic to the firm’s preferred policy stance” and b)
veto points: “have the represented policies eventually prevail in the policymaking arena,
which depends on the constraints that individual policymakers face when attempting to
make policy changes”. So while firms can actively find policymakers sympathetic to their
cause and willing to advance the firm’s interests, it might be difficult for these
policymakers to publicly side with the firm when there is intense community
contestation.

7.3.4.2

Political Linkages

Political linkages between firms and elected officials has been studied in CPA literature
in many forms including Campaign financing, and revolving door policy. Even though
campaign financing (monetary contributions towards a political election campaign) is
easier to discern, it is not a straight forward indication of political linkage. There are
limits to how much direct or indirect contributions can be made and the contributions by
one particular firm is likely to be just part of larger set of political contributions, with
some of the contributions made by opposing interest groups. However, campaign
financing is still an interesting source for understanding political linkages when we
consider changes in patterns of a firm’s contributions. For instance, after Calypso LNG
terminal was proposed by SUEZ of the Florida coast, the local newspaper the SunSentinel carried a news item on the campaign contribution made by the firm. The first
line of the article described the situation thus - “the Houston-based company whose plan
to build a liquefied natural gas terminal and pipeline off the Fort Lauderdale coast is
sparking opposition has introduced itself to key Florida politicians - with campaign
contributions”. Julie Vitek, vice president of communications at Suez, admitted that it "is
one way for us to connect with the elected officials in areas where we have an operating
presence or hope to have one. It provides us with an opportunity to introduce ourselves,
build relationships and share information.” Another way in which campaign financing by
corporations is studied is by lumping it with other types of CPA. For instance, Hadani
and Schuler (2013: 171) combine direct and indirect monetary contributions with money
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sent on lobbying efforts to create a measure that they term as “Corporate political
investments”. They also create a dummy variable termed “Board political service” to
“represent the existence of directors with prior public service” (page 171). This variable
can be broadly described as a revolving door policy.
Revolving doors (Etzion & Davis, 2008) refers to the practice of hiring politically
connected individuals with prior public service experience and is a much stronger
indication of political linkages than mere political contributions. It is a revolving door
because the movement of individuals occur both ways – from corporations to public
services and from public services to corporations. As a covert delegitimation tactic I only
consider movement from public services to the corporate world. For instance, Joe
Desmond, former chairman of the California Energy Commission, joined NorthernStar
Natural Gas, sponsoring firm of Clearwater LNG terminal in California. Broadwater
LNG terminal employed the services of former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani's
company, Giuliani Partners, for security assessments. AES, the sponsoring firm for
Brewster LNG terminal in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, hired a public-relations firm
Regan Communications. Regan Communications team included James Borghesani
(spokesman for a former acting Governor of Massachusetts, Jane Swift) and former
Suffolk County District Attorney Ralph Martin. These political hires are not exact
equivalent to lobbying, even though they can potentially lobby for the firm – so called
“revolving door lobbyist” (Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012: 3731). Political hires can
either be part of the firm or they can be contracted to provide advice but their activities
are not publicly disclosed. On the other hand, lobbyist need to be registered as such and
have to provide some account of their lobbying activities. In this sense revolving door is a
lot more covert than lobbying when they are merely political hires and not revolving door
lobbyist.
As (Hillman et al., 1999) point out “a variety of benefits may accrue to firms that are
successful in creating a linkage with the government: information, access, influence,
reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, etc. However, the direct benefits of such
strategies are difficult to observe”. Nevertheless, it is clearly a tactic meant to circumvent
any publicly visible evaluation processes and to exclude potentially problematic
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stakeholders from such an evaluation process. Hence I consider actions oriented towards
creating political linkages such as political contributions and revolving door policies as
covert delegitmation tactics.

7.4 Future Research Directions
“a signalman may have to handle several trains coming to his
section simultaneously. To handle any one by itself would be
straightforward, but here the problem is the control of them as a
complex whole pattern”.
- Ashby (1957:218)
Firms in the LNG industry faced a complex regulatory system. The main part of the
thesis focused on one particular element of a regulatory system—the federal regulatory
agency, which has the sole authority to approve the LNG terminal proposals. While the
federal regulator has the ultimate deciding power over the proposals, other elements of
the regulatory system working at different levels (state or federal) can impact the firm
directly or indirectly and to varying degrees. Firms face direct impacts from the executive
wings of the regulatory system and face indirect impacts from the legislative wings,
which enact the policy, while the actual implementation is carried out by the executive
wings of the government. Even when community contestation is unable to stop a firm
from gaining approval, it can throw other hurdles that can either delay the process or
make the project less viable even after gaining the approval from the federal regulator.
The above repertoire of actions can be viewed as stemming from the need to engage
stakeholders in some instances and exclude them in other instances as the firm teeters and
totters its way around a system of regulatory processes.
My future work will attempt to delineate the prominent reaction when a firm faces
multiple demands from the regulatory system. I will utilize recent works on institutional
complexity as a starting point for furthering the theoretical implication of this typology.
However, I deviate from the current emphasis in institutional complexity literature in two
major ways: a) instead of viewing complexity as occurring from competing institutional
logics, I shift towards complexity as occurring due to competing institutional
jurisdictions; b) instead of a merely looking at legitimation tactics, I consider
complementary delegitmation tactics from firms facing institutional complexity.
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7.4.1 From Competing Logics to Competing Jurisdictions
Recent efforts to understand firm behavior in response to institutional complexity has
almost made competing institutional logics to be synonymous to institutional complexity
(see for example, Almandoz, 2014; Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016; Greenwood et al.,
2010; Lee & Lounsbury, 2015). For instance, consider the following line from Toubiana
and Zietsma (2016: 3) in a forthcoming AMJ article – “This is particularly true when
organizations face competing prescriptions from different institutional logics, a situation
known as institutional complexity”. Even a call for papers in the journal Strategic
Organization that was dedicated towards “Strategic Responses to Institutional
Complexity” (Vermeulen, Zietsma, Greenwood, & Langley, 2014: 79) had four different
avenues for studying institutional complexities and all of these were connected with
institutional logics.
Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) considered institutional logics as “the socially
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality”. It provides “a link between
individual agency and cognition and socially constructed institutional practices and rule
structures”(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 101). Situating the behavior of individuals and
firms within a broader societal belief system and frame of reference has a somewhat
natural scholarly allure to it because of its ability to capture social life as we as scholars
ourselves experience it. However, it is possible to generate interesting theoretical insights
without necessary equating competing logics with institutional complexity. For instance,
Hoffman (2011) advances the notion of logic schism to explain the polarization of
climate change debate around convinced logics and skeptical logics and how it creates a
“shift from an integrative debate focused on addressing interests, to a distributive battle
over concessionary agreements with each side pursuing its goals by demonizing the
other” (page 3). Hoffman (2011: 9) argues that such logic schisms imply that the “two
sides are not so much competing as they are talking past one another”. Thus competing
institutional logics in this extreme manifestation are not really a source of complexity for
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any of the actors involved but rather they are boundaries that “define clear in-group and
out-group distinctions”.
On the other hand, institutional complexity can be framed without a decisive and
unquestioning recourse to conflicting institutional logics. For instance, Chandler (2014)
considers institutional complexity as “characterized by forces that ebb and flow in
wavelike patterns as societal expectations evolve, with attention coalescing around
specific events and then dissipating”. Complexity in such circumstances arises because of
the need to keep up with evolving societal preferences and not just those that are in
conflict. Using the context of multinational enterprises, Kostova and Zaheer (1999)
advance the notion of institutional complexity based on two dimensions: “first,
institutional environments are fragmented and composed of different domains reflecting
different types of institutions: regulatory, cognitive, and normative. Second, MNEs
conduct operations in multiple countries that may vary with respect to their institutional
environments and, thus, are exposed to multiple sources of authority”. This points
towards complexity arising from multiplicity in the institutions that place concurrent
demands on the firms but these institutions need not necessarily operate with the
underlying institutional logics in a state of conflict.
The institutional complexity due to the influence of multiple institutions is best captured
by “the theory of institutional polycentrism, which suggests that institutions originate
from multiple (poly) rule-setting centers such as governments, associations, and
communities” (Batjargal, Hitt, Texas, Jiao, & Webb, 2013: 1025). This clearly indicates a
shift from competing logics to competing jurisdictions. For instance, Luo, Wang, and
Zhang, (2016) consider the competing demands between provincial and central
governments in China that create complexity for firms trying to report their CSR
(corporate social responsibility) activities. Because of the multiple entities involved in the
regulatory system that I consider in the LNG context, the level of complexity facing the
firms is much greater than the one considered by Luo et al. (2016). Designing studies
with two governing institutions may be driven by the needs of econometric analysis but
as Elinor Ostrom (2010: 2), argued in her Nobel prize acceptance lecture : “due to the
complexity of broader field settings, one needs to develop more configural approaches to
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the study of factors that enhance or detract from the emergence and robustness of selforganized efforts within multilevel, polycentric systems” (emphasis added), Her insight
will be my guiding principle as I advance this line of work.

7.4.2 Legitimation AND Delegitimation
Extant theories in organizational and management research, including research on
institutional complexity, have an overwhelming focus on legitimacy (Überbacher, 2014).
Institutional theory predicts the various symbolic and decoupling measures that
organizations adopt in an attempt to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer
& Rowan, 1977). Stakeholder theory predicts that firms will yield to pressures from
powerful and legitimate stakeholders with urgent claims (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
Resource dependency theory (RDT) indicates that the power emanating from the control
of critical resources will force organizations to seek legitimacy from these powerful
others (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Research on categories indicates that since there are
“penalties for illegitimate role performance” (Zuckerman, 1999), firms tend to conform
to the expectations of the category decided by a powerful audience or critic. The
application of these principles often reduces to treating legitimation as restrictive form of
the evaluation process whereby firms are allowed only to recognize when to yield, how to
yield, and whom to yield to. These conceptualizations render firms powerless in
determining who participates in the legitimation process.
As Lamont (2012: 205) points out, evaluation is a social and cultural process that
involves “negotiation about proper criteria and about who is a legitimate judge [often
involving conflicts and power struggle]” (Bourdieu, 1993). Extant organizational theories
consider “Who is a legitimate judge” (Lamont, 2012) as a question for which the answer
is not negotiated but is merely discovered. For example, stakeholder theory (Mitchell et
al., 1997) considers stakeholder legitimacy and power, and the urgency of claims in order
to establish the salience of the stakeholders; however, firms are expected to only
recognize these attributes, and cannot negotiate or question them in any way.
The typology introduced above expands the horizon beyond legitimation and along two
dimensions. Firstly, I distinguish between covert and overt forms, and secondly, I
introduce delegitimation as a contrast to legitimation. For example, negative personal
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claims involve a publicly visible expression of the negative evaluation by the firm that
directly questions whether the self-appointed judges are indeed legitimate and thus
emphasizes the negotiation aspect of social evaluation instead of a taken-for-granted
aspect. This typology opens up the black box of the legitimation process by bringing the
spotlight on the bi-directional nature of the evaluation process—firms can be evaluators
and can also publicly share negative evaluations of the stakeholders. This is especially
likely in circumstances where firms face institutional complexity due to polycentric
governance (Ostrom, 2010). Hence, this typology explicitly shies away from assuming
that stakeholders are legitimate in an absolute sense because of some de facto,
extraneous, and widely understood social norm.
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion

8

Conclusion

The richness of the LNG industry context was both a boon and a bane. It was a boon
because, as a management and organizational scholar, the number of theoretical threads I
could unravel from its intricate fabric was worthy of intellectual drooling. It was a bane
because bringing the topic under control for generating a focused theoretical insight
would have meant a deliberate alienation of many potentially interesting areas of inquiry.
In spite of this challenge, I tried to be as inclusive as possible by undertaking an
integrative pathway that was aided by a set-theoretic (fsQCA) methodological
orientation. This allowed me to address the primary research question of this thesis: how
firms tailor their rhetorical strategies to community-level market entry conditions, and
how do these strategies affect entry outcomes? On the other hand, Chapter 7 was an
acknowledgment that, in spite of this measured inclusiveness, there are many insights
from this thesis that will keep me occupied for the next several years as I try to address a
much broader research question: how do firms try to overcome community contestation in
their efforts to succeed in their market entry process? Hence, I promote this conclusion
chapter as not an ending but an appraisal of what I have been able to achieve thus far and
an assessment of the landscape that lies ahead.
As this is an exercise in reflection of my scholarly work thus far, I am inclined to borrow
concepts from researchers studying – “work as a practice”. In their summarization of the
practice theory, Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1242) advance the notion of
“relationality of mutual constitution”, which essentially means that “phenomena always
exist in relation to each other, produced through a process of mutual constitution”. Thus
the person producing this thesis, the scholarly work that produced this thesis, and the
resultant artifact that this document represents are all mutually constitutive and one
cannot be separated from the other. I hesitate to share my assessment of the person
behind this work but instead I will discuss my assessment of the thesis as an artifact and
the scholarly work that I aspire to pursue.
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8.1 The Artifact
There are three aspects in this thesis that I feel especially excited about because they
explore areas that have not received a lot of attention from management and
organizational scholars. In the following subsections I will discuss each of these three
aspects: a) the notion of “social barriers to entry”; b) social contestation at the community
level; and c) repertoire of firm responses to community contestation. I am also looking
forward to the prospects of continuing to engage with these three theoretical
opportunities.

8.1.1 Social Barriers to Entry
Establishing a foothold in a new market requires not only a market entry strategy to
overcome barriers to entry but also non-market strategies to overcome social barriers to
entry (see section 6.3 for a related discussion). This study explores one such social barrier
to entry in the form of contestation from local communities, which can potentially derail
the firm’s efforts by leading to regulatory delays or unfavorable regulatory decisions.
While much extant scholarship has focused on the barriers to entry due to industry
structures (Porter, 1981) and political tactics of incumbents (Fligstein, 1996), little
attention has been paid to social barriers to entry at the community level.
Specific locations are not important just for competitive advantages but also for
operational startup. The location constraint forces firms to engage in a discursive process
because an exit is costly and the alternatives may not be viable. Since it is a proposal and
not an operational facility, social contestation occurs mainly on the basis of hypothetical
reasoning, which opens up an exciting avenue for investigation. Few studies consider the
lead up to operational startup (Sine & Lee, 2009) and thus ignore the perils in
establishing a foothold.
My arguments relating to community as a social barrier reflect the “old”
institutionalism’s emphasis on community as an institutional influence (Selznick, 1949;
Warren, 1967). Recently, however, the “new” institutional literature has witnessed calls
to move away from high-level abstractions and start considering (again) communities as
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the relevant social context (Jennings, Greenwood, Lounsbury, & Suddaby, 2013; Marquis
et al., 2007, 2011).

8.1.2 Local Manifestation of Social Contestation
Scholars have considered various aspects of social contestation but mainly in a mature
industry setting. In such macro social settings, contestation centers around socio-cultural
impacts of certain practices, such as the use of sweatshops (e.g., Lamin & Zaheer, 2012);
repeated events that become the realization of worst-case scenarios and fears (e.g., the
railway accidents considered by Desai, 2011); deeply embedded moral and cultural
evaluations of the products and services that translate into industry stigmatization
(Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012); and changing societal concerns such as
environmental issues that shape the re-evaluation of firms in certain industries (Elsbach,
1994; Hoffman, 1999).
By locating social contestation at the industry level and thus linking it with broader
societal concerns, scholars have not fully recognized that contestation can also occur
because of basic human needs and aspirations. As the LNG context of this thesis
demonstrates, themes that can become a source of contestation include mortal fear (such
as the threat of a terrorist attack on the LNG facility), living standards and aesthetics
(often referred to, in a pejorative sense, as NIMBY), recreation (LNG vessels interfering
with recreational boating), and food sources (fish larvae being sucked into the
regasification system). Hence, studying local manifestations of social contestations
highlights the dynamics of contestation centered around every day realities faced by the
communities as well as the firms entering them.

8.1.3 The Firm’s Repertoire of Responses
My main findings indicate that firms draw from a repertoire consisting of three rhetorical
tactics (i.e., positive claims, negative topical claims, and negative personal claims) to
design non-market rhetorical strategies, which under certain circumstances contribute to
regulatory success. This study reorients previous research on rhetoric by switching the
emphasis from persuasive tactics, such as positive claims, to dissuasive tactics targeting
not only the issues raised by communities but also the detractors themselves. By showing
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that none of the four rhetorical strategies leading to regulatory success requires positive
claims, my findings do not deny the widespread existence of positive rhetoric, but do
raise questions about its effectiveness.
This thesis also provides a framework for further enhancing our understanding of the
repertoire of responses available to firms by considering the overt and covert dimensions
of these tactics and by considering whether they are intended for legitimation or
delegitimation. Specifically, my future research will build on this study to understand the
effectiveness of delegitimation tactics by comparing it with the effectiveness of
legitimation tactics, which has been largely unquestioned by organizational and
management scholarship.

8.2 Working in the Middle
My inspiration for the term “The Middle” is from the title of an American Broadcasting
Corporation (ABC) sitcom. The show’s website describes the main character, Frankie
Heck (played by Patricia Heaton), as “a loving wife and mother of three, she’s middle
class in the middle of the country and is rapidly approaching middle age” (emphasis
added) … “sometimes it seems like everyone is trying to get to the top, or struggling not
to hit bottom, but we think Frankie and her family will find a lot of love, and a lot of
laughs, somewhere in The Middle” (original emphasis).15 While I relate at a very
personal level to the character of Frankie, I also find “scholarly happiness” when I am in
the middle. This thesis is also a reflection of the middle ground that I seek. Harkening
back to the article by Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1242) I assess my scholarly work
on three fronts: “empirical, theoretical, and philosophical—that relate to the what, the
how, and the why”.

15

http://abc.go.com/shows/the-middle/about-the-show
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8.2.1 In the Middle of Two Empirical Domains
“Organizational rationality thus calls for an open-system logic, for
when the organization is opened to environmental influences, some of
the factors involved in organizational action become constraints; for
some meaningful period of time they are not variables but fixed
conditions to which the organization must adapt. Some of the factors
become contingencies, which may or may not vary, but are not subject
to arbitrary control by the organization.” (original emphasis)
– Thompson, (1967: 24)
I view conflicts between business and society as an ideal setting to understand the
“constraints” and “contingencies” that influence the behavior of firms. Constraints
imposed by societal actors tend to persist in many instances, much like the sustained
community contestation that I consider, and it is far more difficult for firms to exercise
“arbitrary control” over non-market actors than over market actors. This conflict zone is
also a reminder that the open-system logic can be reversed and the firm’s activities can be
viewed as imposing constraints and contingencies on communities. Arriving at a local
negotiated order (Fligstein, 2001) between the community and the firm is not necessarily
a forgone conclusion, and a sustained conflict is a very real possibility. Being in the
middle of an empirical context that affords such possibilities has already helped me gain
theoretical insights on multiple fronts.

8.2.2 Theoretical Middle Ground
In one of my first PhD courses, I was exposed to the following depiction by Burrell and
Morgan (1979). I was still struggling to make some sense of the words epistemology and
ontology, when I had to figure my bearings on this map.
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Figure 9: “Four Paradigms of the Analysis of Social Theory”, from Burrell and
Morgan (1979: 22)
I have now come to an understanding that this struggle to place myself within a particular
quadrant will never end as I seek to integrate theories that have been built on different
epistemological paradigms. I’ve also come to terms with the two sides of the
epistemology coin: a) “how one might begin to understand the world” and b) how one
might “communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings” (Burrell & Morgan,
1979: 1). The former is an internal struggle to understand how the pursuit of knowledge
should be approached, and the latter is an external struggle to keep pace with evolving
tools, standards, and fads of the most appropriate ways of representing and
communicating this knowledge. In a way I am fortunate that fsQCA is becoming more
and more acceptable as such a tool for representation because it also helps me deal with
my first struggle, by deliberately bridging the divide between qualitative and quantitative
methods. Qualitative and quantitative methods have, in more ways than one, become,
respectively, epitomes of the subjective and objective dimensions in the above figure. It
is also a tool that is well suited for carrying out theoretical integration as my thesis has
demonstrated. The typology I developed in Chapter 7 is also very indicative of my
inclination to connect the dots. I will continue to pursue my work by fully embracing this
inclination for theoretical integration.
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8.2.3 Philosophical Middle (er Muddle)
At various points during my thesis work, I found myself oscillating between the
community’s side and the firm’s side of the story. I was often tempted to deceive myself
into believing that taking the side of the community would help me achieve a moral high
ground. However, what the firms were proposing was not really morally despicable.
Often, as in the context of LNG import terminals that were proposed in the U.S., issues
involved in the contestation are extremely complex and at times charged with emotion.
Certain issues may be so closely linked to the very operation of the industry that
conforming to the pressure would be equivalent to quitting. There are also unintended
consequences to mere conforming or appearing to conform to pressures. In the case of
LNG, multiple other industries rely on the supply of natural gas. Many consumers across
the U.S. have suffered because of high gas prices. In the Northeastern United States,
demand was driven by colder winters, and in the southern parts, it was driven by summer
demands on power generation facilities that were environmentally friendlier than coal
based power plants. While the touted environmental benefits of natural gas may not have
been completely accurate, it is much cleaner than alternatives such as coal or petroleum.
In fact the Sierra Club, one of the largest U.S. environmental NGOs, was a vehement
supporter of natural gas but changed its position with the shifts in public perceptions.
I have now come to believe in Hudson and Okhuysen’s (2014: 246) argument that
“knowledge taboos pose a threat to scholarly inquiry by inhibiting us as researchers
through unthinking self-policing.” While the authors were referring to studying
stigmatized aspects of organizational life, it is possible to think of other instances where
knowledge taboos can inhibit scholars from giving due theoretical consideration to
certain concepts, especially when they are empirically prevalent. This is not a
philosophical preaching of what should be driving a scholarly pursuit but it is more of a
“note to self”. It is my sincere hope that the complexities of the settings I explore will not
drive me towards sanitizing the morality out of those setting but instead I will strive to
embrace morality from every perspective, however at odds they may be. This is the
tightrope walk and “The Middle” that I will continue to pursue in my scholarly works.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Categorization of the Firm’s Rhetorical Responses to Social
Contestation
Note: The articles below are order according to the year of publication.
Article

Specific
themes

Type of
article

Positive claims

Negative topical
claims

(Sutton & Chapter 11
Callahan filing for
(1987)
Bankruptcy

Case studies

Ashforth
& Gibbs
(1990)

Problematic
legitimacy

Theoretical

Espousing
socially
acceptable
goals;
protestation of
legitimacy (“not
sufficient to
merely
exemplify
desirable
qualities: It is
necessary to
promote them”)

Redefining means
and ends (“frame
an issue in terms of
other values that
are seen as
legitimate”)

Oliver
(1991)

Institutional
processes

Theoretical

Manipulate

“Defiance: dismiss
(ignoring explicit
norms and values);
challenge
(contesting rules
and requirements)”

Negative
personal
claims

Defining and
denying
responsibility (“top
management and
the firm are not, or
should not be,
discredited”)

Defiance:
“Attacking
organizations
strive to
assault,
belittle, or
vehemently
denounce
institutionaliz
ed values and
the external
constituents
that express
them”
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Article

Specific
themes

Type of
article

Positive claims

Negative topical
claims

Negative
personal
claims

Marcus
&
Goodman
(1991)

Crisis

Hypotheses
testing

Elsbach
& Sutton
(1992)

Controversia
l and
possibly
unlawful
actions

Case studies

Enhancements
and entitlings
(“to highlight
the positive
changes … and
to claim credit
for these
changes”)

Justifications and
defenses (“of
innocence to reduce
negativeness of the
event and the
organization”)

Elsbach
(1994)

Controversia
l events

Mixed
methods

Acknowledgme
nts linked to
technical
characteristics

Denials “linked to
institutional
characteristics”;
denials “linked to
technical
characteristics”;
acknowledgments
“linked to
institutional
characteristics”

Elsbach,
Sutton, &
Principe
(1998)

Avert
undesirable
responses to
upcoming
events

Case studies

Accommodating
(favors/positive
selfcharacterization
s)

Bureaucratic

Intimidating
(threats)

James &
Wooten
(2006)

Discriminati
on lawsuits

Multifirm
qualitative
analytic

Change efforts

Denial; process
retaliation “firms
demonstrated
uncooperative
behavior and found
ways to manipulate
the lawsuit
proceedings”

Plaintiff
retaliation
(“firms
harassed or
threatened
their
accusers”)

Maguire
& Hardy
(2009)

Widespread,
taken-forgranted
practices of
DDT use

Case study

“Countering
problematizatio
n of efficacy
directly, i.e.
asserting
effectiveness of
DDT.”

Defending the
cognitive pillar
(“used science to
challenge the
factual basis of the
problematizations”)
; defend the
normative pillar
(extend the defense
of cognitive pillar;

Defensive signals
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Article

Specific
themes

Type of
article

Positive claims

Negative topical
claims

Negative
personal
claims

use ethical
arguments); defend
the regulative pillar
(extend the defense
of cognitive and
normative pillars;
no legal basis)
Desai
(2011)

Railway
accidents

Hypotheses
testing

“assert that
organizations in
the field
perform more
reliably than
organizations in
other fields”;
“communicate
gains made or
planned in the
industry”

“place blame for
accidents or poor
safety performance
on actors or forces
outside of
organizations in the
field”

Patriotta
et al.,
(2011)

Nuclear
accident

Case studies

“political actor
able to
contribute to
solving the
problem of
energy”; green
rationale

“industrial ‘test of
worth’ to define the
problem, attribute
causes, and defend
itself”; “maintain
that any assertions
not based on
analytical grounds
lacked credibility”

Lamin &
Zaheer
(2012)

Industrial
Hypotheses
practice
testing
(international
sweatshops)

Zavyalov
a et al.,
(2012)

Wrongdoing
s (product
recalls by
U.S. toy
companies)

Hypotheses
testing

Denial (dismissal
of the allegation);
defiance (“firm
challenges the
assertion that it
needs to take
additional action
and forcefully
questions its
portrayal as an
unsympathetic or
‘bad’ecompany”)
Statements of
ceremonial
actions (“do not
directly address
the cause of a
recall but

Statements of
technical actions
(“actions that are
perceived as
addressing the
problem of
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Article

Specific
themes

Type of
article

Positive claims

Negative topical
claims

Negative
personal
claims

instead highlight manufacturing and
positive
selling defective
characteristics
toys”)
of a firm”)
McDonne Consumer
ll &
boycotts
King,
(2013)

Hypotheses
testing

Prosocial claims
(“expressions of
the
organization’s
commitment to
socially
acceptable
norms, beliefs,
and activities”)
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Appendix B: Summary of Research Utilizing Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA)
Key: AJS (American Journal of Sociology); AMJ (Academy of Management Journal); ASR
(American Sociological Review); JOMS (Journal of Management Studies); SMJ (Strategic
Management Journal)
Note: The articles below are order according to the year of publication.
Article

Jou
rnal

Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ

Outcome

QCA’s Purported Utility

Amenta,
Carruthe
rs, &
Zylan
(1992)

AJS

Political
mediation
model of the
Townsend
Movement
during the
Great
Depression

State-wise
success in
implement
ation of
old-age
pension

“examines many combinations of potential
causes and generates the simplest combination
of them leading to outcomes of interest” …
“more than one path to public spending and that
QCA can locate these paths”

Chung
(2001)

JO
MS

Comparison of Business
marketgroup
centered
formation
theories,
culturalist
perspectives,
and the
institutional
approach to
explain the
emergence of
business
groups in
Taiwan

“Rather than ‘decompose’ a case into variables,
the Boolean approach juxtaposes elements of
cases into causal combinations (or conditions) to
explicate the outcome”

Cress &
Snow
(2000)

AJS

“systematic
understanding
of movement
outcomes by
analyzing how
organizational,
tactical,
political, and
framing
variables
interact and
combine”

“conjunctural in its logic, examining the various
ways in which specified factors interact and
combine with one another to yield particular
outcomes. This increases the prospect of
discerning diversity and identifying different
pathways that lead to an outcome of interest and
thus makes this mode of analysis especially
applicable to situations with complex patterns of
interaction among the specified conditions. In
addition, QCA simplifies analysis by dropping
irrelevant factors.”

“differenc
es in the
outcomes
attained
by 15
homeless
social
movement
organizati
ons
(SMOs)
active in
eight U.S.
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Article

Jou
rnal

Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ

Outcome

QCA’s Purported Utility

cities”
Hodson
&
Roscign
o (2004)

AJS

“interplay
between
organizational
and job-level
practices” as
determinants
of
organizational
success and
worker dignity

Organizati
onal
success
and
worker
dignity

“QCA considers all observed combinations of
causal factors and, with its comparative
algorithmic logic, eliminates redundant and
superfluous information. A key benefit of QCA
thus lies in its ability to specify underlying
configurations of variables relative to all
observed possibilities”; “conjunctural logic
makes QCA particularly appropriate for
analyses that seek to identify and understand
complex patterns of interaction among causal
determinants.”

Vaisey
(2007)

AS
R

“how culture
and structure
combine to
sustain—or
inhibit—the
experience of
community”

“the
experience
of
gemeinsch
aft, (the
wefeeling,
the sense
of
collective
self, or the
feeling of
natural
belonging)
”

“does not pit variables against each other;
instead, it looks at different configurations of the
independent variables and compares their
relationships to the outcome.” “Though they
seem similar, QCA/fsQCA configurations are
very different from GLM [generalized linear
model] interaction terms. For instance, an
‘AXB’ interaction term would take on
equivalent values if A were high and B were
low or vice versa. QCA/fsQCA treats these as
separate types of cases”

Grant et
al.
(2010)

AS
R

“how do the
characteristics
of facilities
and their
surrounding
communities
jointly shape
pollution
outcomes?”

Chemical
plants’
healththreatenin
g
emissions

“treat cases as combinations of attributes and
use Boolean algebra to derive simplified
expressions of combinations associated with an
out come”; “Even the inclusion of interaction
terms in regression does not model causal
complexity in the same way as FSA”... “Unlike
variable based methods that are founded on the
notion of unifinality and seek to estimate a
single recipe for all cases under examination,
QCA methods explicitly take the idea of
equifinality into account, allowing different
subsets of cases to produce the same outcome.”

Fiss
(2011)

AM
J

Miles & Snow
typology of
organizational
strategic

Organizati
onal
performan
ce

“The basic intuition underlying QCA is that
cases are best understood as configurations of
attributes resembling overall types and that a
comparison of cases can allow a researcher to
strip away attributes that are unrelated to the
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Article

Jou
rnal

Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ

Outcome

QCA’s Purported Utility
outcome in question”; “unlike, for example,
regression analysis— fuzzy set QCA does not
rest on an assumption that data are drawn from a
given probability distribution”… “calibration
reduces sample dependence, as set membership
is defined relative to substantive knowledge
rather than the sample mean, thus further
reducing the importance of sample
representativeness”

configurations

Crilly et
al.
(2012)

AM
J

“firms facing
identical
[stakeholder]
pressures
decouple
policy from
practice in
different ways
and for
different
reasons”

Decouplin
g/impleme
ntation

“This view of causality is distinct from that in
variable oriented research, which identifies
general patterns of association and seeks causes
that apply in all contexts”; “the method lends
itself to the use of smaller data sets for the
purpose of theory elaboration”; “By identifying
how effects combine to produce outcomes,
fsQCA is particularly appropriate for advancing
multilevel theory”; “fsQCA allows for
asymmetry between the drivers of decoupling
and the drivers of implementation”

Wright
&
Boudet
(2012)

AJS

Emergence (or
not) of social
movements
based on
community
context

Mobilizati
on or
nonmobili
zation
against
controvers
ial
proposals
for large
energy
infrastruct
ure
projects

“examines set-theoretic relationships, generates
causal recipes (or combinations of conditions
that correspond with the phenomenon), and
reduces these recipes to their simplest form”

Bell et
al.
(2014)

AM
J

“stock market
responses to
different
constellations
of firm-level
corporate
governance
mechanisms
by focusing on
foreign initial
public
offerings

Price
premium

“intended not to isolate the net, independent
effects of single explanatory factors on a
particular outcome, but rather to identify the
combinations of factors that bring about the
particular outcome”; “quite effective in
evaluating both the number and complexity of
alternative paths leading to a desired outcome”;
“enabled us to explore the nature of equifinality
in terms of the impact of different
configurations of firm-level characteristics and
mechanisms jointly with institutional factors on
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Article

Jou
rnal

Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ

Outcome

(IPOs)”

QCA’s Purported Utility
the overall process of legitimation”

Bartley
& Child
(2014)

AS
R

Conditions
related to
structural
power and
cultural
vulnerability
that make
certain firms
attractive
targets for
activism

Firms
targeted
by the
antisweatshop
movement

“helps identify configurations and allows for
probabilistic tests of causal sufficiency”

GarciaCastro
&
Francoe
ur
(2014)

SMJ

“explore
theoretically
and
empirically
some of the
complementar
ities, costs and
contingencies
likely to arise
in stakeholder
management”

High
performan
ce/very
high
performan
ce

“Set-theory uses set-subset connections rather
than correlations between the variables in order
to establish empirical links between the
conditions... While correlations are based on the
covariance of the variables studied, set-subset
connections are based on the degree of
membership in sets and subsets. If set X is
contained in set Y, then X is sufficient for Y. By
contrast, if set Y is contained in set X, then X is
necessary for Y.”

Misangy
i&
Acharya
(2014)

AM
J

Combinations
of governance
mechanisms

High (and
not-high)
profitabilit
y

“fsQCA takes the perspective that cases are
constituted by combinations of theoretically
relevant attributes (i.e., governance
mechanisms), that the relationships between
these attributes and the outcome of interest (i.e.,
firm profits) can be understood through the
examination of subset relations, and thus that the
attributes and the outcome are ‘best understood
in terms of set membership’”

Greckha
mer
(2015)

SMJ

“Executive
compensation
and its relation
to that of rank
and file
employees”

High CEO
compensat
ion, high
worker
pay, and
high pay
dispersion

“it enables disentangling complex
interdependencies among countries’ institutional
dimensions underlying organizational
outcomes”. “Captures the three elements of
causal complexity—conjunction, equifinality,
and asymmetry. Conjunction means that
attributes may not impact outcomes in isolation
from one another. Equifinality implies that
alternative attribute combinations may be linked
to an outcome. Asymmetry means that the
causes for occurrence of an outcome are not
necessarily the inverse of the causes of its
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Article

Jou
rnal

Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ

Outcome

QCA’s Purported Utility
absence and therefore each requires separate
theoretical and empirical consideration; it also
implies that the presence versus absence of
attributes may play different roles in the
occurrence of outcomes.”

Joshi,
Son, &
Roh
(2015)

AM
J

“sex
differences in
rewards and
performance”

Men
(women)
receive
higher
performan
ce
evaluation
s than
women
(men)

“Unlike other statistical procedures that rely on
significance testing or aim at explaining
variance in an outcome of interest, QCA
identifies which specific set of causal attributes
is common across all cases of an outcome”

Judge et
al.
(2015)

JO
MS

“how
imprinting
forces interact
with strategic
choice factors
to address
organizational
capacity for
change as a
firm moves
from private
to public firm
status”

“organizat
ional
capacity
for
change”

“The main advantage of fsQCA is that it enables
the discovery of one or more configurations of
cases as combinations of causal conditions,
whereby each case is assigned a groupmembership score in every causal condition”;
“while traditional variance methods require a
normal probability distribution of variables,
fsQCA makes no such assumption. This makes
it more suitable for smaller samples such as the
one investigated in this study. Since fsQCA does
not assume any kind of probability distribution,
outliers are not as much of a concern as in
regression analysis”

Vergne
&
Depeyre
(2015)

AM
J

Firm
adaptation
explored using
the competing
perspectives
of cognition
and dynamic
capabilities

Adaptatio
n (nonadaptation
)

“FsQCA relies on logical minimization to
identify necessary and sufficient conditions that
predict the occurrence and non-occurrence of an
outcome (here, adaptation and non-adaptation)”;
“fsQCA seeks commonalities and differences
across cases sharing the same outcome”; “allow
us to identify separately the antecedents of
adaptation and of non-adaptation”; “enables an
integration of two related literatures by
examining complementarities among their core
variables, all within a causal framework that
does not neglect the qualitative insights obtained
from the case studies”

Investor
reactions

“One of the core characteristics of fuzzy set
theory is that it allows for configurational
classifications and judgments based on the

Camp
bell,
Sirmo

AM
J

Investor
perceptions of
merger and
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Article
n, &
Schijv
en
(2016)

Jou
rnal

Phenomenon/
Theory/RQ
acquisitions
announcements

Outcome

QCA’s Purported Utility
simultaneous consideration of multiple
interdependent factors, in line with our
knowledge of how humans process
information”; “On the analytical front, these
tools provide a unique middle ground between
qualitative and quantitative methods”
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Appendix C: Summaries of Cases Used in Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (fsQCA)
The following table provides a snapshot of the 41 cases of LNG proposals used in the fsQCA
analysis. Subsequently, I provide a brief descriptive narrative of each case. As these descriptive
narratives indicate, each individual case has many different factors that can potential combine in
different and complex ways to determine regulatory success (or failure). This is exactly the kind
of circumstance where fsQCA is most useful and tries to combine the best of both the qualitative
and quantitative worlds. Traditional comparative case qualitative research relies on the
researcher’s ability to select the most theoretically relevant case studies for comparison. The
utility of fsQCA is that it algorithmically partials out the cases that are related to the causal
combinations of interest, from all other cases, which can probably be explained by other causal
combinations but are not related to the current theoretical focus. Hence, the number of cases that
finally make it to the causal recipes in the Findings section is much fewer than the universe
described in this appendix. However, by considering the entire set of 41 cases, fsQCA explicitly
incorporates the possibilities for other solution pathways and thus provides an equivalent of the
control logic of econometric method but at the entire case level (as a bundle of all attributes) and
not for individual variables.
Key: DEIS (Draft Environmental Impact Statement); FEIS (Final Environmental Impact
Statement); BCF/d (Billion Cubic Feet per day)
Ref

Project

Announce

Applied

1

Beacon

19-Jan-05

2

Bienville

2-May-05

3

23-Feb-05

5

Bradwood
Broadwater
Cabrillo

6

Calais

7

Calhoun

29-Aug05
13-Oct-04

4

9-Nov-04
14-Aug03

DEIS

FEIS

19-Jan05
12-Jan06

3-Mar06
28-Jun07

15-Jun06
17-Feb06
3-Sep03

17-Aug07
17-Nov06
29-Oct04

3-Nov06
22Mar10
5-Jun08
11Jan-08
15Mar07

6-Jan10
18Mar-05

30-Jun06

8-Aug07

Approval

Size
BCF
/d

Distanc
e to
city/
town
(miles)

Communit
y

Deep
water
Port

1.50

56.00

Yes

29-Oct10

1.40

63.00

Cameron,
LA
Mobile, AL

18-Sep08
20-Mar08

1.00

18.00

No

1.00

9.00

Clatsop,
OR
Suffolk, NY

1.50

21.50

Ventura,
CA

Yes

1.50

6.00

No

1.00

5.00

Washingto
n, ME
Calhoun,
TX

8-Aug-07

Yes

No

No

121

Ref

Project

Announce

Applied

DEIS

FEIS

8

Calypso

17-Dec-05

9

Camero
n

12-Jul-01

13-Oct06
30May-02

6-Nov07
28Mar-03

10

Casotte
Landing

17-Nov04

6-Oct05

20May-06

18-Jul08
14Aug03
26Dec06

11

Clearwater
Compass

18-Mar03
29-Mar04
3-Mar-03

28-Jan04
29Mar-04
23-Dec03

11-Feb05
18-Nov04

23-Nov04

23May-05

15-Dec05

3-Dec-03

29-Sep04
23-Dec06
7-Apr03

18-Feb05
15May-09
6-Nov03

16-Sep04
20-Dec02
3-Nov03
2-Nov04
13-Sep07

3-Mar05
2-Oct03
18-Jun04
24-Feb05
2-Sep08

12
13

Corpus
Christi

14

Creole
Trail

15

Crown
Landing
Downeast LNG
Freeport

16
17

18
19
20
21

Golden
Pass
Gulf
Gateway
Gulf
Landing
Ingleside

11-Jul-05
18-Jun-01

17-Jun-03
20-Dec-02
29-Jul-03
30-Jan-04

22

Jordan
Cove

23-Aug04

23

Liberty

9-Apr-08

24

LNG
Clean
Energy
Main
Pass

20-Oct-04

26
27

25

28

29

28-Sep10
8-Nov05

8-Nov05

19-Jun-03

27-Feb04

10-Jun05

Neptune

14-Feb-05

Northeast
Gateway
Oceanway

4-Jun-04

15-Feb05
13-Jun05

31May-06
16May-06

Oregon

14Apr-06
4Mar05
5May06
28Apr-06

25May04
3-Jun05
5-Dec03
3-Dec04
10Jun-05
1May09

24Nov06
9Mar06
27Oct-06
24Oct-06

Approval

Size
BCF
/d

Distanc
e to
city/
town
(miles)

Communit
y

Deep
water
Port

0.80

10.00

Yes

10-Sep03

1.50

13.00

Broward,
FL
Calcasieu,
LA

15-Feb07

1.30

3.60

Jackson,
MS

No

1.40

12.60

Yes

1.00

11.00

Ventura,
CA
Mobile, AL

13-Apr05

2.60

10.60

Nueces, TX

No

15-Jun06

3.30

0.00

Cameron,
LA

No

20-Jun06

1.20

3.50

No

0.50

3.00

26-Sep06

1.50

3.20

Gloucester,
NJ
Washingto
n, ME
Brazoria,
TX

30-Jun05
16-Jan04
29-Apr05
21-Jul-05

2.00

8.70

No

0.50

116.00

Jefferson,
TX
Orleans, LA

1.00

38.00

1.00

17.40

17-Dec09

1.00

4.00

2.40

15.00

15-Feb07

1.30

4.10

3-Jan-07

1.00

26-Mar07
7-Feb-07

No

Yes

No
No

Yes

Cameron,
LA
Nueces, TX

Yes

Coos, OR

No

Monmouth
, NJ
Jackson,
MS

Yes

37.00

Plaquemin
es, LA

Yes

0.75

10.00

Essex, MA

Yes

0.80

13.00

Essex, MA

Yes

Los
Angeles,
CA
Clatsop,

Yes

18-Jan-06

18-Aug06

1.20

21.00

3-Jan-07

10-Oct-

1.00

1.10

No

No

No
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Ref

Project

Announce

LNG
30
31
32
33
34

35
36

37
38

39
40
41

Pearl
Crossing
Port
Ambrose
Port
Arthur
Port
Dolphin
Port
Pelican
Quoddy
Bay
Sabine
Pass

Applied

DEIS

FEIS

Approval

Size
BCF
/d

Distanc
e to
city/
town
(miles)

08
25-May04
28-Sep-12
16-Apr-04
2-Apr-07
15-May01
8-Jun-04
6-Dec-01

Safe
Harbor
SES

26-Jan-06

Sparrow
s
Vista
DelSol
Weavers

14-Jan-06

9-Oct-02

25-Jul-03
10-Apr-02

25May-04
28-Sep12
15Mar-05
29Mar-07
25-Nov02
26-Dec06
22-Dec03

Communit
y

Deep
water
Port

OR
18-Apr05

29-Aug05
17-Apr08
29May-03

12-Aug04

29Mar-07
2-Feb04

7-Oct05

23-Jan07
8-Sep04
30-Dec03

25-Apr08
17-Dec04
30-Jul04

28Apr-06
13-Jul09
22Aug03

12Nov04

5-Dec08
15Apr-05
20May05

15-Jun06
19-Apr10
20-Jan04

15-Dec04

15-Jan09
15-Jun05
30-Jun05

1.00

40.00

Cameron,
LA
Monmouth
, NJ
Jefferson,
TX
Hillsboroug
h, FL
Vermilion,
LA

Yes

0.40

31.10

1.50

5.86

1.20

28.00

1.60

36.00

2.00

0.50

Washingto
n, ME
Cameron,
LA

No

2.60

10.40

2.00

13.50

Nassau, NY

Yes

0.70

2.00

No

1.50

1.00

1.00

10.00

Los
Angeles,
CA
Baltimore,
MD
Nueces, TX

0.80

2.20

Bristol, MA

No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No

No
No

The picture below maps the distribution of the terminals. The numbers correspond to the
reference in the table above. The green numbers reached the approval stage and those in
red didn’t. The explosion sign marks proposals that faced sustained community
contestation.
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Descriptive Narratives
Beacon (Beacon Port Clean Energy): In announcing this project, ConocoPhillips touted its many
benefits and its own capabilities, stating, “This state-of-the-art facility will offload LNG from
carriers, store and regasify the LNG, then make the natural gas available through a system of
pipelines for delivery to consumers in Louisiana and beyond. This terminal is part of a larger
effort by ConocoPhillips to meet growing demand for natural gas around the world. The company
is developing or has proposed other U.S. regasification facilities in Freeport, Texas, and offshore
Alabama. ConocoPhillips has an active liquefaction facility in Kenai, Alaska, as well as others at
various stages of development around the world, including Australia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia and
Venezuela.” Beacon did not face any community contestation but was abandoned because
Conoco had already signed up for capacity in Freeport and Golden Pass LNG projects, which
were in the same Gulf of Mexico region.
Bienville (Bienville Offshore Energy Terminal): TORP Technology decided to introduce the
HiLoad Technology into the LNG import terminals for the first time in the world through this
terminal proposal. Lars Odeskaug, CEO of TORP, described it as “semi-floating L-shaped
loading terminal that can dock onto any ship in a similar way as a forklift picks up a pallet” …
“We’re in 525 feet of water and the features on our seawater intakes have been designed to
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minimize the impact on the environment. We have designed our seawater filters such that we
don’t actually suck in marine life.” This technology was superior to open-rack vaporizers used by
other offshore terminal proposals in the Gulf of Mexico that faced community opposition because
of their impact on fisheries. However, the technology was also inferior to the closed-loop systems
that used ambient air instead of seawater for converting LNG to its natural state. As a part of the
regulatory process, the National Marine Fisheries Service warned that this technology could still
be potentially harmful. The Alabama Governor also expressed concerns. TORP decided to
modify its design to incorporate these concerns even though doing so meant the process would be
delayed.
Bradwood (Bradwood Landing Project): Bradwood was the fourth LNG proposal along the
Columbia River in Oregon. CEO William “Si” Garrett, of NorthernStar Natural Gas LLC (the
sponsoring firm), indicated that “Bradwood’s remoteness makes it safer and other benefits to the
site include that it is already zoned for marine industrial and is near the shipping channel.”
Similar to other proposals along the Columbia River, Bradwood started facing community
contestation very early, and the intense contestation was sustained throughout the length of the
proposal. Being so far upstream meant that the location was remote but it also meant that the
LNG tankers would need to make a longer journey along the river, passing through potentially
vulnerable areas such as the Lewis and Clark National Wildlife Refuge. It also meant the river
had to be dredged to allow this journey to happen. As one are resident, Robert Pile, put it, “if it
goes ahead the natural setting of the lower Columbia would change radically and for all practical
purposes forever.” Fisheries, especially the salmon habitat, became a big concern, leading
NorthernStar to promise a $59 million remediation fund. It recruited the Lower Columbia Fish
Recovery Board and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to work with them and identified
150 acres on Svensen Island that it would purchase to implement the remediation. As Gary
Coppedge, vice president for permitting and development, indicated, “funds go ‘above and
beyond’ the company’s legal requirements to mitigate the impacts of the project.”
Broadwater (Broadwater Energy): This proposal was a joint venture between Shell and
TransCanada. As Hal Kvisle, TransCanada’s CEO, acknowledged, “we were jumping into a
frying pan when we chose this site, but we believe it is the closest possible location to the New
York and Connecticut markets. New York is at the end of the pipeline network, making the giant
market one of the most difficult areas to provide with adequate gas volumes.” Even though it was
designated an onshore terminal, the actual structure would be in the middle of a water body
between New York and Connecticut, called the Long Island Sound. As one of the project
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spokesperson, Froydis Cameron, described it, “Viewed from nine miles away on a clear day it is
hardly visible, and is blocked by the tip of your thumbnail if you hold it up against your line of
vision. Besides, it is designed to look like a ship. Ships are nothing new in New York—the city
with an amazing maritime heritage. LNG ships coming into the [Long Island] Sound would
simply join the countless others already plying the trades.” The project remained anything but
inconspicuous and the companies were really jumping into the fire rather than the frying pan.
When Broadwater offered $15 million in annual payments (in lieu of paying taxes), Philip
Cardinale, the Town of Riverhead supervisor, called it “hush money” and “payment in lieu of
safety.” The town voted on a resolution opposing the project because of “insurmountable
problems relating to safety and security” and “permitting an industrial use in Long Island Sound,
a public resource, by a private for-profit entity is bad public policy.” John Hritcko, Broadwater’s
regional planning director, was quick to launch a counterattack, stating, “I am a little surprised he
is using that terminology. We haven’t been clandestine or underhanded.”…“We are committed to
a process of determining the future of Broadwater based upon facts, not conjecture or unfounded
assumptions.” When Richard Amper, executive director of the Long Island Pine Barrens Society,
described it as “the biggest threat to safety and environment since the Shoreham nuclear power
plant 25 years ago,” Broadwater response was, “You have to look at this on a factual basis with
knowledgeable people who understand safety and security and who understand these systems,
and not to go out and make these sensationalized claims that it’s going to be doom and gloom and
harm for the folks on the shoreline.” As the contestation intensified, Broadwater also intensified
its use of dissuasive rhetoric.
Cabrillo (Cabrillo Port/ Cabrillo Deepwater Port): Proposed by BHP Billiton in order to become
an entry point for its liquefaction projects in Australia, Cabrillo was supposed to provide “a
unique and environmentally friendly alternative to meeting the energy and environmental
demands of California” because “Natural gas is a more efficient and cleaner burning fuel than
coal or oil, and offshore location minimizes social and environmental impacts while providing a
safer and less intrusive locale for its operations.” Tim Riley, an attorney in the city of Oxnard,
California, set up a website (http://timrileylaw.com/LNG.htm) dedicated to fighting this project
and even produced a video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2E0U9q1yFGk ) highlighting the
many risks of an LNG terminal. Riley predicted very early on that “The solid opposition in
Oxnard that has fought against LNG in the past is stronger than ever and has been reinforced and
fortified by new members of our community” and “the Malibu community, whose affluence and
influence go without saying, will join our extended coastal communities.” Sure enough, Malibu
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Mayor Andy Stern got the council to budget $50,000 to pay the legal costs in fighting the project.
Pierce Brosnan had an opposition letter signed by Barbra Streisand, Cindy Crawford, Martin
Sheen, Tom Hanks, Sting, and Charlize Theron. That letter said, “Once built, the terminal will be
the length of three football fields, 14 storeys high and will receive, store and process LNG, a
highly flammable substance, from huge LNG tankers that arrive at least two to three times a week
from various foreign countries.” However, Chip Goodyear, CEO of Goodyear, thought
“environmentalists are living in ‘dreamland’ if they think conservation will meet the state’s
growing energy needs.” Kathi Hann, BHP spokesperson, also countered, “We’re not in anybody’s
backyard. We’re in the middle of the ocean.”… “We chose this spot because it has a coastal
pipeline connection already existing that we can hook into.” Cabrillo had its supporters such as
Oxnard Chamber of Commerce and it even enlisted Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard to
lobby with Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger. However, because of intense local opposition, both the
California Coastal Commission and the California State Lands Commission voted against the
project forcing Gov. Schwarzenegger to reject the proposal. Finally, the MARAD (the Maritime
Administration, the federal regulator) also disapproved the proposal—the only offshore proposal
that was actually disapproved (not withdrawn).
Calais (Calais LNG Project): Calais was initially promoted by BP Consulting (not related to
British Petroleum), a private firm formed by Maine State Rep. Ian Emery and Former
Passamaquoddy tribal Councilor Fred Moore. Cianbro Corporation (one of the largest
construction companies in the U.S.) and the Passamaquoddy tribal government for the Indian
Township reservation would be part owners of the LNG terminal. Moore remarked that, “we’re
talking about full participation by a Native American tribe because BP Consulting is examining
the need for economic development opportunities for native American communities and how that
need can be interfaced or meshed with industry.” This did not preempt community opposition
against Calais, especially from the local NGO, Save Passamaquoddy Bay, whose spokesman, Bob
Godfrey, described it as the “the absolute worst of the three projects” (referring to the two LNG
projects proposed before Calais in Washington County, Maine). The proposal ran into initial
trouble when Cianbro withdrew its backing but Ian Emery revitalized the project by bringing in
Art Gelber, head of Texas-based energy consulting and advisory firm Gelber & Associates. While
community opposition persisted, especially with respect to the navigability of the LNG vessels
through the St Lawrence Canal, Calais ran into trouble getting project financing. For a short
while, they had the backing of Goldman Power (a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs Group Inc.) but
that fell through after the 2008 financial crisis. Apparently Goldman Sachs had already spent $24
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million on the proposal before its exit. Finally, in 2012, the FERC disapproved the project stating,
“your continued inability to secure either financing or a site for the project is evidence that you
are not currently in a position to proceed with this project.” This was one of the two onshore
projects (along with Quoddy) that were actually dismissed.
Calhoun (Calhoun LNG): It was proposed by Gulf Coast LNG Partners, a privately held firm,
and Haddington Ventures, next to an industrialized zone. There were multiple industrial facilities
nearby that could be potential customers for natural gas and was also very close to a major natural
gas pipeline corridor. It faced only isolated incidents of community opposition.
Calypso (Calypso Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port): Proposed by SUEZ Energy North
America (SENA), this offshore terminal was supposed to have “marine offloading buoy and
anchoring system that will reside approximately 150 feet below the ocean surface when not in
use. It will connect to an undersea pipeline operated by another SENA subsidiary, Calypso U.S.”
Zin Smati, President and CEO of SENA, promoted that the project thus: “The overwhelming
feedback we have received from Florida customers is that they need additional, LNG-based gas
supplies and they need them as soon as possible. It is our intention to meet our customers’ needs
and be the first supplier of natural gas directly into the southeastern Florida market derived from
LNG… We believe our Calypso project is consistent with Governor Bush’s call for fuel
diversification as outlined in his comprehensive 2006 Florida Energy Act.” Apart from the typical
issues of safety, environmental concerns, fossil fuel, and fisheries that other offshore projects
faced, Calypso also faced some local flavors of these concerns. Pedro Monteiro, Sierra Club
Broward Group conservation chair, said, “Judging by the number of oil rigs destroyed or adrift
due to Katrina, the industry does not appear to be able to make their structures stand up to the
increasing number of hurricanes. I have concerns about how Suez will bring the gas to shore, and
how they will ensure that the pipeline will not break free and sweep the seafloor.” There was
mounting pressure on Florida Gov. Charlie Crist to reject the project with residents urging him in
town hall meetings, stating, “We want him to know we don’t want something in our community
which is potentially dangerous, subject to terrorist attack, potentially going to damage not only
our beaches and waters but our homes. If there is an explosion we will be annihilated.” After
Gov. Crist expressed his concerns, Calypso withdrew from the project.
Cameron (Cameron LNG/Hackberry LNG Terminal): This was initially proposed by Dynegy as
Hackberry LNG, but because of its financial troubles, it sold the proposed project to Sempra
Energy just after the project had received its Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS).
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Sempra renamed the project as Cameron. When the project was announced, Steve Bergstrom,
president and chief operating officer of Dynegy Inc., highlighted its many advantages: “The
existing Hackberry site was operated as an LPG terminal by Trident and acquired by Dynegy in
1995. The terminal is strategically positioned with access to the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic
Basin and will have the ability to connect to a number of natural gas pipelines that reach most
major natural gas markets in the United States. Dynegy will add one LNG tank and vaporization
facilities to the Hackberry site. Siting the new terminal and gasification plant at the Hackberry
site with key infrastructure already in place, including a jetty, dock and ship berthing structure, is
a tremendous advantage.” Cameron didn’t face any community contestation. Cameron became
the first offshore LNG terminal to be approved by the FERC in the new millennium. The decision
famously became known as the “Hackberry decision.”
CasotteLanding (Casotte Landing LNG Project/Bayou Casotte Energy): When ChevronTexaco
announced this project next to its Pascagoula Refinery, it was joined by Mississippi Gov. Haley
Barbour, who claimed, “ChevronTexaco has a history of continued investment in Mississippi and
is a recognized leader in the production of cleaner diesel and gasoline fuels. These projects
address a growing demand for energy in the U.S. and would position Mississippi as a leader in
the supply of clean and reliable energy to the region.” CasotteLanding didn’t face much
community contestation.
Clearwater (Crystal Clearwater Port project/ Clearwater Port): This project was initial proposed
by Crystal Energy LLC with a logic that its president William O. Perkins III elaborated as
“California currently imports about 90 percent of the natural gas it consumes. Demand
projections call for a 20 percent increase this decade. Yet, even as demand is increasing, other
Western States that once provided California with inexpensive natural gas are now using more of
the supply for their own needs, leaving the state with a severe shortage. By locating the facility 11
miles offshore on an existing platform, public safety and environmental impacts will be reduced
to the simple installation of a state-of-the-art natural gas pipeline.” For a short while, there was
participation in the project from Woodside Energy, Australia’s largest publicly traded
independent O&G company, before it decided to pursue its own offshore LNG terminal proposal
(Oceanway). After Woodside’s exit, NorthernStar Natural Gas Inc. took over the project from
Crystal. A little north from Clearwater location, NorthernStar was already developing the
Bradwood but justified its decision thus, “We will be able to leverage our knowledge and
experience as we develop our projects to expedite the permitting process and to increase the
likelihood of success for each successive project.” Shortly after taking over, NorthernStar hired
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former Ventura County Deputy District Attorney, Jeff Gorell, and former chairman of the
California Energy Commission, Joe Desmond. Clearwater faced a similar type of opposition as
the nearby Cabrillo project but continued pressing forward even after Cabrillo was disapproved,
with Desmond claiming that, “Unlike BHP we’re making use of existing infrastructure, which is
consistent with the Coastal Act. More importantly the company would use ‘ambient air
vaporizers’ [closed-loop] to bring the cooled fuel’s temperature up for regasification. That
process uses 80 percent energy.” Pacific Environment, a local NGO, published a report,
“Collision Course: How Imported Liquefied Natural Gas Will Undermine Clean Energy in
California,” which called into question the very premise of Clearwater, including increased
demand and lower emissions. The project didn’t even make it to the DEIS stage as the company
stopped its efforts.
Compass (Compass Port LNG project): When ConocoPhillips started working on this project, it
had recently faced defeat from the town of Harpswell, in Maine, where its JV project with
TransCanada had been voted out by the residents. So one of the first things Compass did was to
commission Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants to conduct safety studies of accidental LNG
releases in offshore terminals and Dauphin Island Sea Lab to conduct studies of impact on sea life
because of seawater intake in open-rack technology based offshore terminals. Because LNG is at
–260° F, when the seawater comes in contact with the container holding LNG, there is a heat
exchange and LNG becomes natural gas but the seawater suddenly drops in temperature. This
water is then pumped back to sea. Just a few months after Conoco commissioned the studies, in
September of 2004, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) started raising
concerns that “If the organisms are not killed by the temperature drop, they will not survive being
banged around by the pump machinery or the harsh chemicals used to keep the inside of the pipes
clean… the risk of wiping out entire species of commercially important fish in the Gulf, such as
red drum and red snapper, is too much to allow the once-through system.” NOAA’s report on the
negative impact led to community contestation that eventually got the Alabama Gov. Bob Riley
to also denounce the project. Conoco withdrew the proposal stating, “It is clear that Governor
Riley still has environmental concerns despite the independent scientific studies predicting
minimal impact.”
CorpusChristi (Corpus Christi LNG): This project was a partnership between Cheniere Energy
Inc. and BPU LLC, an affiliate of Sherwin Alumina, to build the terminal next to an existing
Sherwin facility, which would also be a consumer of the natural gas from the terminal. The
project faced no community opposition.
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CreoleTrail (Creole Trail LNG): CreoleTrail was another onshore project of Cheniere in the
South that did not face any opposition. During its announcement, Steve Trahan, president of the
Cameron Parish Police Jury (equivalent of county council in Louisiana), said, “Cheniere Energy
is welcome in Louisiana and especially in Cameron Parish. Their openness with our residents,
pro-active commitment to becoming a good citizen in the community and their credibility in
delivering on their promises to work with us as they developed the Sabine Pass LNG terminal has
earned our support for any other project they choose to develop.”
CrownLanding (Crown Landing LNG): CrownLanding, sponsored by British Petroleum (BP),
faced lower local opposition compared with other onshore projects, and it had overwhelming
support from the New Jersey state government. Its problem was across the border—from the state
of Delaware. This proposal led to a spat between the two state governments because of a 17th
century boundary, which New Jersey claimed was “superceded by a 1905 interstate compact
signed by Delaware and New Jersey that gives New Jersey control over facilities on its side of the
river.” Delaware’s claim was “a Supreme Court decision dating from 1935 upholding Delaware’s
control over that particular patch of the river, though New Jersey has control over other parts of
the Delaware River.” The escalation between the two states reached such a point that Delaware
House Majority Leader Wayne Smith introduced a bill, urging the Delaware Governor “to call
upon the Delaware National Guard to protect the territorial integrity of the State of Delaware and
to block and/or remove any encroachments upon our boundary.” The Governor of New Jersey
responded (jokingly perhaps) that “the capital of Delaware, Dover, is within firing range of the
USS New Jersey, which has been de-commissioned and is now used as a floating museum on the
New Jersey shore.” Thankfully, the two states resolved the issue in the court of law. While the
case dragged on in the Supreme Court for nearly four years, BP secured federal regulatory
approval for the project. Even though the courts finally ruled equal jurisdiction between the two
states, the federal approval remained intact.
Downeast (Downeast LNG): In 2005, Downeast became the second proposal to appear in
Washington County, Maine. At the end of my data collection period (December 31, 2013),
Downeast remained an active proposal but hadn’t moved past the DEIS stage because of
sustained community opposition. The project was promoted by Dean Girdis, with financial
backing from Kestrel Energy Partners LLC, an oil and gas private equity investment firm. At the
beginning of the project, Girdis enthusiastically proclaimed, “The burden is on the developer. It’s
for us to go out there and talk to people and try to answer their questions and address their
concerns and keep them informed of what the project is. In the absence of that, human reaction is
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understandable.” Downeast tried various tactics to assuage community fears. They brought in
experts to explain the dynamics of the flammability of LNG and the technical features of the
terminal that would make it safe. They demonstrated computer simulations and brought in local
ship pilots to counter concerns that the LNG vessels couldn’t navigate Passamaquoddy Bay.
However, the project faced intense and sustained contestation from the local NGO Save
Passamaquoddy Bay and, at the same time, the project also had to deal with a financial crunch.
The initial funding of $7.5 million provided by Kestrel was fast running out with all the studies
and outreach programs that the project needed to conduct. That didn’t prevent Dean Girdis from
offering $3.5 million in annual benefits (once built) to the Town of Robbinston. Some of the
components of this offer were “DowneastLNG would pay the entire portion of its property tax
obligation, estimated to be 92 percent of the town’s budget. (Currently around $300,000, the
budget would soar to about $1.3 million because of the higher total valuation for the town.) The
company would establish a town community development fund for $100,000 annually during the
plant’s construction phase and $1.2 million a year during its operation. The company would
contribute $500,000 annually to a previously announced Washington County economic trust
fund. Homeowners with abutting properties would have a choice of three compensation plans,
including a one-time $25,000 “impact fee.” By 2011, Kestrel had already spent $17.5 million and
was still trying to find a way to make it to the FEIS stage.
Freeport (Freeport LNG): Freeport was one of the first LNG proposals of Cheniere and faced a
few incidents of community contestation but not at sustained levels. Initially, Crest Investment
was involved in the project. Crest Investments had two co-chairmen. One was Jamal Daniel, who
was appointed by Crest to serve as advisor to the Board of Cheniere. The other co-chair was Neil
Bush, sibling of President George W Bush and Governor Jeb Bush. Because of Neil Bush, there
is an interesting conspiracy theory promoted by CounterPunch.16 Cheniere had filed a lawsuit
against Crest because it had obtained rights for the Quintana Island location where Cheniere was
planning to propose the Freeport project. The lawsuit was settled out of court and shortly after
Cheniere and Crest became partners. CounterPunch claims that it has an internal Freeport memo
that designates Crest to “handle the political permitting side.” Apart from this alleged internal
memo, everything else is a veritable fact! By 2004, a private investor Michael S. Smith had also

16

http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/03/08/neil-bush-and-crest-investments/
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purchased equity in the project and had become the CEO of Freeport LNG Development, LP.,
and then Dow Chemicals picked up equity stake along with supply of natural gas to one of its
local plants.
GoldenPass (Golden Pass LNG): When ExxonMobil announced this project, it was accompanied
by Texas Governor Rick Perry who stated: “This project will provide jobs and other economic
benefits to Sabine Pass and Southeast Texas, and bring long-term supplies of natural gas for our
industries, power plants and homes. We support ExxonMobil’s efforts to bring this important
project to Texas.” The project did face small levels of community contestation mainly based on
safety and aesthetics concerns. Port Arthur Mayor Oscar Ortiz said he “wouldn’t support
disannexing more than 900 acres for the ExxonMobil facility unless concerns over pollution and
local labor are resolved.” Jefferson County was an out of compliance region for the Clean Air Act
purposes. However, the local council voted 9–1 for providing land to Exxon, with Mayor Ortiz
being the sole dissent. A few months later, Mayor Ortiz had also changed his stance. When some
of the local residents started putting up signs opposing the terminal, he stated, “if ExxonMobil
moves forward with the project, the city could add $600 million to $800 million to its tax base.
It’s something that the city couldn’t pass up even if it wanted to. There’s always a chance of an
accident, but these people have got to understand, they’ve been living in a city that has got more
refineries in it than any other city in Southeast Texas and we haven’t had that kind of a
catastrophe yet and hopefully we never will.” A local resident, Shirley McGuire, described the
DEIS by summing it all up: “The draft environmental impact statement is very thick and it covers
people very little.”
GulfGateway (Gulf Gateway project/Energy Bridge offshore LNG Port): El Paso initially
invested in this project as a means to implement a new technology it had developed called Energy
Bridge. In traditional LNG import terminals, the regasification occurred on the terminal but
Energy Bridge’s compatible ships would have this ability onboard. When the Energy Bridge ship
arrives near the terminal, a buoy would be employed that would be pulled into a receiving cone
and connect with the ship. Then the regasified LNG in the form of natural gas would be directly
pumped into a subsea pipeline that would take it into the main natural gas pipeline network. This
project, along with the Energy Bridge technology, was later spun off into a separate company
called Excelerate Energy, LLC. This project did not face any contestation throughout its lifecycle.
GulfLanding (Gulf Landing LNG terminal): This offshore project of Shell became a target of
community contestation because of the impact on fisheries. National Marine Fisheries Service
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(NMFS) in its report said, “the project’s open-loop heating system, which will use an estimated
135 million gallons of seawater per day to regasify the LNG, would have a dramatic impact on
certain fish stocks. This single LNG terminal could cause mortality to billions of fish eggs and
larvae annually. The proposed action described is unsatisfactory from an environmental and
public welfare standpoint.” However, Shell countered this claim, stating, “the Coast Guard has
advised us that numbers cited in their FEIS for impacts on red drum [are] incorrectly overstated
and will be adjusted. This adjustment will clearly demonstrate that there are no significant
impacts on essential fish habitat. The percentage quoted by several organizations is only a
comparison to the amount of red drum landed by recreational fishermen and not to the overall red
drum population. Red drum landed by recreational fisherman—12.7-million pounds in 2002—
likely represents a small fraction of the overall red drum population.” Shell also asserted that
changing over to closed-loop system would cost $43 million annually and it was too expensive.
Shell promised it would engage scientists from Louisiana or Texas universities to study the
impact once the terminal was built. Relatedly, it made multiple charitable donations—“$4 million
to America’s Wetland, Louisiana’s nonprofit public relations campaign in support of the state’s
coastal restoration efforts”; “spent more than $5 million on its Marine Habitat Grant program,
which finances a variety of research and education programs aimed at the Gulf, in association
with the National Fish & Wildlife Foundation.”
Ingleside (Ingleside Energy Center): This Occidental Petroleum’s proposal was located within
its own petrochemical facility where it would “warm the LNG back into a gaseous state with
waste heat from the chemical complex and then to feed the vaporized gas to its chemical unit’s
440 MW cogeneration unit, as well as to fuel the chemical plants themselves.” It did not face any
community contestation.
JordonCove (Jordon Cove LNG): Initially this project was proposed by a consortium of
investors, who formed a company specifically for this purpose, called Energy Projects
Development LLC. A year after its announcement, it was taken over by Fort Chicago Energy
Partners, a Canadian income fund. Jordon Cove faced very high levels of sustained community
contestation. This was the first of the three terminals proposed along the Columbia River in
Oregon. While safety fears and the impact on the Columbia River because of the LNG ships were
the main concerns, other concerns also formed the undercurrent of fear. One big fear was that the
locals would not have a say at all and this was how a local resident, Jody McCaffree, put it, “It’s
not right to have non-elected people decide these things when we taxpayers are paying for this. I
think this is all being done without any public input. I’ve tried to be open-minded about it, but
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they’re trying to put these [terminals] in all over the country and they’re being turned down right
and left.” Bob Braddock, project manager, held multiple community meetings where he
highlighted the many benefits of the proposal including “site already is zoned for industrial and
marine use, will be largely obscured by dune woodlands and is a mile and a quarter from the
nearest home”; “Jordan Cove will be a good neighbor to the Bay Area”; “would be the smallest
LNG import terminal in the country”; “most efficient and environmentally benign natural gas
fueled power plant in Oregon” and also countered safety concerns by stating, “these [LNG
terminals] withstood the Kobe earthquake [in Japan].” However, the feeling of being exploited
continued among the local residents with one of the fears being that most of the gas was meant
for California or in the words of a resident, “We’re using only 10 percent of this gas and getting
100 percent of the mess.” In some meetings, demonstrators shouted that they didn’t want to get
“FERCed” (sounding like a well-known swear word). Jordon Cove remained aggressive in
countering issues and often times the detractors.
Liberty (Liberty Natural Gas): A JV between Canadian Superior Energy Inc. and Global LNG
Inc., called Excalibur Energy (USA) Inc., was set up to manage this project. Canadian Superior’s
CEO, Craig McKenzie, highlighted its many benefits, including an interesting design feature:
“Liberty Natural Gas was borne out of over two years of design development and several series of
stakeholder interviews in the New Jersey and New York areas. Its design is simple and it is
basically a natural gas pipeline project with an offshore, anchored submerged natural gasreceiving turret. Impact on all components of the environment and marine life has been carefully
considered in our design. Near-shore the pipeline will be directionally drilled so that no surface
sediments are disturbed. Onshore the pipeline will be laid within an existing interstate pipeline
corridor to Linden, New Jersey. The design capacity is up to 2.4 billion cubic feet per day, which
is sufficient to safely satisfy all the growing needs in the area such that multiple projects will not
have to be undertaken.” However, this was not enough to prevent local opposition led by NGO
Clean Ocean Action, which laid out the many issues with the proposal including: “LNG is foreign
and will come primarily from sources in Russia and the Middle East. These countries are not the
friendliest to the US, nor are they consistent”; “Markets all over the world that do not have rich
domestic sources are vying for LNG and are willing to pay as much as twice as the US, and at
times even more. The loyalty of the supply is to the dollar”; “can be up to 40% more polluting
than US gas supplies because of the excessive energy needs that LNG requires during its lifecycle
through cooling, loading onto tankers, transporting and regasifying. Moreover, the
industrialization of the ocean with tankers and facilities would have substantial environmental
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consequences to the marine environment, threatening our fishing and tourism industries and the
economy.” The project also faced internal troubles with the financial situation of its sponsor firms
and then moved to a private firm. It was finally abandoned as the private firm backing it decided
to start a completely different project called Port Ambrose.
LNGCleanEnergy (LNG Clean Energy/ Project Clean Energy): This project was initially
proposed by Gulf LNG Energy, LLC, and was later joined by Sociedade Nacional de
Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol), which had liquefication projects in Angola. The president of
Gulf LNG Energy was Dee Osborne, who was also the president of Crest Investments, which was
involved in Freeport LNG project (see the above discussion on Freeport and its connection with
Neil Bush). LNGCleanEnergy faced very little community contestation.
MainPass (Main Pass Energy Hub): McMoRan Exploration highlighted the many benefits of
this project when it announced its proposal: “deepwater access for large LNG tankers and is in
close proximity to shipping channels”; “will utilize the substantial existing platforms and
infrastructure at the site, which were designed to withstand a 200-year storm event”; “Safety and
security aspects of the facility are enhanced by its remote location”; “to include significant cavern
storage of natural gas using its massive 2-mile diameter salt dome…offers excellent opportunities
to achieve added value for LNG imports and provides security of supply and peaking capabilities
for downstream customers.” However, MainPass ran into the same trouble as the other open-rack
terminals in the gulf (as highlighted in the cases above). However, instead of just pushing through
with its plans or withdrawing it, MainPass was one of the few terminals that actually made a
design change midway through the regulatory process (I incorporated this fact specifically for
MainPass while calibrating the variable “Project design advantages”).
Neptune (Neptune offshore LNG delivery system): This project proposed by SUEZ Energy
North America (SENA) was proposed as an offshore complement to its existing operational
onshore LNG terminal at Everett (near Boston, Massachusetts). This relationship was a huge
selling point for Neptune and not just because it was sponsored by the firm that had the only
terminal with continuous operations of LNG imports in the U.S. for nearly four decades. The
other advantage was that SENA could temporarily shut down the Everett facility anytime it
wanted by switching over to Neptune. This was a distinct possibility because after 9/11, the coast
guard did shut access to LNG vessels, fearing that terrorists might attempt to blow them close to
Boston. Neptune had also decided to use closed-loop vaporization system unlike the controversial
open-rack used by offshore terminals in the Gulf of Mexico. Neptune’s logic was thus: “the water
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is colder in New England than in the Gulf of Mexico. We wouldn’t get the same efficiency if we
used sea water vaporization in the same capacity at the end of the day.”… “The other reason is
the environmental issues in New England on emissions [are too restrictive]. The [closed loop
system] keeps everything internal to the vessel and we don’t use steam turbines.” However, the
community contestation against Neptune had a specific element that was different from other
offshore terminals. It was located very close to the feeding ground of North Atlantic right whale,
a highly endangered marine mammal. As Mason Weinrich, executive director and chief scientist
at the Whale Center of New England in Gloucester, explained, “Over time, if a whale is
approached and left, again and again, it’s receiving lots of exposure to close-proximity noise that
may impact an animal’s ability to hear. It’s sort of like going to a loud rock concert again and
again.” Julie Vitek, SENA spokesperson, countered, “Noise is an issue we take seriously and the
Neptune project is being designed to minimize it. For example, installation is planned for the
summer when the North Atlantic right whale—an endangered species—is less prevalent in the
region. Project’s pipeline route avoids rocky areas, allowing for plowing of the sea floor rather
than blasting during construction. When the Neptune facility begins operation, the shuttle and
regasification vessels that serve it would travel a route that avoids transit within the Stellwagen
Bank National Marine Sanctuary. Also, when leaving or returning to the shipping lanes into
Boston Harbor, the [ships] will transit at half speed.”
NortheastGateway (Northeast Gateway Deepwater LNG Port): This project was Excelerate
Energy’s second LNG terminal after GulfGateway (described above) and proposed to use the
same Energy Bridge technology. It was expected to connect with Duke Energy’s HubLine system
that was laid on the ocean floor. Russell Sherman, a Gloucester fisherman, described HubLine
thus: “The existing gas pipeline, finished last year, was hit with construction problems and
mishaps. In particular, weather delays meant portions of the pipe lay unburied on the ocean floor
during the annual lobster migration season. We don’t know about the habitat destruction from the
pipe, what it all means.” They expected connectors from NortheastGateway to HubLine and the
terminal itself to also cause similar problems. They also expected it to disturb a 50-year-old toxic
waste dump that can affect the surrounding marine life. As Gloucester Mayor John Bell put it,
“We don’t see why we have to sacrifice a 400-year-old fishing industry for the short-term energy
needs of New England.” Doug Pizzi, a spokesman for Excelerate, was optimistically stating,
“We’ve met with these groups as often as they’ve wanted to and still try to keep an open dialogue
with them, in an attempt to make sure that we minimize the impact on what is obviously a very
important cultural and economic asset.” As the community contestation intensified and no
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resolution was being reached, Rob Bryngelson, Excelerate’s chief operating officer, commented
that they have “been largely rebuffed, especially by fishermen, in repeated attempts to meet. We
have met with everyone who would meet with us and listened to everyone’s concerns.”
NortheastGateway also announced a $6.3 million mitigation package to be handled through an
NGO for helping impacted fishermen. It was also going to deploy two marine mammal acoustic
detection systems at a cost of $16 million to protect the Gerry E. Studds Stellwagen Bank
National Marine Sanctuary.
OceanWay (OceanWay LNG): OceanWay was started by Woodside, Australia’s largest
independent O&G firm, after it exited the ClearWater project. However, it faced the same kind of
opposition that ClearWater did but not at the same level of intensity. The City of Malibu passed a
resolution officially opposing the terminal. Steve Larson, Woodside Natural Gas President and
former executive director of the California Public Utilities Commission, continued to emphasize
the positives: “OceanWay will: Protect the environment by meeting all federal and state air and
water quality standards. Preserve ocean views because OceanWay will not require the
construction of any onshore storage facilities or permanent offshore surface structures. Commit to
community safety by locating the project 28 miles offshore, far removed from population centers
and existing shipping lanes. Use proven technology, relying primarily on ocean air for
regasification and a buoy system similar to one that performed reliably and safely during
Hurricane Katrina. Provide a secure and reliable energy source for California, capable of
supplying 15 percent of California’s annual natural gas demand and adding valuable peak supply
during events like heat waves. Create jobs by committing to US staffing and flagging of the
regasification ships.” OceanWay decided to cut the size and scope of its project but could never
submit a redesigned version even to reach a DEIS stage before it was withdrawn.
OregonLNG (Oregon LNG): This project was essentially a rejuvenation of the Skipanon LNG
project that didn’t enter the regulatory cycle because of Calpine’s financial troubles. So former
Calpine executives, Peter Hansen and Mohammed Alrai, took over from where the earlier project
had left, with the help of Leucadia National Corp., which created a subsidiary called LNG
Development Co. in order to transfer Calpine’s 94-acre lease with the Port of Astoria that
Leucadia had obtained during Calpine’s bankruptcy. Hansen highlighted some of the competitive
advantages over projects proposed upstream along the Columbia River: “We don’t need to bring
the tankers under the bridge, past Astoria and 30 miles up the river. We’re located exactly where
a facility like this should be located—at the mouth of the river. The need for other LNG projects
to take their tankers past downtown Astoria is the ‘800-pound gorilla in the room’”…
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“[OregonLNG] also has the proper zoning to build a facility at the Skipanon site, unlike the
Bradwood Landing project, which is located 20 miles east of Astoria on the Columbia River.”
When Hansen conducted a site-tour of the location for local residents, Lori Durheim who had
fought against the original Calpine proposal gave Hansen a taste of things to come by saying,
“We’re going to have a good fight again.” Fear of intentional attacks on the terminal or accidental
leaks drove much of the intense and sustained community contestation. Residents also feared that
the local hospitals and fire departments were ill-equipped to face the eventualities. As one
resident put it, “As long as these out-of-state energy speculators know that their permitting
process will proceed smoothly right up to the moment of obtaining the building permit, there is
no motivation to negotiate with the local fire, police and sheriff departments concerning who pays
for what.” In spite of the community contestation, Oregon LNG remained active until the end of
my data collection period even though there were many local obstacles from residents as well as
Clatsop County commission, which was trying to prevent the access pipeline from going through.
PearlCrossing (Pearl Crossing LNG): This project was an ExxonMobile offshore terminal that
faced similar opposition to the other terminals using open-loop technology in Gulf of Mexico
region. Exxon spokesman Bob Davis response was, “In the design of our project, we’ve
introduced a number of factors to drastically reduce the impact to fish and other marine life such
as crabs and shrimps. In our view, the impact would be minimal.”… “Their [detractors]
interpretation and the mathematics they are applying to the number are extremely exaggerated.
They’ve taken the worst-case scenario and are not including the best side.” … “There are a lot of
misperceptions and they carry on.” Exxon withdrew the proposal as its other onshore proposals
(GoldenPass and VistaDelSol) advanced in the regulatory process.
Port Ambrose (Port Ambrose LNG): This project was a second attempt at getting an LNG
terminal through the regulatory process by Liberty Natural Gas and its CEO Roger Whelan after
the failed Liberty project (see above). Since the project entered the regulatory process in
September of 2012, it had not made much progress. However, the local anti-fracking groups were
concerned that the project was guised as an import terminal but was intended to be converted to
an export facility at a later date. An export terminal would mean that fracking activities would
pick up in the nearby areas as there was now an outlet for exporting the natural gas extracted
through the fracking process.
Port Arthur (Port Arthur LNG): Sempra Energy proposed this terminal on a parcel of land it had
owned since 1985 and followed its success with Cameron LNG (the first terminal approved by
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the FERC in the new millennium). Darcel Hulse, president of Sempra Energy LNG, highlighted
the many benefits of the project: “Our Port Arthur LNG project is ideally situated to meet the
needs of those suppliers, and it has positive support from the local community”… “the project
would employ 1,000 or more construction workers at its peak with an average of 600 throughout
the project’s development stage. When the terminal is operational, it would employ 60 to 70
people full-time.” The project faced no community contestation.
PortDolphin (Port Dolphin Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port): This offshore terminal was
proposed by Hoegh LNG, which had decades of experience building floating storage and
regasification units (FSRUs), a combination of both LNG carriers and floating terminals.
Community contestation was aimed more at the connecting pipelines than the actual terminal
itself because the pipeline routes were originally supposed to cross two marine aquatic reserves
and would also affect the beach nourishment system that brought the white sands to the local
beaches. PortDolphin publicly apologized to the local county officials for not consulting and
“miscommunication.” Port Dolphin spokesman, Harry Costello, said, “We want to be a good
neighbor. We will do a better job in communicating.” They also revised the undersea pipeline
route to address all the concerns.
PortPelican (Port Pelican LNG): ChevronTexaco’s PortPelican was the first offshore terminal
proposed in the U.S. It was able to get through the permitting process without any community
contestation because the whole controversy of open-loop vaporization system hadn’t yet emerged
at that time.
QuoddyBay (Quoddy Bay LNG terminal): It was the first of the three LNG terminal proposals in
Washington County, Maine. It faced a very intense and sustained community contestation. At one
point, its private promoter, Brian Smith, commented during an open house: “So far today, I’ve
been told to shut up and called a liar. It’s tough to sit here.” QuoddyBay couldn’t secure a lease
for the land where it was planning its terminal and became only one of three LNG terminals and
one of two offshore terminals to be explicitly disapproved.
SabinePass (Sabine Pass LNG): This was another of Cheniere’s terminals in Texas. Announcing
this proposal, Charles Reimer, president and CEO of Cheniere, said, “All the work we have done
continues to support our conclusion that Texas is well situated to develop LNG receiving
terminals because of its extensive infrastructure for transportation and the large industrial demand
in the state.” SabinePass did not face any community contestation.
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SafeHarbor (Safe Harbor LNG): SafeHarbor was proposed by a private firm Atlantic Sea Island
Group. Chairman Howard Bovers commented right after its launch that, “I don’t mind
environmental opposition to projects at all. But unfortunately, what we often have today is what I
would consider to be mindless environmental opposition, in which people are against anything
and everything. I thought we might be able to eliminate that by having a process offshore.” The
firm also indicated that a “50-acre island would be created in 70-foot-deep water, using dredged
sand and rock and would be barely visible from the Long Beach boardwalk.” However, a local
activist, Adrienne Esposito, described this man-made island thus: “the more we learn, the more it
sounds like the island of Dr. Moreau.” While SafeHarbor sought to project itself as an alternative
for the highly contested Broadwater terminal and did manage to convince some of Broadwater’s
opponents, it could not convince everyone and faced moderate amounts of community
contestation. After more than four years of hard work and spending more than $10 million,
SafeHarbor was withdrawn without even reaching the DEIS stage.
SES (Sound Energy Solutions): SES was proposed by the energy division of the Japanese
conglomerate, Mitsubishi, and at a later stage (after the DEIS) ConocoPhillips became involved.
SES started its proposal work by actively courting local residents, NGOs, and officials. Thomas
E. Giles, SES senior managing director, explained in one such meeting in 2002: “This whole
industry was developed around the threat of something happening. These facilities are not very
good terrorist targets. You won’t get much bang for your buck, if you’re trying to wreak havoc.
LNG does not explode and in its liquefied form, it burns slowly—yet cleanly—with a low flame.
The liquefied gas is stored at low pressure, unlike such fuels as liquid propane. There are not
many things that could penetrate one of these tanks.” However, this explanation still didn’t
prevent community contestation to such an extent that California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) became involved. The project became an arena for the jurisdictional battle between the
CPUC and the FERC for the right to determine the approval of the project. SES took up the
FERC side and directly attacked the CPUC. After a legal battle between the FERC and the
CPUC, the FERC authority was firmly established. Sustained community contestation put an
enormous amount of pressure on the Harbor Commission for the Long Beach port that was
supposed to lease land meant for the project. The Harbor Commission kept delaying its own
assessments and studies in spite of legal challenges. The FERC suspended the process because of
inactivity and SES finally had to withdraw the application.
Sparrows (Sparrows Point LNG): This project was proposed by AES Corp., one of the largest
power companies in the U.S., at a former shipyard in Baltimore County. Sparrows faced sustained
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and intense community contestation because of multiple issues, including the dredging of the
shipping channel, “the potential effects of a leak, about terrorist attacks on the tankers or terminal,
about dwindling property values and about interference to recreational boating and fishing from
the tankers.” While the residents felt it was too close to a populated area, Sparrows insisted that,
“by industry standards, the Sparrows Point site is considered ‘remote.’” County officials sought
to disrupt the project by throwing multiple hurdles, including changes in zoning laws, which AES
fought in court. Kent Morton, project director for AES, also publicly attacked the county council
by stating: “the county has misinterpreted the project at a basic level. They just refuse to
acknowledge that this project is bringing any environmental benefits.”
VistadelSol (Vista del Sol LNG terminal): VistadelSol was launched by ExxonMobil right after
its launch of GoldenPass proposal. In this case as well, Texas Governor Rick Perry was present at
the announcement ceremony and reiterated: “Texas and the United States need secure supplies of
natural gas to attract industries, assure development and to continue the strong economic growth
we're experiencing in our state and throughout the nation. This project will bring jobs and other
economic benefits to San Patricio County and the greater Corpus Christi area, and will provide
long-term supplies of natural gas for our industries, power plants, and homes. We support
ExxonMobil’s efforts to bring another important LNG project to Texas.” The project did not face
any community contestation.
Weavers (Weaver’s Cove LNG): Weaver’s was initial proposed by Poten and Partners, an energy
consulting firm, and was later joined by Amerada Hess, one of the largest O&G companies in the
U.S. From the beginning, the project was headed by Gordon Shearer, who became the CEO of
Hess LNG after Amerada Hess got involved. Shearer had made his career in LNG and was in
charge of the LNG facility at Everett, which was the only continuously running import terminal in
the U.S. since 1970s. However, Shearer met his match in the mayor of the city of Fall River,
Edward M. Lambert Jr., who built a coalition of opposition from local residents, activists, city
officials, and federal politicians, including Senator John Kerry. Weaver’s faced intense and
sustained contestation. In spite of the high levels of community opposition, the FERC approved
the project. Excerpts from the FERC approval notice are shown below
In performing this review, we have taken a number of extraordinary steps
to assure detailed consideration of safety and security issues regarding both
the proposed LNG import terminal and related LNG vessel operations.
Recognizing the public concern, the U.S. Coast Guard in coordination with
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the Commission initiated a series of workshops with local law enforcement
agencies and port stakeholders to develop the procedures and resources
required to manage the safety and security of LNG vessels while moving
through Narragansett Bay and unloading LNG at the dock. An initial vessel
transit security plan is summarized in the final environmental impact
statement (FEIS). This process was the most extensive effort ever
performed prior to Commission authorization of an LNG import project,
and will serve as a blueprint for evaluating future proposals.
In response to comments from local agencies about the security and
emergency management cost that could be imposed on state and local
agencies, we are adopting the FEIS’ recommendation that Weaver’s Cove
be required to prepare a comprehensive plan identifying the mechanisms
for funding all project-specific security and emergency management costs
incurred by state and local agencies. We are also requiring Weaver’s Cove
to file an initial emergency response plan and identify emergency
evacuation routes prior to construction, to develop emergency response
plans with local officials throughout the construction period, and to report
progress at 6-month intervals as recommended in the FEIS. We are also
requiring additional safety measures by requiring Weaver’s Cove to
incorporate into the final design of the terminal improved features for
cryogenic valves, instrumentation, equipment isolation, hazard detection
and control systems.
With these conditions and others discussed herein, we find that the
proposed new LNG terminal will promote the public interest by increasing
the availability of natural gas supplies in the New England market and that
the Mill River laterals are required by the public convenience and necessity
to connect the proposed LNG facilities to the interstate pipeline system.
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Appendix D: Coding of Firm’s Rhetorical Responses
A detailed protocol was prepared for manual coding of the rhetoric-related causal conditions. The
coding protocol was updated multiple times during the initial iterations and it was applied
repeatedly to a set of claim segments until the protocol was largely stabilized. Any further
updating that occurred to the protocol was restricted to particular word markers that could
potentially indicate which of the three rhetorical tactics was used. After the completion of coding,
these markers were rechecked for false negatives — segments that might not have been coded for
a particular type but should have been. The final coding protocol with instructions was given to a
graduate research assistant, who coded 100 randomly selected claim segments to generate an
inter-coder reliability rating. Initial interrater reliability was only satisfactory, with a Cohen’s
kappa of 0.76. After discussions with the coder, I realized that many of the differences occurred
because of lack of deep knowledge of context. For instance, in one case the coder thought the
firm was referring to a city as a stakeholder but the actual reference was to a rival proposal in
another city. The revised Cohen’s kappa after correcting for only those instances involving
knowledge of the context was 0.85, a very satisfactory level.

Summary of Instructions
Rhetorical Categories
You will be coding three main categories of rhetoric. Positive claims is a type of self-promotional
rhetoric used by firms to draw attention towards the positives of the firm and the LNG terminal.
Negative topical claims are used to counter issues raised by stakeholders. The broad purpose of
these claims is one or both of the following – a) question the validity of the issue raised by the
stakeholder; and b) provide an alternative take on the issue. Negative Personal claims are directly
aimed at the stakeholder. The object of these claims is not to undermine the issue but to directly
undermine the stakeholder.
Coding strategy
1. Please code the segments in order, from top to bottom and do not sort the table.
2. Read the segment of the text carefully and identify who is representing the firm, what is
the topic/issue/theme, and who is the stakeholder (if present).
3. Code each segment using the following guidance.
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Coding guidelines
1. Positive claims will clearly bring out positive attributes of the firm, the particular
proposed project, or LNG in general. It can also be a combination of the three. Typical
themes used by the firm for highlighting the positives are:
a. Economic and industrial benefits: Jobs, tax revenues, higher supply of natural
gas, alternative supply to traditional sources, and lower natural gas prices.
b. Environmental: Touting the safety and reliability of the terminal. Indicating the
environmental benefits of natural gas as a cleaner burning fuel with lesser
emissions when compared with traditional fossil fuels.
c. Geographic: Locational advantages of a particular terminal in terms of access to
natural gas pipeline infrastructure, re-use of a brownfield site (previous industrial
use), and distance from populated area.
d. Technological/Technical Benefits: These would typical be used in conjunction
with the other positive attributes. So the firm will not just share the factual
information about the tech used but also the benefits from that tech.
Examples of Positive Claims:
Themes

Example

Economic and industrial benefits

Henry pointed out that t”he LNG plant would be a
financial boon to the town, whose annual budget is
$200,000”. “The Freeport LNG terminal, if it becomes
operational, would provide the town with fees of more
than five times that amount”, Henry said.

Environmental

“Safe Harbor Energy is designed with security, safety
and environmental features a priority, including
meeting a 200-year storm design standard, selfsufficient systems for water supply, wastewater
management, energy, fire and safety, and using ‘best
available technology’ consistent with the requirements
of the Deepwater Port Act.”

Geographic

“The fact that it happens to be only 1.2 miles from a
[natural gas] hub line, has deepwater access, would
only need a 300-foot jetty and very little dredging,
made us think was a very neat site that we needed to
bring to the attention of state officials,” he added.

Technological/Technical
Benefits

Rob Bryngelson, Excelerate vice president, said “a
version of the company’s ‘Energy Bridge’ technology
has been used safely for years in the North Sea to
unload petroleum from oil tankers”. “The Excelerate
mooring systems can withstand severe storms, and
unloading operations can be shut down within 15
minutes in an emergency”, Bryngelson said.
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2. Negative personal claims will have a clear target for the rhetoric, a particular
stakeholder. It will be typical of the form X is Y, where X is a stakeholder and Y is
something negative about the stakeholder. So the grammatical structure will typically
have stakeholder as the subject and something negative about the stakeholder as the
object of a sentence. In some instances these two aspects may be split between sentences
but you will have a pronoun linking the two. The following sub-types of negative
personal claims can be recognized:
a. Discredit
i. Accused of wrongdoing or not playing by rules
ii. Attack motive or stance
iii. Accused of misinformation, misrepresentation or distorting facts
iv. Opponent is considered ignorant
v. Question competence or ability
vi. Accused of not carrying out their obligation, role or duty
vii. Undermine position, authority or status
b. Dismiss
i. Marginalize opponents; downplay their importance; or circumvent them
in the process
ii. Accused of behaving inconsistently with their status, identity or authority
iii. Dismiss, trivialize or belittle them
Examples of Negative Personal Claims:
Types of disapproval

Example

Attack motive or stance

“Organizations critical of the approval of the Gulf Landing
LNG terminal apparently fail to recognize the strict and
enforceable conditions of environmental performance
imposed to protect marine life,” the statement said.

Opponent is considered
ignorant

BHP’s Chip Goodyear says “environmentalists are living in
‘dreamland’ if they think conservation will meet the state’s
growing energy needs”. “You can say that, but it doesn’t
really work,” he says.

Marginalize opponents;
downplay their importance;
or circumvent them in the
process

Accuse opponents of
behaving inconsistently
with their status, identity,
or authority

“Fishing Families for Harpswell represents a very small
group of fishermen,” Micciche said Friday. “The majority of
fishermen I’ve spoken to are in favor of this project.”

“We’re disappointed that this would be something being
sponsored by the selectmen. The film that selectmen plan to
show about the dangers of liquefied natural gas terminals is
a scaremongering-type film that’s not based in reality,” said
a top official for the company that wants to build such a
project near Hull. “I don’t think it’s based in science or
anything else,” said Aaron Samson, the managing director of
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Types of disapproval

Example
LNG projects for energy company AES Corp.

3. Negative topical claims are difficult to recognize if the issues are implicit because of the
context. In instances where the stakeholder issue and the alternative suggested by the firm
is clear, it is easier to recognize that segment as a negative topical claim. There are some
marker words and phrases that are helpful in recognizing that the firm’s representative is
trying to counter an issue.
a. A negation or polarity switch: not true; don’t think; don’t agree; don’t believe;
don’t see; does not/doesn’t; no reason
b. Contrasting conjunctions: But; although; though; however; whereas; unless; if
only; even if; even though; rather than; while; contrary. These conjunctions need
to contrast the implicit/explicit stakeholder issue with what the firm is
forwarding.
c. Certain marker words are not in the actual statement of the firm rep but in the
way the media report qualifies the statement. Examples: Denied; disagreed;
countered; questioned; rejected; downplayed; dismissed; insists; argued; retorted;
pointed; unfazed; despite; puzzled; refuted, etc. Some of these can also be within
the statement. For instance, take the word ‘question’ and its derivatives. The
media can characterize it as ‘Firm rep questioned the validity of the issue’ or the
firm rep may be quoted as saying ‘We question the validity of the issue.’
d. Certain marker words are completely dismissive of the issue, in a similar vein as
the ‘Dismiss’ sub-category for Negative Personal claims above (point 3b).
Typical words used: inaccurate; incorrect; misstated; misrepresented; irrelevant;
false. etc. Be careful to distinguish what the subject is. Consider the general
structure — X is incorrect. If X is an issue then it is a negative topical claim but
if X is a person then it is negative personal claim.
e. Some words project the firm’s belief or opinion. Look for marker words/phrases
such as: In our opinion; we believe.
Examples of Negative Topical Claims:
Types of identifying
markers

Examples (emphasis added to point the markers)

A negation or polarity
switch

“We don’t agree that it is industrialization, nor is there
any indication that having this facility will lead to having
other such facilities in this region,” he said.

Contrasting conjunctions

“Contrary to many of the claims made in public meetings
and correspondence, our studies indicate that the off-shore
dredging we have proposed will not harm the health of the
Chesapeake Bay in either the long or short term. In effect,
AES is proposing to clean up an existing environmental
condition—one that we did not cause—without the need for
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government funding.”
Media report descriptive

Bradwood Landing spokesman Chuck Deister disagreed
with the group’s premise, saying “now is the time to
introduce LNG to the region, because renewable energy
sources are gaining traction but can’t yet supply all of
society’s needs”.

Dismissive

Hritcko said “some of the ‘facts’ Blumenthal and Johnson
recited were ‘absolutely false,’ including Blumenthal’s
contention that every town along the coast would have to
spend money for new boats so fire departments could be
ready for emergencies”.
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Appendix E: Inductive categorization of negative personal claim sub-types
Since negative personal claims is a relatively novel concept, I employed an inductive
method to categorize the sub-types. Once I recognized the rhetorical segment as containing a
negative personal claim, using the coding protocol detailed above, I also recorded the first order
categories for the type of negative personal claim. Each instance of the rhetoric segment was
coded in a matrix form (rows for the rhetoric segment and columns for the first order type). The
screenshot below illustrates how data was coded.

Figure 10: Illustration of first order coding of negative personal claims

I then used the hierarchical cluster analysis provided by SPSS to derive linkages between
the first order categories and club them into second order categories. The Dendrogram plot was
used to identify linkages between disapproval types. The second order categories are based on
proximity scores (x-axis), which is an indicator of an underlying latent dimension that is driving
these first order categories to occur together in a rhetorical segment. I further categorized the
second order negative personal claim by potential motivations of the firm to employ them. This
resulted in the following categorization of the sub-types
a. Discredit
i. Intentions Targeted
1. Accused of wrongdoing or not playing by rules
2. Attack motive or stance
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3. Accused of misinformation, misrepresentation or distorting facts
ii. Capability/ability target
1. Opponent is considered ignorant
2. Question competence or ability
3. Accused of not carrying out their obligation, role or duty
iii. Undermine
1. Undermine position, authority or status
b. Dismiss
i.
Marginalize
2. Marginalize opponents; downplay their importance; or
circumvent them in the process
ii.
Inconsistency
3. Accused of behaving inconsistently with their status, identity or
authority
iii.
Trivialize
4. Dismiss, trivialize or belittle them
This categorization enabled me to reassess the coding of negative personal claims in order to
improve the construct validity.
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Appendix F: Coding of Community Contestation
I measure contestation by aggregating unique incidents as reported by the media. An incident
reported by the media was identified as a contestation event if they it three criteria: reflected a
negative social evaluation of the firm or its proposal, provided a clearly identifiable date for the
incident, and identified a specific community member (e.g., a resident or an elected official
residing in the same county or a local NGO). Using the associated rhetoric of the stakeholders
and the media characterization, I identified the following types of contestation events: Protest
Rally; Petition/Campaign (letter writing, membership, or signature campaign); Community
Meetings; Stakeholder’s Regulatory Actions (meeting federal officials, formal intervenor status);
Official Forum (Regulator- or Company-sponsored forum); Radio/TV/Online/Ad Campaign;
Legal; Release of Report or Study sponsored by stakeholders; Legislative/Executive/Political
action (Legislature Proceedings, Task Force, Resolution, Vote, Referendum, Bill, Hearings);
Press Conference (as a collective); and Press Statement (Press Release, Individual Interviews).
Examples of Contestation Events:
Types of events

Media reporting of the incident

Protest Rally

“The Mothers March Against LNG (liquefied natural gas), to
protest the possible arrival of LNG terminals on the Columbia
River, took place Sunday afternoon in a heavy downpour, which
didn't dampen the enthusiasm of the participants one bit. A large
crowd of children and adults carrying NO LNG placards passed
out NO LNG fliers as they marched from the Blue Scorcher Cafe
to the Bradwood Landing office on the corner Ninth and
Commercial streets to issue a proclamation and to put up an
‘eviction’ notice on the door.”

Official Forum

“Dundalk-area residents - less than pleased by a global power
company's plan to build a liquefied natural gas plant at Sparrows
Point - were openly hostile last night during an open house
meeting with company officials. ‘This thing is more dangerous
than you all are painting,’ Dundalk resident Jerome Hancock said
of the terminal proposed for a former shipyard site.”

Petition/Campaign

“Notice of the opposition group's formation was distributed
through e-mail by the staff of the Hull Life-saving Museum. Lory
Newmyer, the museum's executive director, said Save Outer
Brewster consists of museum staff members but is not technically
affiliated with the institution. Museum officials said yesterday that
the response to the petition has been positive. Newmyer said
several hundred have signed it since it began circulating a week
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ago.”
Legislative/Executiv
e/Political

“Lauderdale-by-the-Sea Mayor Roseann Minnet said she will
submit a resolution opposing the gas plant at the town's May 27
commission meeting, saying, ‘if there's an accident, the entire
town could be obliterated.’”

Radio/TV/Online/A
d Campaign

“Save The Bay is poised to begin a high-profile campaign to rally
Rhode Islanders against a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal
proposed for Mount Hope Bay. The $12,000-effort will feature
advertisements on radio, in Newport and Jamestown newspapers
and on billboards on Routes 195 and 24.”

Less than 20% of the events were press conferences or statements on their own but in most
instances the press conferences and statements occurred in conjunction with another event. I
decided to aggregate the contestation events across multiple categories for the following reasons:
A. These incidents represent issues for firms to the extent that the press reports them, and
measuring how much media coverage each incident receives provides a way to make
them comparable.
B. Media reports are valid indicators in this context because the facility is not yet built; it is
only proposed. So protests and boycotts will not cause any operational disruption since
the proposal hasn’t reached the operational stage. For the purpose of this study, it is the
rhetoric associated with the protest that becomes important.
C. Previous research has also shown that media reporting is the crucial factor even in cases
where the firm’s ongoing operations are targeted. For instance, King (2008:395)
considers boycott events and finds that “corporate targets of boycotts were more likely to
concede when the boycott received a great deal of media attention”.
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